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ABSTRACT  
Jennifer Ann Hall 
INTERACTIVE ART AND THE ACTION OF 
BEHAVIORAL AESTHETICS IN EMBODIED PHILOSOPHY 
 
A new language to discuss and critique interactive artwork is emerging 
from the intersections of cybernetics, neuroscience, and embodied philosophy. 
This language includes both biological materialism and posthuman developments 
as part of an evolutionary trend in aesthetics. Interactive aesthetics has emerged 
from the historical discourse of a phenomenally situated subject. Adding a 
neuroscientific lens to our understanding of embodiment brings into further focus 
some of the detailed ways in which we deploy choices in our actions. This project 
challenges the traditional notion of neuroaesthetics as a reductionist methodology. 
As an alternative, neuroscientific findings can provide ways in which to 
understand the brain as a series of patterns of activity that provide introspection 
for full-body actions within the larger world. Using the frame of behavioral 
aesthetics, this project offers a critique that argues interactivity as a common 
language for the post-biological object to have voice approximate to that of the 
biological subject. This multidisciplinary investigation explores the ways in which 
interactive artworks are reinventing a place in contemporary practice that focuses 
our attention on how experience creates aesthetic purpose.  
 vii 
 
Embodied aesthetics deploys the phenomenological affirmation that we 
are always present in thought and perception. We load cognitive work onto the 
environment and the environment offers us fresh stimuli. The environment is very 
much a part of a cognitive system and is able to impact the configuration of our 
cognitive function, often in unpredictable ways. Cognition is body-based and 
works in a distributed way across all systems to employ—to urge from the 
environment—an empathetic participation. A study of interactive artworks brings 
attention to this act of creative inhabitance. 
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Introduction to Interactivity 
 
Interactive art requires a new aesthetic critique. As an approach situated in 
the intersections of cybernetics, neuroscience, and embodied philosophy, this 
dissertation explores the inherent qualities of interactive art that necessitate the 
development of a new interdisciplinary framework for its understanding. In that 
sense, it studies the disciplines and philosophies that might underpin such a 
framework but also appropriate for these disciplines in aesthetic discourse. 
Together, the viewer and the object have risen to a new interactive art 
status that demands a deep range of conceptual and social interrelationships. This 
contemporary interactive aesthetic has emerged from the historical position of a 
phenomenally situated art subject and into a new art. Adding a neuroscientific 
lens to our understanding of embodiment brings into further focus some of the 
detailed ways in which we deploy choices in our actions. Most importantly, this 
contemporary art challenges the traditional notion of neuroaesthetics as a 
reductionist methodology, which is useful for understanding what is happening in 
the aesthetic body system. As an alternative, neuroscientific findings can provide 
ways in which we can understand the brain and body as a series of patterns of 
activity that provide introspection for full-body actions within the larger world. In 
this way, the brain can show us patterns that connect thought to action and this 
action is a key way to better understand our own functionality and aesthetic voice. 
Using the frame of behavioral aesthetics, this project also critiques interactivity as 
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a common language to review both the theory and practice of human to object 
communication, and that intends to give the post-biological subject and the 
biological subject equal voice in the aesthetic discussion. This multidisciplinary 
investigation explores ways in which interactive artworks are reinventing our 
aesthetic place and purpose.  
Embodied aesthetics deploys the phenomenological affirmation that we 
are always present in thought and perception. We load cognitive work onto the 
environment and the environment offers us fresh stimuli. The environment is 
integral to our cognitive system and it is able to impact the configuration of our 
cognitive function, often in unpredictable ways. Cognition is body-based and 
distributes itself across all systems to employ—to urge from the environment—
participation. A study of interactive artworks brings attention to this act of 
creative inhabitance. 
This new aesthetic critique looks closely at the language historically used 
to describe art, which stresses the primacy of sense perception and of sensible 
experience. To investigate interactivity as it relates to art involves an examination 
of both the contextual character of contemporary aesthetics and the theory of 
embodied action. It also seeks to include an analytical understanding of the 
biological system through material structure and the situational functionality of 
action. And finally it considers the dynamic forms of interactivity that are key to 
the development of a new interactive language for art. 
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Interactive aesthetic events have two shared behaviors that necessarily 
shift the traditional focus of aesthetic critique: one is the event, and the other is 
cause. The first point is that philosophical intersubjectivity requires the 
philosophical activation of a full-body experience. A subject’s interior functions 
are inextricably tied to the phenomenological experiences of the whole subject. 
Each interactive event produces interdependent events that reverberate to affect 
the subject—and beyond. Everything that arises from an event stems from 
multiple causes and conditions. Nothing exists as an isolated, independent event, 
including the contemporary object. This understanding forms the aesthetic space 
to analyze the participant and the object, the personal and the shared. In providing 
a deeper look at these events and conditions, the kinds of phenomena that emerge 
can be coded by the behaviors of the events in which specific situations emerge. 
The second behavior of interactivity is that there will always be causal events 
generated by every embodied experience. Events are dynamic and can run very 
far from the events that set them off. This does not mean they are disengaged 
from their sources. On the contrary: subjects are not only embodied, but are 
inseparable from the environment they interact with; each event, therefore, is an 
interacting event, bound by intentionality and activation. Intersubjectivity is a way 
that the subject keeps track of the nuances of experience and works to make them 
perceivably whole. Framed in contemporary aesthetics, intersubjectivity can be 
used as an intermediate perspective of the world, providing a view between 
personal experiences and communal judgments.  
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Two important additional points emerge from creating behaviors of 
interactivity. One is that an expansion of existing notions of intersubjectivity is 
not just a personal understanding of the world. The individual is a permeable 
structure and the flow that is encountered to and from the environment is called 
experience. Intersubjectivity is the way in which emotions are bound to 
experiences and then are shared. The second critical understanding is that 
individuals are very creative in that they find ways to maximize the stimulation 
this flow affords, by actively seeking diverse and challenging experiences. This 
philosophical activation of a full-body event is a complex system of other events 
that deploys a variety of aesthetic behaviors within the art experience. Depending 
upon the intentionality of those behaviors, they may render further experiences far 
more profound than the sum of the parts involved. Interactive art makes these 
connections more apparent. 
Interactive art is a field within contemporary aesthetics that is the 
intersection of both scientific and aesthetic fields. Like phenomenology— 
frequently the source of current embodied theory— interactive art brings together 
many distinct fields through the phenomenological issues of intentionality, 
consciousness, and bodily experience. The move in western art towards the 
performative provides fertile ground for interdisciplinary experimentation and 
contributes to an ongoing discourse fundamental to philosophy: how does the 
body raise consciousness and how are we are propelled towards opportunity 
through that same vessel?  
Behavioral aesthetics help describe what might arise in the process of 
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interactive aesthetic engagement. The body is so natural to us that, as long as it 
functions normally, we tend to neglect its existence. We experience the things we 
see directly, as if we were touching them with our very thoughts. Yet, perception 
happens within—not through—the body. The body operates on a sub-personal 
level independent of conscious awareness, actively modulating perception to 
determine which information will be picked up, when, and how. This process has 
two outstanding features. One is that perception is formulated though 
intermingling with the larger world. The other is that the body must be an active 
participant in this world in order for perception to arise. The two features are so 
obvious that they are taken for granted as we move about every day.  
An instance of this interactive claim is the reinvention of our 
understanding of the brain’s relationship to the embodied system. The brain is 
itself an intersection of possibilities that is activated by the things with which it 
comes into contact. The more we look to the brain to understand how it functions, 
the more we need to step back and see it in the larger situation of engagement in 
which it is interacting. One way to dislodge the traditional dichotomy between 
thought and action and to challenge the distinctions constructed between 
interiority and exteriority of action is to regard the brain as a biological spread of 
intentionality in aesthetics that includes more than a binary model. In traditional 
philosophical aesthetics, the aesthetic experience requires a specific attitude and a 
characteristic work of imagination. Cognitive sciences offer an alternative 
narrative, which is useful in explaining aesthetics in naturalistic terms. When we 
consider how experiences rise, we must also consider issues such as time, space, 
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and actions within these contexts. This complex arena creates a new domain of 
discourse called interactive aesthetics. Studying the brain shows us, in part, how 
imagination is tied to embodied theories and the rise of aesthetic behaviors. 
One aspect of behavioral aesthetics involves identifying organic systems 
that we can associate with aesthetic experience. Autopoiesis is a system of self-
creation that suggests a schema for interaction between subjects and art. 
According to Francisco Varela, credited with creating the term autopoiesis, these 
controls can be identified in both artificial living systems and self-generating 
mechanical forms. While autopoiesis refers to biological systems that self-
reproduce, it also applies to non-biological systems that possess the characteristics 
of self-sustaining processes, usually through the use of internal feedback controls. 
The integration of autopoietic biological and mechanical systems also creates 
phenomenological boundaries—semi-permeable membranes of demarcation 
among objects. When autopoietic systems overlap or blend with one another, they 
create new typologies according to their behavioral characteristics. Both 
transformative and destructive, these independent systems in turn become agents 
to and within other seemingly unrelated systems and can be sourced back to the 
original autopoietic system. Autopoiesis is a new way to conceptualize our 
relationship to everything with which we come in contact. This blending also 
produces a larger, more complex, second-level union of interaction that is how we 
relate to an artwork and how we can critique those aesthetic experiences.  
The frame of interactive art can help human subjects focus attention 
towards their bodies and how their bodies are in constant play with everything the 
  7 
world has to offer. Our senses involve a larger and more dynamic situation that 
accesses time, space, action, and intent. The subject has authority over some of 
these but not much. Engagement, therefore, is part of the process of accepting 
responsibility as a co-creator of experience for the subject as part of the world that 
surrounds the event. It also is part of a system that cannot be controlled. The 
complexity of how these events take place and the meaning they provide in 
aesthetics becomes of particular importance for deploying an enactive approach: 
the more involved and aware subjects can be, the more they can understand their 
possibilities and limits. Awareness in interaction is also fundamental to the 
contemplation of the interiority and exteriority of the self and is how we develop 
expression through the acts of expression. 
A rudimentary principle of interactivity is that it is an exploratory act. It 
serves as a basis supporting existence or determining essential structure and is the 
fundamental mechanism of asking, offering, and receiving in the world. 
Interaction as an expression is what Mikhail Bakhtin proposes to be an embodied 
act of creation. He claims that “what underlies the unity of an answerable 
consciousness is not a principle as a starting point but the fact of an actual 
acknowledgement of one’s own participation as a unity as a being as event. And 
this fact cannot be expressed in theoretical terms but can only be participatively 
experienced.”1 
It is the immediacy of experience that accounts for the uniqueness that 
substantiates the acts themselves. To frame an action as art, therefore, offers a 
way to look at embodied experience different from the everyday. This action, in 
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turn, has the power to shift our own thinking about our choices as active 
participants in the world. To investigate the nature of interactivity is to stress the 
priority of action over doctrine, of experience over fixed principles, and to hold 
that ideas derive meaning from their consequences and truths from their 
verification. To ask “what is the act of interactivity?” is to understand that 
experience is process. Consciousness is always a dynamic set of correlations, and 
not necessarily explanations.   
  9 
Chapter 1: Historical Overview 
 
The Field of Interactive Art 
The new language to discuss and critique interactive art includes both 
biological materialism and posthuman developments as part of an evolutionary 
trend in aesthetics. The contemporary art viewer claims an ever-increasing 
authorship in art and the object has taken on a more complex role as the site of 
aesthetic experience. Together, the viewer and the object have risen to a new 
interactive status that demands a deep range of conceptual, physiological, and 
social interrelationships. This contemporary interactive aesthetic has emerged 
from a historical discourse on how we are phenomenally situated in the world at 
large. Adding a neuroscientific lens to our understanding of embodiment brings 
into focus some of the detailed ways in which we deploy our activities and 
choices. Replacement of many human actions by mechanical devices has 
provided a fresh look at what it is to be human—dissolving distinctions between 
living and non-living subjects by activating the domain of the post-biological. 
Using the frame of behavioral aesthetics, we can better understand that 
humanness is more about our actions in the world than the material properties of 
form alone.  Critiquing interactivity therefore, allows the post-biological to have 
agency along with with that of the biological because the focus becomes what we 
do with all the part together.  This multidisciplinary investigation explores a 
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variety of ways in which interactive artwork is reinventing our aesthetic place and 
purpose.  
Media theorist Ryszard W. Kluszczynski describes this new aesthetic 
framing as an area of participatory activity. He writes: 
An interactive artwork takes on the shape of an event. An artist 
does not make a final, completed piece of art, instead produces an 
area of activity for the receivers, whose interactive actions bring to 
life an artwork-event. Regardless of what shape the final product 
of an artist’s activity takes on, an interactive artwork finds its final 
formation only as a result of participative behavior of the viewers.2 
 
According to Kluszczynski, the embodied aspect of open action—the 
coalescence of an experience rather than a focus on the mimetic potential of the 
object—is an essential element of any interactive endeavor. The focus of an 
interactive event is therefore upon the relationship between the events of the 
interactant and the events of the object. Interactive installations require that the 
interactants make certain physical actions with their bodies, such as the use of 
limbs, eyes, voices, brainwaves, or breath, in order to activate the space of the 
aesthetic exchange. Rising from these events is a new phenomenological 
discourse for embodiment in art that includes a scientific understanding of brain, 
body, and consciousness.  
Cybernetic art involves the use of feedback from the object and through to 
the viewer to create an active loop of the two with some kind of electronic or 
digital technology. Neuroaesthetics studies the relationship between aesthetics 
and brain function. Embodied aesthetics deploys the phenomenological 
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affirmation that we are always present in thought and perception. As we offload 
cognitive work onto the environment we deploy avenues of exploration that are 
inherently creative. Cognition, as a body-based system that exchanges with the 
world, is always full of participatory potential. 
Challenging traditional notions of Western aesthetics, embodied aesthetics 
provides a fresh perspective on what Immanuel Kant described as the “finality of 
form” in his 1790 treatise, Critique of Judgment. We can look to Kant’s study of 
the beautiful and the sublime as part of a larger project to explore the logical mind 
through understanding emotions, feelings, and the patterns that emerge from our 
responses to objects in our environment—as opposed to merely evaluating an 
object’s materiality for aesthetic value. This distinction binds the senses to the 
intellect and is a critical step in the collapse of René Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum. 
Bringing our full selves to the aesthetic object is arguably the start of the 
contemporary moment for art. The subject and the object—where they stand 
separate and where they bind together through action—is one of the essential 
ontological questions of what is beautiful in contemporary art.  
Kant understood the mind as always a priori and judgments of taste that 
are part of the mind and part of the senses as both subjective and universal. These 
aesthetic judgments are subjective because they are responses of personal pleasure 
and do not essentially involve any claims about the properties of the object itself. 
On the other hand, they are universal because they are grounded in logic; they call 
upon intellectual discourse and are what Kant describes as “disinterested” in 
everything but the object’s formal analysis. It is this claim of beauty that permits 
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logical thinking to be part of the aesthetic discourse of the beautiful. It was Kant 
who, perhaps inadvertently, found a world of both logic and beauty that can slide 
between the rational and the emotional with aesthetic judgment bound to both.  
The object for Kant is one of contemplation; this contemplation must 
display a kind of undefined purposefulness, so that it seems to be organized with a 
final purpose in mind, although it is not possible to say what that purpose is. In 
this way, the object must release part of its own authority into the world in a 
search for its own identity. And, in turn, the viewer reciprocates. A work of art 
displays a kind of free play of forms, consistent with the presence of a purpose 
that we are unable to access until we are involved with the act of contemplation. 
That inaccessibility can be understood as the missing component of perception 
that may only be acquired through experience. This experience—the play that is 
acquired in the space between viewer and object—needs to be actively sought out 
by the viewer with both the intellect and the senses.  
For a short period of time, Kant followed the ideas of Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten, another philosopher of the European Enlightenment. Baumgarten 
undertook the concept of aesthetics as the science of sensory cognition with his 
1730 treatise, Metaphysica. Fearing an elusive and subjective approach that could 
menace the philosophical status of modern analytic aesthetics, his fellow 
philosophers ultimately refused to endorse the idea of an academic discipline 
concerned with sensory perception and experience. In recent years, however, 
Baumgarten’s perspective has been revived not only by contemporary trends in 
aesthetics, such as neuroaesthetics and somaesthetics, but also by new approaches 
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within other philosophical branches, such as metaphysics, gnoseology (the human 
faculties for learning), or more directly, phenomenology. This revival attests to 
Baumgarten’s significance to the current expansion of the aesthetics field, three 
centuries after his effort to propose it as a new discipline with philosophical 
legitimacy. However, Kant declared that Baumgarten’s aesthetics could never 
contain objective rules, laws, or principles of natural or artistic beauty because his 
use of “taste” drew from a rational critique of aesthetics rather than what Kant’s 
new aesthetics had to offer—a hybrid philosophy that was rational yet fixed on 
individual judgment. The loss suffered in the birth of Kant's modern aesthetics 
was a dislodging of the embodied and sensorial aspect to the beautiful that dated 
back to the ancient Greeks. It was at this historical moment that modern aesthetics 
turned away from Baumgarten’s understanding of the important role the senses 
play in aesthetics, and the study of embodiment in Continental philosophy was 
temporarily derailed. 
An embodied reading of Kant and Baumgarten would find that both, to an 
extent, were correct. Baumgarten highlighted the importance of our senses to 
experience and Kant realized that the intellect must play a role in aesthetic 
judgment. What neither was able to express at the time was that the brain’s 
functions for developing ideas, memories, and logical concepts are all also part of 
embodiment. The senses play a far more strategic role in our actions than simply 
activating pleasure or displeasure. Pleasure and displeasure involve a complex 
union of the relational nature of embodiment with recognition of such scientific 
theories as representational intentionality, exposure to choice-making, and the 
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triggers of desires upon actions. Embodiment involves all these activities as an 
integral part of a bonded process—acting together is what gives us the feeling that 
experience is a whole phenomenon. The critique of an aesthetic experience is an 
excellent forum for debunking the paradoxical separation between mental 
phenomena and physical action. 
 
  
Stills from two untitled and undated films by Nicholas Schöffer (26:00 and 52:00, 
respectively) as featured in SCHÖFFER-TINGUELY-Hommage, Original footage by 
Marion Sarraut; reproduced in a 1993 documentary by Bernard Vincent on Schöffer’s 
work. While the original films are undated, they are probably ca. 1956. 
 
In a continuation of the transformation set in motion by the industrial 
revolution, art and science were able to come together to create a new field of 
intelligent machines by using internal models of external reality.3 The concept of 
intelligent machinery became a key impetus for reconstructing how the cognitive 
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world might work. Cyberneticists, such as Norbert Weiner, searched for a 
common understanding between machine and animal by using ideas from the 
disciplines of mechanics, art, and biology.4  
Nicolas Schöffer’s CYP1 (spatiodynamic sculptures) of 1956 is commonly 
considered to be the first cybernetic artwork. Attached on the metal mechanisms 
for the kinetic structures are an onboard electronic brain to coordinate events, 
photoelectric cells to activate vision, and a microphone to record variations of 
color, light, and sound in the surrounding environment. The sculpture moves 
according to its digital sense of the environment, including the movement of 
nearby dancers. This was, arguably, the first attempt to converge the spectacle of 
robotic sculpture with the choreographed movement of humans; it sits squarely at 
the intersection of cybernetics and embodied arts. Schöffer’s “spatiodynamic 
sculptures” also relate to the cybernetic study of the mechanical mind, or machine 
intelligence, which gained prominence in popular science, along with the 
modeling of brain processes, during the middle of the twentieth century.  
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Atsuko Tanaka, Electronic Dress, 1956. 
Enamel paint on light bulbs, electric cords, and control console. 
 
In 1956, the artist Atsuko Tanaka covered herself in electric wires and 
painted light bulbs. Creating a tension between the cyborg spectacle and the 
vulnerable female body, Tanaka’s barely visible face peers out from an 
entanglement of technology as adornment. The work overwhelms the viewer with 
intense light and weight. In what Tanaka herself described as an “incessant and 
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chaotic”5 barrage that limits sight and movement, the performer can only stand 
and bear the overwhelming contraption as a technological metaphor. The drama 
of the device is to Tanaka a kind of external and cultural circulatory system—a 
sight where the privacy of the internal is exposed and used as a shrouding of the 
human condition of modernity. The apparatus becomes the technological 
structure, which cocoons the human and prepares the cyborg in transition. 
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Atsuko Tanaka, Electronic Dress, 1956, reconstruction, 1986. 
Enamel paint on light bulbs, electric cords, and control console. 
 
The body as a living form can also be considered in direct juxtaposition to 
technology, with technology that sets apart as a kind of corruption of human 
nature. Charles Baudelaire coined the term modernité to refer to the modern social 
condition, the human relationship to industrial depravity. This modernité as 
represented through art is, according to Baudelaire, a challenge to historical 
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beauty. The work of Tanaka is thus embroiled with a century-old discourse of the 
human struggle with the technological apparatus. Technology challenges the 
human as a historical condition but, at the same time, modernité also brings about 
an understanding that aesthetics is connected to the mechanistic makings of the 
observer. This juxtaposition of human to machine replaces the historical 
relationship of human to nature with one that critiques living to technology.  
Embodied philosophers also expose the need for crossing philosophical 
divides between human and machine, so that “the cognitive sciences [can become] 
a meeting place between the transitions, with benefits in both.”6 The development 
of embodied aesthetics as we understand it today stands upon the shoulders of 
such mid-century interdisciplinary projects. In 1967, the artist and theorist Roy 
Ascott defined cybernetic art as having certain characteristics of dada, surrealism, 
fluxus, happenings, and pop art, combined with the science of cybernetics.7 One 
important commonality between these particular art movements is the object’s 
shift to performativity. The coupling of these art movements with the science of 
cybernetics provides a distinctly embodied and activity-oriented perspective on 
the digital era that began in the 1970s. In this way, technology became a particular 
kind of performative element. As critic Edward A. Shanken reveals, “the value 
lay more in the event, the process, the shared experience.”8 The interconnection 
between computers, telecommunications, and the people who use them becomes 
an entire nervous system of social organization, which includes the viewer as an 
active agent in a dynamic aesthetic exchange. 
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The co-construction of technology and modernity remains an essential 
quality within the multidisciplinary work of contemporary art. As a study of 
divides and crossovers, life against or in balance with, technology has been a 
theme within aesthetics for well over a century. Both life and technological 
apparatus have their own embodiments and both are in negotiation with the other 
for shared space and resources. 
 
 
Guto Nóbrega, Equilibrium, 2008. 
Motors, solar cells, microchip, light sensors and a plant. 
 
The sculptures of Guto Nóbrega expose this nuanced relationship between 
the living and technology. Equilibrium is part of a series that Nóbrega calls 
“hybrid organisms.” These hybrid organisms are systems in which a plant and an 
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artificial mechanism share mutual relationships. The whole Equilibrium system is 
arranged as a balanced sculpture that is able to spin around its own axis. The 
technological system occupies one side of the balance and it is set to perform in a 
photovore (light-seeking) behavior by controlling two propellers, which set the 
whole system to rotate clockwise or counter-clockwise. A growing plant is 
located on the other side of the balance; when the balance rotates its axes the plant 
is re-positioned towards the light. In turn, along with the plant two solar cells 
absorb light and feed the artificial system. Equilibrium is an environment with 
both relational and autonomous behavior. It belongs to a class of artificial hybrids 
emerging from contemporary art practices that create new man-made organisms. 
Nóbrega writes, “This class of beings points to new questions on the issue of 
interaction as their relationship with the observer is not only based on rules of 
cause and effect. More than interactive response to human behavior these 
organisms ask for dialogues, requiring a sort of investigation into their own nature 
in order to unfold the network of meaning to which they belong.”9 The project 
suggests that nature is a concept never achieved objectively, but only subjectively. 
“Art,” Nóbrega writes, “is one of the most powerful tools to modulate 
subjectivity, ultimately our consciousness, the hybrid of plants and artificial 
systems may bring new insights about the world we live in and its ongoing 
metamorphosis.”10 Introspection then becomes a crucial way in which the 
aesthetic experience arises from the occurring act of changing relationships of the 
parts.  
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Neuroaesthetics was defined around 1999 by neuroscientist Semir Zeki as 
the scientific study of the neural bases for the contemplation and creation of a 
work of art.11 But it was as early as 1991 that Zeki along with M. Lamb wrote a 
paper on brain scientists’ understanding of kinetic art.12 Although Zeki and Lamb 
take here an empirical and reductionist approach towards the visual cortex to 
explain aesthetic experiences, their claim about what artists are doing when they 
make kinetic art is compelling. Zeki/Lamb write, “artists are unknowingly 
exploring the organization of the visual brain though with techniques unique to 
them.”13 This suggests that Zeki/Lamb see artists providing instinctual or intuitive 
contributions to the science of movement.  
It is possible to combine the knowledge from Zeki and Lambs’s 
reductionist studies with the performativity of contemporary art, because they are 
both on the hunt for aesthetics through the coupling of embodied action within the 
environment. Zeki’s interest in musical beauty has led him to suggest that a 
specific part of the emotional brain, field A1 of the medial orbito-frontal cortex, is 
critical for such time-based experiences.14 Emotions and decision-making appear 
to use this part of the brain for processing, which may also help mediate 
subjective hedonic experience.15 The aesthetics of interactive art looks at the open 
event of the entire, knowable experience—people, places, and things all in action 
together, all working towards the rise of an aesthetic experience that requires a 
new form of systems critique. Interactive art goes beyond and corrects Zeki’s 
reductionist localization of aesthetic experience. Aesthetics is more than a brain 
processing. Interactive art consists of sets of functional and behavioral attributes 
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shared through the action of participation. Neuroaesthetics can help in locating 
particular electrochemical events that can be observed for their patterning in the 
larger embodied event. 
Cybernetic culture remains in a state of uncertainty. The impact that 
technological innovation is predicted to have on human beings ranges from the 
development of utopian living standards to devastation and destruction. But if 
cybernetic culture is a miasmatic condition in which biological humanism and 
human embodiment are challenged, interactivity between the biological and the 
post-biological, first and foremost, is a response to this ubiquitous human 
condition. In other words, the formality of framing the human being as one that 
hinges on biology has ended. Humanness is better described not by material 
properties but by intentions and actions. Because action and participation are the 
key elements of interactive art, defining an aesthetic space includes the endeavors 
of many forms of existence that are ready to participate in the act of life-
negotiation.  
The post-biological claim that organic matter no longer has a singular hold 
on life distinguishes the contemporary moment from the last century of 
technological integration. Interactive art also can be defined as post-biological. 
Together, the post-biological and post-cybernetic collapse any substantive 
distinction between living organisms and the technology that they invent or 
consume. Post-delineation, the idea that form always involves some sort of 
displacement, but not necessarily along existing lines of demarcation, exposes the 
permeable structures of life and casts a wider net over aesthetic experience. 
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Furthermore, art projects that use both aesthetic and scientific methodologies are 
changing the cultural landscape, allowing a more fluid understanding of 
participatory identity in both to emerge.  
Contemporary art encompasses a broad domain of temporal and 
polysystemic techniques claiming that it is action which brings art meaning. 
Interactive art furthers this realization with the understanding that being of the 
world rather than passively in it, creates kinesthetic self-awareness, a self-
awareness that can be aesthetically critiqued through the study of an action’s 
material, mechanical, and interactive components. The process of this 
examination points to aesthetic functionalities within the systems of a post-
biological, post-cybernetic, and post-delineated existence. By bringing these 
conditions into very close proximity, interactive art demands a new aesthetics of 
behavioral attributes. 
Behavioral aesthetics can be defined as biological and post-biological 
elements that make up a bodily gesture. Because parts of the aesthetic behavior 
may be sourced from biological forms and other parts may not, interactive art has 
little need to define actions of the organism through the distinctions of living or 
nonliving. Instead, actions that are created within the interacting system may also 
be regarded as a gesture of the organism. Behavioral aesthetics dislocates 
traditional notions of subjectivity as the center or purpose of art. Art critic Claire 
Bishop’s aesthetic perspective on interactive art is that viewer activation and 
viewer decentering are ways in which installation art is experienced.16 
“Decentering” is a moving about of the subject, a constant re-establishment of a 
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self in time and space. Behavioral aesthetics therefore expands on Bishop’s 2005 
idea of activation and decentering by positioning the behavioral aspects of 
engagement as key strategies in the engagement with interactive art. This includes 
all forms of body and thought, because all forms work within and upon the same 
material and behavioral forces. A collapse between mind/body distinctions also 
works to unify our physical selves with our feelings and experiences. 
 
Phenomenological Patterns of Action 
Activation is a key theme of embodied philosophy. The energy involved 
with activating a process is part of the larger function of any act. Activation and 
the event itself cannot be separated from the ability to perform the function of the 
action to which it is connected. An action has a built-in transitory state, as it is 
always pushing intention into activation; this is a dynamic state that is exhibited 
in many fields of material science, from chemistry and biology to physics and 
neuroscience. Brain science reveals that patterns in the brain associated with 
intention are similar to patterns associated with full-body actions in the world. 
The brain is stimulated by what the body senses to be activity—these sensations 
perform as activators and pattern-makers. Neuroscience remains unclear as to 
what the particular patterns may mean, but the relational potential of the patterns 
of activation in embodied cognition is abundant. These patterns become the 
material activity of a scalable concept of decentering, and interactive artists are 
developing projects that reflect this dynamic form of activation. Through 
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interacting with installations, the complexity of intention and action are exposed 
as an aesthetic consideration. Interactive projects, in turn, change the way our 
brains are stimulated, reshape our neural networks, and facilitate new 
associations—all creating feedback connections.  
An example of this scalable activity can be observed in how an animal cell 
activates neighboring cells to work together. First, the cell stimulates and then 
connects to another, creating a path of adhesion. The path becomes a structure of 
signaling molecules that relays positional information among many neighboring 
cells in a tissue. These signaling pathways are critical to maintaining homeostasis 
within the tissues to form structural stability. The processes involved in the body 
healing a flesh wound depend on positional information in the skin organ in order 
to restore normal tissue architecture. As the cell pathway extends, the equilibrium 
of the entire system must be readjusted. The system is in a constant state of 
sending and receiving signals and, therefore, in a constant state of homeostatic 
readjustment as the system remains in balance. Other intersecting and competing 
tissues must negotiate the healing and will recharge the lost energy needed for 
mending the torn structure. The parameters of a homeostatic readjustment event 
include a constant metabolic remodeling of the system itself and the ability to re-
assign the duties of one cell for the need of another. 
The whole body behaves in a similar way. It is constantly in search of a 
state of balance, and will constantly adapt to and negotiate with neighboring parts. 
The body is extremely complex, requiring countless tiny adjustments every 
second as new input propels the body off balance. The imperfection that exists 
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within any balance is a particular pattern that also serves as a general 
phenomenological observation of being in the world. Stasis is simply ontological 
idealism. The body, the self, is always in a state of becoming. Adjustments 
become more than a temporary element of the system; they are the mechanism 
that allows for imperfection to become a binding force for all events. 
 
 
Brian Knep, Healing Tiles, 2012. Harvard Medical School.  
Projected software animation. 
http://www.21cmuseumhotels.com/cincinnati/museum/collection/ accessed March 14, 2014. 
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In 2012 Brian Knep developed a series of public interactive-art 
installations entitled Healing Series. The work serves to demonstrate the dynamic 
nature of interaction. Each individual installation project is built upon a computer 
projection of a patterned carpet. Left alone, the patterns slowly pulsate and shift. 
When an interactant walks across the carpet, he/she leaves a trail through the 
projection, “wounding” the pattern. After a short time, the carpet heals the path 
left by the interactant, but the original pattern is forever altered. The wounds heal 
differently after each person walks on the carpet, reflecting, over time, an 
accumulation of interaction and response. From the time the installation is turned 
on, the graphic pattern reflects a piece of every single interactant. 
Knep explains his interests in natural patterns that emerge from this 
process: 
Think about a zebra—the mother isn’t painting those stripes on. 
What is happening is that there are cells. And the cells are 
expressing a certain color—either black or white. And each cell—
all they know about is neighboring cells and they have some sort of 
complex system in place that tell them to be black and white. 
Somehow, in this very simple interaction between each cell and its 
neighbor is stabilizing to these beautiful patterns.… And you can 
look at lots of systems that way. Under a microscope our brains are 
billions of neurons and all each neuron knows about is its 
neighboring neurons and sends signals to them. Each neuron wants 
to survive—the connections want to survive—and out of that we 
get this amazing illusion of consciousness, free will, and all these 
things.”17 
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Brian Knep, Healing Pool, 2008. Milwaukee Art Museum, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  
Projected software animation. http://www.blep.com/ accessed March 14, 2014.  
 
 
Brian Knep, Healing Pool, 2008. Milwaukee Art Museum, Milwaukee, Wisconsin  
Projected software animation. http://www.blep.com/ accessed March 14, 2014.  
 
Knep is less interested in the discussion of whether the patterns created are 
illusions or not. Issues of illusion and representation are, he argues, an aesthetic 
for a past century. His attention is focused on how the temporality of self is 
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constituted from billions of smaller interactions and how those interactions create 
a new aesthetic. Knep is an example of a contemporary artist who brings together 
the rich history of cybernetics, new knowledge drawn from neuroscience, and the 
desire to sustain an embodied practice that retains a focus on the physical and 
temporal nature of our relationship to the art object. The idea of causality—how 
everything affects everything else—becomes part of a new aesthetic drive that 
runs through a wide variety of interactive artworks. It is this combination of body 
and world that lays claim to the creation of a new behavioral aesthetic. 
 
Materiality of Ideas 
Claire Bishop’s collapse of distinction between the spectator and the art 
object is a critical offering to interactive art because it involves an ongoing act of 
decentering the subject. It is a slippage of time, intentions, and the material 
properties of being-in-the-world that shifts aesthetic expressions beyond such 
purposes as the beautiful or sublime and towards an exploratory dynamic. How 
the spectator transforms into the interactant, Bishop would argue, is certainly part 
of the modernist project. In this case, only since the willful design of interactive 
projects started in the mid-twentieth century have the mechanics of intentionality 
been embraced in aesthetics. 
Neuroaesthetics can also be described as the scientific investigation of 
what occurs in the brain during the act of observing/experiencing art. Generally 
speaking, this domain combines neurological research with Western aesthetics by 
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investigating a traditional understanding of beauty and appreciation of art at the 
level of brain function and mental state. Neuroaesthetics attempts to explain 
aesthetic experience through a set of physical laws at neurological sites. 
Currently, scientists use two main approaches in neuroaesthetic research. The first 
is to measure brain activity of individuals, usually artists, in order to uncover how 
brain mechanisms act in the making of art. The second is to study the art observer, 
with the aim of discovering general rules about how the brain functions through 
art appreciation. Both of these methods hinge upon the scientific precept that any 
act of individual consciousness can be replicated within the same brain and 
applied to other individuals. This method of research is both highly structuralist 
and reductionist in its approach to consciousness. Yet neuroscientists tend to 
agree that the biology of the brain relies on a far more fluid and non-reductive 
process than these methods of aesthetic research provide. A non-reductive 
materialism is one way in which scientists and artists can work together to 
develop an updated methodology for investigating consciousness. Neuroaesthetics 
can incorporate non-reductive materialism and provide a far wider reaching 
purpose to the research. 
Badiou’s “first ontology” is an excellent example of non-reductive 
materialism.18 Badiou designates material form as being in an “inconsistent 
multiplicity” in its very presentation. In Georg Cantor’s mathematics terminology, 
an inconsistent multiplicity cannot be set because it is too large; it is an infinite 
possibility. Badiou opens up Cantor’s strict language to alter the meaning and 
functionality of ontology itself: mathematics becomes a system of reflecting 
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relationships of being within the event of being. This includes the between-ness of 
individuals as well as larger world experiences. Materialism can hold all the 
inconsistent multiplicities that Badiou makes available to us, as demonstrated in 
the example of Cantor’s mathematics lexicon. Through his examples, Badiou 
explains that any discrete field of study, such as mathematics, science, or art, is an 
arbitrary delineation that, in itself, lends no meaning to the subject at hand; 
meaning is found in the use of the system in context. The historical deployment of 
these systems leads to a similar contemporary revelation—a constant decentering 
of the parts of the system that come about through their use. It is enaction that 
moves one thing into another, displacing and reformulating new ideas as the 
action rolls out. Ideas, in this way, can be observed as a dynamic material, 
formulated by the convergence of thoughts and actions. It is this enaction in the 
philosophy of mind that explains how perception and action combine to allow us 
to perceive, and to have consciousness. 
Badiou provides a philosophy of being, a subject in which historical time 
is of lesser importance in the construction of subjective perception. Only within 
the enaction of the now do we see the possibilities that change provides. Badiou’s 
materialism, as part of a diverse schema of action in the world, describes the 
importance of the human body in contemporary society.19 By stating that 
materialism is the site where life is expressed, Badiou traces this decisive line of 
human demarcation and then moves forward to obliterate any possibility that life 
could be contained within a single body. From Badiou’s understanding of the 
multiple subject and a bringing together of all the pieces and parts found within 
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action, we may find consciousness and meaning. But the current use of 
materialism within neuroaesthetics is reductionist and in many cases, without 
social context. This leads to a problem with the current state of neuroscience in 
general: the research is both scientifically reductionist and aesthetically 
modernist, which stunts any consideration of time-based interactions. This leaves 
out much of what contemporary art offers to the study of the brain—deployment 
of the temporal body and the decentering of intersubjective authorship whereby 
identity as a material substrate of the world can never be a fixed point. 
Since 1980, biologist Francisco Varela and neuroscientist Antonio 
Damasio have been piecing together how the material brain creates experience at 
a biochemical level of the human body, providing another window onto the 
overall functioning of consciousness. Like most scientific researchers, however, 
they limit their description to pictorial representation. While the arts have moved 
toward a hybrid model of intersecting disciplines, the treatment of art by 
neuroscience remains insular and in need of updating. Recent neuroscientific 
research has addressed these complex modes, but it has yet to look at them as 
participatory, dynamically modeled systems in the visual arts. And although there 
has been research into human motion through dance, music and film theory, it has 
been limited. The relationships in which time-based mediums affect the body are 
far more complex than has previously been discussed in the critique of dance, 
music and film.20 Furthermore, time-based research has yet to take into account 
the complex modes of participatory expression and social context in 
contemporary visual art. 
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Scientists’ underlying interest in studying the brain is to understand what 
consciousness is and how it works. Artists’ interest in consciousness may overlap 
that of science, but they may pursue areas of investigation that may be prohibited 
in traditional scientific discourse. Their range of investigation is open, for 
example, to data scientists will see as tainted, but artists may find useful. These 
areas are not exchangeable. The outcome of artistic research, therefore, may not 
directly serve scientific endeavors.  
Multiple methodologies nevertheless may produce a fresh way of 
exploring any topic. So many overlapping disciplines stake a claim to the question 
of consciousness, it is arguably impossible to tease out a sole valuable field that 
provides a sense of the entire experience. This may be why there are so many 
different disciplines working on understanding consciousness at so many scales. 
In physics, for example, the external world is perceived as a hierarchy of objects 
that moves from water molecules to atoms to neutrons and then to down quarks, 
up quarks and electrons. Scientifically exchangeable aesthetic explorations can be 
seen as contributing uniquely to an overall understanding of consciousness. 
The study of embodied consciousness demands that experience remains 
connected to the action in which it has been expressed. Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
offers a solid support to embodied action as his phenomenological view of the 
wholeness constitutes meaning in human experience through the ontological 
body-subject relationship. Merleau-Ponty maintains a general concept of 
consciousness in the larger world while describing the human body as a 
perceiving thing intricately intertwined and mutually engaged. By observing the 
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correlate of our body and its own sensory-motor functions, Merleau-Ponty finds 
the actions that make meaning in the world. In a ontology of becoming, as 
Merleau-Ponty argues for it, is an appropriate framework for the neuroscientific 
method because it reminds us to consider the wholeness of experience while also 
looking at substrate materials and their particular properties.  
An example of how substrate materials may have larger implications for 
consciousness, can be found by reviewing—through a phenomenological lens—
research common to both theoretical physics and quantum mechanics. New 
studies show that the smaller parts of the conscious processes are indeed physical: 
parts of consciousness can be observed as a state of matter, like a solid, a liquid, 
or a gas. From this, cosmologist Max Tegmark conjectures that, “consciousness 
can be understood as yet another state of matter. Just as there are many types of 
liquids, there are many types of consciousness.”21 If this is accurate, then the 
process of any action is also material, and that material process is also 
performative and varied. Tegmark’s research explores how the particular 
properties of consciousness might arise from the physical laws that govern our 
universe.  
This idea of consciousness as materially based has spread into the field of 
physics. The material properties of consciousness, Tegmark explains, allow 
physicists to reason about the conditions under which consciousness arises, and to 
consider how we might exploit consciousness to better understand why the 
material world around us appears as it does.  
  36 
This new approach to consciousness has largely originated outside the 
physics community, not only with cosmologists like Tegmark, but also with 
neuroscientists such as Giulio Tononi. In early 2014, Tononi corroborated a 
controversial twenty-year-old theory that consciousness has the literal structure of 
a microtubule.22 Microtubules are major components of the structural skeleton of 
cells. In this example of material consciousness, we see that form binds the 
product of the brain through to a material shape of the cell. Tononi’s discovery of 
quantum vibrations in microtubules inside brain neurons corroborates that 
quantum vibration computations in microtubules are “orchestrated” by synaptic 
inputs and that memory stored in microtubules have the same material property of 
protein polymers inside the brain neurons. The vibrations have a form and the 
form makes the structure that is built upon by larger structures. These tiny 
patterns found in consciousness have both form and weight in the world. Perhaps 
more valuable for the study of interaction, these patterns are in a constant act of 
activation, decentering, and displacement. And perhaps even more profound, the 
vibrations are defined as material properties through their own enaction. The 
driving concept of enaction is the fundamental role of motor action for storing and 
acquiring knowledge. Yet microtubes as a material building block of the neuron 
cannot explain consciousness.  
Microtubes in the act of vibrating show us that the structure emerges only 
in the activity of its own behavior. Behavior is the internally coordinated response 
(actions or inactions) to the whole living organism and microtubes find purpose 
and value only in the activation of the orchestration of its parts. Perception is the 
  37 
organization of these parts through the technological transduction of stimulus. 
Without perception, action would be unguided, and without action, perception 
would serve no purpose. This constructivist understanding as to how matter and 
action work together constitutes the conditionally open position of the subject. If 
all goes well, perception and enaction combined provide the rich environment in 
which consciousness emerges, and where activity is the agent for invention. 
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Chapter 2: Brain Spread 
 
The combination of neurological research and aesthetics does not need to 
follow a strict scientific script to be valuable. Scientific methodologies are used 
regularly by artists in ways that may not have been originally intended by science 
but have become useful in many overlapping disciplines—such as design or 
psychology, as examples. In many cases, hybrid research comes back around as 
useful in both art and science. There are contemporary artists whose work with 
recent findings about the brain also blur the distinction between art and science, 
the subjective and the objective of a thing.  This work, in turn, has compelled 
scientists to reframe many of their own guiding questions. Artistic and scientific 
methods have a great deal in common: they provide—and often share—
fundamental insights into how we organize the world.  
One of these shared insights is that strikingly different systems can 
produce similar patterns. Moving particles in gas, bacterial colonies, and 
neighborhoods of people, for example, create similar, continually complex 
patterns that both science and art can observe.  
The brain is one such complex system that shares a common space of 
autonomy and community. At the material level, high-resolution images of nerve 
cells linked by dense webs of intricate pathways look very much like models of 
social networks. And study of social networks shows us patterns of embodied 
systems similar to those in the constructed world of shared experiences. The 
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“social brain hypothesis” suggests that the human amygdala (a mass of nuclei 
located deep within the temporal lobe of the brain) might have evolved partially 
to deal with an increasingly complex social life.23 It is important to move past the 
idea that the brain passively transmits impressions. The brain is fully engaged in 
the environment around it, actively participating in every event with which it 
comes into contact. Research into biological systems by artists provides the ever-
essential realization that making or experiencing art is part of the same life system 
as any other field of study.  
This reminder posed by neuroaesthetics is particularly important when 
discussing interactivity, because linear or reductionist cause-and-effect models 
would lead to many bogus assumptions about how we experience the world. 
There are many contemporary examples of cross-pollination between 
neuroscience and art that show it is no longer necessary to plot scientific ways of 
understanding interactivity against aesthetics. In the projects that express both 
disciplines, the brain points us towards a new aesthetic by manifesting the vastly 
complex ways in which its universe of electrochemical activity works—resulting 
in emotions, ideas, and actions. Ultimately, it is the combination of objective 
functions and intersubjective moments, mixing the activity of the inner world with 
external active experiences, that produces what we call the human condition. 
 
The Brain Spread 
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The brain has historically been considered the seat of human 
comprehension, with its chief activity being to ascertain its own nature. The 
ethicist concerned with worldly resources looked to the brain’s rational intellect to 
search for freedom; the brain scientist looked at the brain to know the mind; and 
the artist accessed intuition supplied by the brain in response to the body’s 
sensorial attributes. From each of these perspectives, in some combination of 
brain, body, and expression, a concept of the fully formed person emerged. But 
such isolated perspectives on the world no longer seem adequate. The ethicist 
now reaches beyond universal claims to apply action and change in the world; the 
neuroscientist reconsiders brain functioning to include both the internal body and 
the external body; and the artist collapses the aesthetic distinctions between idea 
and form. Transformed from thing to actions, the mind from both a scientific and 
philosophical perspective now resides in no particular singular place. Descartes’ 
hold on the western tradition of the separation of mind and body, or thought and 
action, is losing its grip. 
The brain is usually defined anatomically, as a physical part in service to 
both thought and body. Its function is generally considered to be a kind of 
centralized processing facility, its purpose being to keep track of things by 
controlling actions and thoughts. It is a common scientific understanding that the 
brain’s primary function is to extract biologically relevant information from 
sensory input.24 But new knowledge of its own material development and 
functionality suggests new possibilities. The brain may provide a centralized 
location for cognitive processing; but it also possesses characteristics of a 
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dynamic entity, with the potential for expressing an array of actions that respond 
to its own needs, for survival and growth. In this way, just as human biology can 
be understood as many interlocking systems working together to develop 
consciousness—with every organ, every cell, every biochemical pulse expressing 
that energy—the brain is far more than just a service station for the rest of the 
body or an isolated center of thought and reason.  
Neuroscientists believe in a kind of amorphousness of the brain. The 
chemical neurotransmitters momentarily shape and endlessly reshape the physical 
brain throughout a lifetime. The plastic nature of brain synapses—the spaces 
between neurons—for instance shows us that the brain and the self are in constant 
flux. In The Synaptic Self, Joseph LeDoux describes how synapses are the 
channels through which we think, act, imagine, feel, and remember, as well as the 
means by which our most fundamental traits, preferences, and beliefs are 
encoded.25 The brain, however, can be understood as more than simply a catalog 
of encoded behaviors, or a device to call out bodily instructions. Material 
functioning by itself cannot be considered consciousness, because there is nothing 
in the reduced elements that answers to the concept of a self. It is only in the 
application of the brain to an action that the potential of its function is rendered. 
As a thing in itself, the brain must have direct connection to experience. This 
connection can be found in an endless array of patterns that the brain and the 
world make together. Through such modern technology as electromagnetic 
scanning we can finally see patterns of biochemical processes and how they relate 
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to the kinetic self at the full-body scale. Here, the brain is a temporal map of its 
own activity.  
As a simple example of the brain’s temporality, the patterns of chemicals 
that surge through the brain cells awaken different functionalities at different 
developmental stages of life. The focused use of these cells changes the physical 
condition of the brain, altering its potential for future adaptation. More 
functioning either creates more nerve endings to accommodate the load or lowers 
the threshold potential needed to jump synapses. In either case, function reshapes 
the formations of thoughts, and ideas are constantly morphing, pushing the 
physical boundaries of the biological matter that contains them. The generation of 
new neuron endings is a neuroregeneration of axonal sprouting that accompanies 
functional reorganization in adults over a lifetime, even where substantial 
degeneration may have occurred due to age, illness, or trauma.26 Signals from the 
sensory receptor cells, furthermore, remain both specific to individual physical 
parts of the brain and generalized, available to other parts of the brain. When the 
neuroscientist breaks the brain down into distinct parcels, such as sensory or 
motor functionality, she will always offer a caveat, describing all the ways in 
which the brain—broken down into a collection of parcels and identified to have 
discrete functionalities—does not neatly fit into any finite, clear-cut functional 
category. 
Because of the neuroscientist’s caveat that scientific study doesn’t always 
provide clarity toward an understanding of the brain, we have to look to other 
modes of inquiry to find meaning. Materialism in neuroscience holds that mental 
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phenomena are identical to neuronal phenomena.27 Type materialism in 
philosophy, however, is more generalized: it holds that the only thing that exists is 
matter.28 Implicit in this stance is the assumption that management of 
consciousness is not part of a transcendental experience, one that offloads the 
qualities of experience to another being, power, or location. We must look to the 
properties held within the system, such as the brain or the body, to uncover some 
surprising ideas about the uncertainty of matter. Studying the aspects of matter 
can be useful as a way to find connections between, for instance, an individual 
cell and an entire organ; but the same study can also reveal differences, 
decenterings, or slippages in the shift from that cell to that organ. Both the 
categorical and biological systems work in conjunction with these slippages. The 
understanding we gain from materialism is that things still work despite the 
apparent contradictions. 
Qualia or the subjective quality of human experience is the philosophical 
way of describing this slippage between the scientific qualities of all that is 
“immediately apprehensible in consciousness.”29 This slippage can be identified, 
for example, in the time it may take for a sensation from the skin to change to an 
electrical pulse. As a result, in contemporary scientific materialism there exists no 
necessity to distinguish between the physical brain and its functionality. The basic 
proposition in material neuroscience is that the properties assigned to the brain are 
also among the properties that make up the thought and interaction of mind. In 
other words, the brain and the mind tend to be used interchangeably. This in turn 
makes the neuroscientific explanations of the distinction between mind and brain 
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increasingly elusive. If aspects of the surrounding world define the mind, we must 
subsequently accept that the brain should be afforded, at least partially, the 
conceptual and contextual territory given to the mind. Is it possible, with all that 
we understand from neuroscience, to free the brain from the exclusivity of 
reductionism by looking to the contingent nature of its functionality?  
If the brain works with the similar-reciprocal pattern of distribution, as 
does the rest of the body, it can be reasoned that the action of experience is a 
reciprocal exchange between the parts of self. This exchange further challenges 
the autonomy of individual people and things, and brings their related systems to 
our attention. This search for wholeness of the self—the reciprocal patterning of 
the kinesthetic participation in the aesthetic experience—is an act of relocating 
the brain as a cognitive engine to a direct part of cognitive action upon the world. 
With all the confusion between brain and mind, the concept of brain has 
been left behind in the contemporary attention to the mind and body. We still 
think of it as an archaic binary machine. It is actually much more fluid and 
dynamic. A shift from the traditional concept of the brain provides a fresh 
perspective on how a person utilizes interactivity. This shift must include an 
erasure of the traditional expectations of the brain as a computational engine for 
the body and a relocation of its essential functionality to the whole self. Placing 
the brain under erasure, brain provides a vehicle for recovery from the mistake of 
the dual identity of the self as thought and body. Using a Heideggerian model, 
erasure of an idea expresses the problem of presence and absence of meaning in 
its own definition. “Brain” is not wholly suitable for the concept it represents. 
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Continental philosopher Jacques Derrida extends the problem of presence and 
absence to include the notion that erasure marks not the loss of presence, but 
rather the potential impossibility of presence; brain, in other words, marks the 
potential that meaning has never been exclusively attached to the word or term 
“brain” in the first place. The challenge of this erasure is to extend the notion of 
the brain as a material action. Through action, the brain is both an organ and a 
function, which reaches away from itself through energetic forces of thought. 
Within its very definition, brain carries the lack of its own finitude. Because of the 
contingent nature of this action of spreading beyond itself, brain cannot be a 
freestanding entity, and an understanding of this brings us to the very problem of 
presence and absence of meaning in language. This lack of proper or precise 
meaning can be extended to the idea that the brain alone does not provide enough 
signification to explain its relationship to the rest of the body or to the larger 
world. 
Analytic philosopher Mark Rowlands argues for an externalism holding 
that the mind is “not only the result of what is going on inside the nervous system 
but also of what is outside the person.”30 All parts of cognition, in other words, 
must be larger than the body of the subject. According to brain philosopher Andy 
Clark, “cognition leaks out into body and world.”31 Brain is the materiality that 
cognition rides upon. Such cognitive processes as belief, memory, and learning 
depend upon a dynamic causal coupling between the person and her environment. 
Cognitive functioning is tied not only to material properties of the body but also 
to its own penetrability, to its ability to absorb and transmit beyond predefined 
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boundaries. Externalism claims that the brain and nervous system are insufficient 
separately or together to produce conscious experience—that environment and 
action are more than contingent causes, are part of the essential matrix of 
autonomous acts. This calls for at least a partially extracranial description of the 
brain.  
Another way of understanding the brain is through a phenomenal 
externalist view that psychologist Riccardo Manzotti calls the spread mind.32 
Manzotti questions any material separation between subject/observer and object, 
because what we consider objects and subjects/observers are merely two 
incomplete perspectives on and descriptions of the same physical process.33 
Objects are no longer autonomous as we have thought them, but are processes 
framing our reality. In this model, the interoceptive and exteroceptive dimensions 
of the body-self are mediated by the physical action of thought, creating a spread 
brain, contingent upon our senses but extending well beyond the skin.  
Manzotti claims that there are not two physical phenomena in the 
observer-object relationship but rather one phenomenon that encompasses both, 
and which takes place in the neuro-collective of the brain. If either the observer or 
the object moves, the other will also be observed as moved. This suggests that 
there is some very tight coupling, as one produces the other. Manzotti builds an 
interesting argument on the assumption that it takes time to observe. At time zero, 
there is no object yet.16 From the observer’s perspective, the image from the 
object creates the spatial and temporal opportunity for the observer to participate 
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visually with the object in the general act of observing. With the observer in just 
the right place at just the right time, seeing takes place.  
It is because of the existence of the observer at that moment that the object 
becomes activated. So the object and the viewer together complete the act of 
seeing when they confront each other. This relationship of seeing is one that is set 
in time—from the time it takes for light rays to bounce from the object to the 
human eye and then for knowledge to form in the consciousness. Because we too 
travel within time, seeing—though it takes place in discrete buds of 
entanglement—leads to the sense of a whole experience.34 And although 
Manzotti’s argument supports a phenomenological experience that happens within 
a localized brain, it is those physical processes that begin in the external world 
and are gathered up in formation that produce a contingent brain, one in which the 
function of brain optics is extended by light and transfers to the surface of the 
object. The experience of spread brain is a way for the world to take place in ways 
which we can comprehend, and to take place thanks to our physical structure.  
 
The Brain as Aesthetics Form 
The neurological understanding of the brain can reasonably be applied as 
an aesthetic model for critiquing art that involves bodily participation. The 
neurophenomenology of action and response requires examination of the material 
aspects of how neurobiology expresses itself in time and through action, 
providing a methodology for understanding a key aesthetic of interactive 
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installation. The philosophical importance of looking at things from a 
neurobiological perspective offers an escape from the old traps set by the role of 
mimesis in aesthetics. Aesthetic experience does not need to be an imitation of an 
action, as Aristotle first argued for art, but can exist as an experience that holds a 
reality unto itself. In other words, if art is simulated within itself, then there must 
be another experience that renders art as a more authentic truth. The notion of 
mimesis involves a framing of reality: what is contained within the frame, it 
suggests, is not “real” or authentic.  
This is a problematic concept for an aesthetic like that of interactive 
installation, which is driven to expose the authentic experience of itself. 
Interactive installation also works upon the assumption that the brain’s activity is 
neither a beginning nor a reduction of an aesthetic experience, but rather a process 
that can be located on many biological scales of human expression. The aesthetic 
experience can, therefore, offer another connection to the patterns of brain, one 
that comprehends embodiment as a gesture of authenticity. Interactivity is best 
perceived through practice, and due to the kinesthetic nature of the interactive 
experience, the action calls upon the brain to work within the physical 
construction, or embodiment, of being. These distinctions of interactivity lay 
claim to experience as an act within the nowness of time, with the authenticity 
emerging at a particular temporal location. 
Interactivity is a relational situation—requiring, by its very nature, two or 
more entities connected through some sort of action. For the cognitive 
neuroscientist, interactivity is an action where a sequence of brain regions is 
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activated jointly in a particular causal sequence, allowing an activity in one 
location of the brain to be available to the brain as a whole.35 The ability to 
function in a scalable way throughout the body is thus built into the 
neurostructure of the brain, because the brain regions and their substructures are 
both maps of particular events and systems of dynamic activity.36 Functioning 
brain depends, therefore, on a constant and consistent comparison of a variety of 
patterns that are present in an experience. This multiplicity of event sequencing is 
also found in interactive installation, with some projects illustrating this 
connection more explicitly than others, taking further cues from contemporary 
common knowledge about the biological roots of our own behaviors. 
Two contemporary art projects that critique the brain’s explicit 
relationship to the body put forward interesting propositions. The aim of “The 
Einstein’s Brain Project” (EBP), an ongoing series of individual events produced 
by Alan Dunning and Paul Woodrow, a Canadian artists’ collaborative, is to 
inspire visualization of the biological state of the body through the fabrication of 
environments.37 EBP comprises multiple installations using technological 
interfaces to measure and direct the output of the human body in response to 
virtual environments, constantly being altered through feedback from a 
participant’s biological body. “The Einstein’s Brain Project” marks an artistic re-
evaluation of the “stuff” that makes up the world—stuff many times too small or 
subtle for the human eye to perceive. The project is actually a series of projects 
that began with an installation at the 1976 St. Petersburg Biennale, in Russia, and 
ran its course in 1997 at a variety of media events in Italy, Australia, Canada, 
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England, and other locations. Some of these projects involve physical 
performances and some use only virtual representations, but as a group of works 
they have a focus on the neurological processing in the brain as both a real and 
metaphorical interface between bodies and bodies and larger worlds. Starting with 
performing bodies, data from the internal processes such as heartbeats, sweating, 
and bioelectrical fields are used to overlay a dynamic graphic back into the body, 
creating an inside/outside flip of electric processes. 
 
 
 
Alan Dunning and Paul Woodrow, The Auratic Body, 2004. From “The Einstein’s Brain 
Project.”  
Performance and Technological Interfaces (film still). 
 
The core of EBP is a discursive space that collapses distinctions between 
the constructed human body and posthuman forms by refocusing on the auratic 
intensities of the techno-body, rather than its biological aspects. As Dunning and 
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Woodrow describe their intentions for the project: 
In producing systems to examine bioelectrical fields, the project 
has generated visual forms and shapes directly out of the human 
acts of living, acting and thinking, and projected these outside the 
body. This representation is the outcome of many lines of inquiry 
into mapping the dynamic body. The project has pursued two main 
themes: (1) that the body’s electromagnetic energy is in constant 
interaction with external electromagnetic fields, (2) that the world 
is a construct sustained through the neurological processes 
contained within the brain.38 
 
The use of technology as a kind of body prosthesis, as Marshall McLuhan 
pointed out over forty-five years ago, exposes the mimetic forces of both 
materialism and the symbolism of information systems.39 In particular, EBP 
removes mind-body polarity by exploiting our biological properties as the point of 
negotiation between ourselves as host, and our environment. In this work, the 
brain is both part of a physical spread of energy fields and an action upon the 
brain; it suggests a body so enmeshed with the external world as to be inseparable 
from it. The energy fields of EBP also identify the energy fields of the viewer—
an ontology of energy that Dunning and Woodrow share with Manzotti.  
EBP is raw information constantly transformed by the interwoven acts of 
the viewer’s participation.40 Furthermore, the project builds the case that to be 
alive we must be active in the world. As humans, we engage with our 
surroundings, and in doing so, our own potential rises through our own enaction. 
The energy fields do not build without bodily movement. Being is a moving 
target—not a common body or an organized collective but rather a community of 
performer, technician, spectator, and technological device that all activate through 
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action.  
In the deconstruction of a singular autonomy, the existence of another 
becomes the necessary condition for creative freedom. According to Dunning, the 
artist is explicit about a shift in the traditional body through the application of 
energy fields as an aesthetic medium. It is worth quoting in extenso his 
perspective on the body as a site of self-destruction: 
In the areas of bioscience and neurology, it has now become 
possible to fabricate many complex models and simulations of the 
body and brain, which were once thought of as impossible. 
Technological invention has not only influenced the way in which 
the body and brain are visualized but, what is perhaps more 
important, it has predisposed the way in which the body and brain 
are conceptualized.… More recently the body has been positioned 
at the point of intersection of many discourses, cultural, scientific, 
and artistic, and consequently finds itself subject to equivalent 
processes of deconfiguration. The body has become a site of self-
destruction—no longer a stable physical entity, but an 
indeterminate mass of fluctuating data in continual transformation 
that destroys itself even as it is remade.41 
 
The model of representation that Dunning and Woodrow deploy stems 
from the concept of cybernetics used in the second half of the twentieth century. 
The augmented human that cybernetics first introduced in the 1920s has come 
back into contemporary interest through recent understandings of cognitive 
functioning based on the material properties of the human body. The hybridism 
that cybernetics imposes provides a multiple reading of what is coherent in the 
external world. Therefore the spread brain as previously defined continues this 
discourse, by reaching across conscious acts and actions without particular 
affinity to separate living and nonliving entities. This spread brain is part of a new 
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taxonomy for the second wave of cybernetics that considers living systems a 
subset of all systems. Although highly problematic in its structuralist perspective, 
it does introduce a repositioning of anthropocentrism for the machinic-biological 
interface. Another useful shift of second-generation cybernetics is a focus on an 
observer dependency in all systems. As part of self-reflexive philosophy, we are 
drawn to an awareness of individual action as it places a mark upon the larger 
system. This is where EBP fits historically—the brain is constructed and 
reconstructed by an individual interacting with the environment. 
Dunning and Woodrow also explore this cybernetic spread of overlapping 
systems of bodies and worlds that are not amalgamations of solidity, but rather 
can be seen in a closely knit combination with energy. The energetic form 
emerges only through the action of artistic performance.  
It is this multilayered flow of EBP that connects many performative works. 
In an event called The Shape of the Real, scientific data from a technologically 
prepared performing body pushes the coordinates of a computer graphic mesh into 
endlessly morphing graphic shapes. Complex forms, built carefully over hours, 
days, and even weeks, contain layers of retrievable activity that serve as a way to 
build up the body as bioelectric patterns over an extended period of time. 
Spectators also impact the graphic patterns of the performing body, because their 
presence further alters the recorded data. The final data are taken from both 
performer and spectators—distinction between the bodies becomes insignificant. 
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Alan Dunning and Paul Woodrow, The Shape  of the Real, 2003. From “The Einstein’s Brain 
Project.”  
Performance and Technological Interfaces (film still). 
 
Dunning and Woodrow refer to the data as “dérive mirrors.”42, 43 “Dérive 
mirror” is a term coined by Damasio to indicate the continual moment-by-
moment construction of the self in relationship to time. In The Shape of the Real, 
Dunning refers to its images as an auratic flow of consciousness. The term 
“auratic” traces back to Walter Benjamin, who defined it in 1936 in his The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: “that which withers in the age of 
mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art.” 44 What Benjamin 
described is here in the Dunning and Woodrow work the shift of the locus of the 
auratic object's "unique appearance" to that of the multiple. It has moved from the 
object itself to its creator, or rather artist. In the ancient periods of many cultures, 
an object was perceived as having an aura because it was thought to possess 
magical or holy qualities. As societies became more secular, the uniqueness of an 
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object was increasingly associated with its creator or the artist who conceived it. 
In the age of mechanical and electronic reproduction, a further shift has taken 
place: the locus of the "unique appearance" of an object is now located within the 
perceiving crowd. The object is not auratic because it is perceived as having 
intrinsic spiritual or magical features as supported by historical readings, nor does 
it appear special because the object is created by an artist as Benjamin first 
argued. Dunning’s object is auratic because it is perceived as the center of 
hundreds of other gazes. So although Dunning and Woodrow are suggesting a 
qualitative relationship with Benjamin’s understanding of appearance to its 
contingency to society at large, The Shape of the Real performs this relationship 
through a transitory and collective understanding of objecthood. 
Dunning is careful not to call it scientific data but rather the material 
choices available to the artist. Dunning and Woodrow’s aesthetic deployment lies 
squarely in a nonreductionist understanding of the performative. In other words, 
they do not see the performance as a singular representation but rather as a 
process of multiplicity where human bodies are made visible. Dunning and 
Woodrow render the aesthetic of becoming one subject by which spectatorship 
allows the dérive mirrors to emerge.  
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Guy Debord, Naked City (detail) (from “Maps of the City” collection), Paris, France, 1957. 
 
Dunning and Woodrow nod to Guy Debord, whose collage Naked City 
consists of randomly collected fragments taken from a map of Paris and 
assembled to explore a structurally “unintelligent” view of the city.45 The dérive 
in this way is a situationist technique for a noninstrumental or an undirected 
navigation of a city. Dunning argues that Naked City produces a kind of aura of a 
city—a fragmented body made up of fragmented bodies. It is a world of 
spontaneous perception between apparently unrelated items, where the spectator 
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finds creative ways to connect the body to the environment. It is a process 
wherein the city is altered by the individual experience as embodied but 
ungraspable. In Dunning’s words, “the spectator is forced to search for 
disappearing and lost ghostly bodies.”46 Debord’s performative can be understood 
as the spread between self and group, a performative action or spectacle action of 
the individual, where this very realization becomes an aesthetic point of departure 
for interactivity. Dunning and Woodrow see this performance between the 
singular and the group as an aesthetic feedback loop binding together the 
fragments of experience. The loop is used to develop a coherency in experience 
by which the spectator can derive a sense of wholeness from the experience.  
Debord, as a post-Marxist theorist, is inclined to identify his own work 
with revolution—a move away from the debilitating modernization of both the 
private and public spheres of everyday life today. Naked City points to an 
engagement in a class struggle, reclaiming individual autonomy from the 
spectacle. Debord’s artistic tendencies exhibit a decentering of the power of 
economic forces. Political uprising is arguably an essential aspect of how and why 
Debord developed his theory of the spectacle. What then, might be Dunning and 
Woodrow’s equivalent? Dunning and Woodrow’s work exists in the rarified 
environment of a research facility, not the streets of Paris. Debord’s decentering 
of economic forces is replaced by Dunning and Woodrow’s engagement with the 
fragmented body. But the new fragmentation is devoid of any political reference 
to the contemporary moment that this could imply. Although their work may be a 
critique of the consumariat, Dunning and Woodrow do not provide this argument. 
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The question remains if this is an equal enough exchange for Dunning and 
Woodrow to be able to claim the same aesthetic intentionality as Debord. It may 
be that Dunning and Woodrow are far more modernist in their application of the 
body than even Debord intended to be in his. 
Dunning and Woodrow’s spectator comes away from the artwork with two 
concepts to ponder. One, it takes time to observe. The very act of seeing 
something belongs to a long process of bodily calculations that are interconnected 
with time. Seeing unfolds at the rate of living and so can never be totally 
separated from the unfolding of experience. Two, the spectator realizes that all 
observation is a form of interactivity, because it works as a way to tease out traces 
of the past and overlay them with the current moment. With this understood, there 
can be no longer be passive viewing in art. There is no distinction between the 
spectator and the viewable object. This puts the work of Dunning and Woodrow 
squarely within the neuroaesthetic discourse of the posthuman, where cognitive 
systems can be easily exchanged with the systems of worldly interaction. 
This approach to interaction hinges on the cognitive processes of the 
spectator through an aesthetic interconnection between technological effect and 
affective human response. The artworks of Dunning and Woodrow seek to expose 
how this aesthetic interconnection creates an engagement with interaction, while 
suggesting a new forum for addressing the philosophical problem of the 
relationship between body and mind. But their project retains a modernist 
concern, because it treats the body as an object without political context. 
Interaction works as a mechanism between the body’s functionality and the 
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technological extension. This aesthetic interconnection between technology and 
human cognition has been referred to in art technology circles as “affective 
aesthetics.”47 It introduces the application of emerging technologies to interactive 
artworks, via cognitive feedback loops, to engage and dynamically activate 
affective responses in the participant. “Affective aesthetics” is a term used 
specifically by Dunning and Woodrow to mean the self-reflexive positioning that 
dérive mirrors provide within the spectator’s brain. Dunning understands the 
source for internal images as coming from the internal structure of the brain: 
[T]he images in the consciousness narrative flow like shadows 
along with images of the object for which they are providing an 
unwitting unsolicited comment. To come back to the metaphor of 
the movie-in-the brain, they are within the movie. There is no 
external spectator . . . the core you is born.48  
 
From this core we can think of all experience as a kind of shift or 
decentering, where a moment begins to spread the brain out, and among 
everything else in the world that surrounds it. Shortly after the thought of self 
arises in any experience, there always comes a dispersal of that energy. In the case 
of Damasio and Dunning and Woodrow, it does not particularly matter if the 
spark originates in the action of the brain or the action of the larger world, as the 
dispersal of one to the other is so swift and blended. What does matter is that the 
spark activates both time and directionality. The brain is bidirectional. In the case 
of EBP, the first mark of the movie-in-the brain becomes a visible trace upon the 
performer’s body. This overlay turns quickly into the spectator’s brain as the 
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action of relations. The brain continues to spread back out, and the movie-in-the-
brain becomes once again the movie-in-the world. 
Another artist who uses Damasio's movie-in-the brain concept is Melvin 
Moti. Moti’s movie-in-the-brain, however, starts in the brain and appears to 
remain there, because there is a lack of anything outside of itself to spread to. 
Moti takes the process of a movie-in-the-brain quite literally, and although he is 
explicit about using both visual and conceptual materials too subtle for the senses 
to perceive, he would say that there is a complete theater experience that occurs in 
the brain’s processing of the material.  
 
 
 
Melvin Moti, The Prisoner's Cinema, 2008.  
35mm film with sound (film still). 
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This idea is most apparent in Moti’s film installation The Prisoner’s 
Cinema. The term “Prisoner's Cinema” refers to the nonstimulated phosphenes, or 
the internal varicolored play of light, that occurs after gazing into a visually 
unmodulated and virtually unchanging environment for long stretches of time.49 
Experienced by prison inmates, pilots, and long-distance truck drivers, these 
apparitions can be scientifically explained as a phenomenon generated 
internally—not by a synchronous outside world but by the processing of the 
brain—perhaps by the very action of the brain’s chemistry moving within the 
skull. With no external stimuli, the brain fills the space with its own behavior. 
Neurophilosophers explain this as the brain’s reaction to an undersupply of visual 
stimuli.  
Moti’s work targets the spectator’s mind as the locus for all the patterns 
that make up our experiences. The Prisoner’s Cinema uses projected-light to 
simulate the kind of visual effects that, according to studies, occur within the 
stimulus-deprived brain during Prisoner's Cinema. Prisoner's Cinema as defined 
in science is neither a visual phenomenon, passing through the optic system, nor a 
compensatory phenomenon, gathered up by other sensorial systems and 
transmitted to the brain. It describes instead how light is rendered upon the brain, 
by the brain itself, without the activation of the optic nerve or any other system.  
Moti claims that the experience of the entire world is also held within the 
processing of a single brain. This processing introduces the viewer to the familiar 
patterns that play within the brain when a person is deprived of any external 
sensory activity. In this way, the focus of Moti’s installation takes place primarily 
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within the mind. The viewing of the film therefore becomes an external 
explanation of that experience, and not an extension of internal mechanical 
processing. Moti’s work suggests that when left to itself, the mind creates a world 
of knowing by accessing everything it has collected and archived through past 
experiences.  
If we understand brain as being without finite internal and external 
distinctions, it is easy to see that the energetic forces of the world can play upon 
the internal functioning of the brain in an influx of patterns. It appears that we 
need to make narrative with those patterns, in an attempt to make our 
apprehension of experience into a whole. Like Damasio’s notion of the “movie-
in-the-brain,” the system puts together a context for all the brain’s activities.50 To 
this point, the brain supplies an endless stream of material parts, where the 
narratives are deeply rooted in our bodies. Damasio argues for the possibility of a 
neurobiological approach to self-representation that can be found in such an 
internal narration.  
Damasio breaks the problem of consciousness into two parts: The “movie-
in-the-brain” kind of experience (in which a number of sensory inputs, or a 
memory of inputs, is transformed into the continuous flow of sensations of the 
mind), and the self (the sense of “owning” that the movie comes to be part of the 
self). The “movie-in-the-brain” is a nonverbal process, and, as Damasio argues, 
language is not a prerequisite for consciousness. The key issue to Damasio is that 
brain cells represent events occurring somewhere else in the body—as if the cells 
of the body have a kind of intentionality within them. Brains are not mere “maps” 
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of the body; they also represent what is taking place within that topography. 
Indirectly, the brain also represents whatever the organism is interacting with, 
since that interaction is affecting one or more parts of the body. So when an event 
occurs in the brain cells, it also occurs throughout the body. This is both a 
distribution method and a means by which we can see the whole system working 
together as a unit—what Damasio calls a first-order narrative. 
Damasio argues further that there also exists a second-order narrative: 
one’s relationship to other people. The second-order, relationship narrative is 
operating at the same time as the first-order, internal narrative. We create these 
multiple narratives while the “movie” is playing, developing a sense of self 
created by the movie. The thinker is created by the thought. In this manner, the 
spectator of the movie is part of the movie.51 Moti’s work with non-stimulated 
phosphenes encourages his audience to take their own meditative role in art by 
placing the movie squarely within their own body chemistry and onto the internal 
narrative. This fits with Damasio’s theory that consciousness has evolved to adapt 
to multiple experiences and interpretations.  
Damasio’s first layer of consciousness explains core consciousness as the 
simple sense of self in the present. The Prisoner's Cinema internalizes perception 
as an awakening of the clear mind. It is within this clearing of the mind, the work 
suggests, that a complete experience within the brain’s structure occurs. And it 
suggests that, as a pattern, this experience can autonomously generate the same 
patterns found outside its direct purview. The desire for brain stimulation is 
already strong by itself. In The Prisoner's Cinema, it is the lack of mental 
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stimulus that provides the brain with the ability to spontaneously create 
experiences.  
Along with core consciousness, Damasio claims there is another cognitive 
process, which he calls “extended consciousness.” This is where more 
complicated patterning occurs as an act of awareness of both a past and a future 
with respect to oneself and the world. The narrative created within the first layer 
of consciousness is where the here and now can take on deeper meanings by 
overlapping them with life experiences. This is perhaps where introspection 
begins to take on shape within consciousness. 
Damasio describes extended consciousness as an event in which the 
subject has a more elaborate sense of self than with its first or core conscious 
event. Extended consciousness evolves over a lifetime of individual experience, 
placing what core consciousness produces from experience in a broader 
relationship with others and within the extended time frame of lived past and 
anticipated future. Extended consciousness, he says, “still hinges on the same core 
‘you’ (the fleeting, momentary sense-of-self known in core consciousness), but 
that ‘you’ is now connected to the lived past and the anticipated future”—an 
autobiographical record reactivated when autobiographical memory is accessed.52  
Damasio goes on to say that autobiographical memories are artifacts, 
objects that generate a pulse of core consciousness or a sense of self-knowing. 
Extended consciousness thus depends upon two abilities: one is to learn and retain 
records of myriad experiences, and the other is to generate a sense of self-
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knowing by reactivating those records in such a way that they can be known to us. 
Core consciousness, Damasio says, provides a rite of passage into knowing, and 
extended consciousness builds on that capacity, permitting levels of knowing that 
can sustain human creativity. The capacity with which consciousness extends to 
creativity allows us to transform and combine images drawn from that “repertoire 
of patterns of action stored in memory, to invent new ways of doing things and 
make new plans for future actions.”53  For Damasio, creativity and consciousness 
are intimately linked. If we take away consciousness, creativity vanishes. If we 
take away creativity, extended consciousness becomes chaotic fragmentation with 
no apparent cohesion. In this way, the act of creation that the spectator brings to 
these projects may be framed as the aesthetic act of binding together the 
fragments that can never be completely bound. 
The brain spread is one part of the realization that the current boundaries 
of body parts do not adequately explain the functionality of those parts. Parts must 
instead be understood within the whole system in which they live. Neurons 
throughout the body, as an example, are now known to perform advanced 
calculations—actions it was previously believed only the brain could perform.54 
This realization forms part of a critical shift, away from what were originally 
considered the most important aspects of interaction, such as the edges of objects 
that touch or overlap.  
Relationships of things to things, we have now discovered, are instead 
multidimensional and constantly shifting in time and space. Within the human 
body, the situation is the same: at any given time, which of its many zones 
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become the sensitive zones of interest is navigated by the body. These are the 
pathways for how complex receptive fields of art rely on an embodied 
understanding of experience.  
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Chapter 3: Towards a Behavioral Aesthetic 
 
The Biological Modernist 
Chapter 2 reviews calls among theorists for a reinvention of our 
understanding of the brain’s relationship to embodied systems. It lays out the 
claim that the brain is a biological site of intersecting possibilities that activates 
and is activated by the things it comes in contact with, things which therefore alter 
it in substantial ways. The outcome is a reinvention of the understanding of the 
brain as a biological spread and a challenge to the distinctions of interiority and 
exteriority of embodiment. 
The interactions between the brain and the body are more than a series of 
contingencies to other body parts—they are a dense intersection of what, perhaps 
in more general terms, Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls “the field of perception.” 
This field creates a dynamic weave within which human consciousness assigns 
meaning and which affects how we experience every physical aspect of life. For 
instance, we may understand fear as an abstraction, but it is not until we are 
engaged in an act of fear that we feel it. At a moment of danger, biology triggers 
what is commonly called the “fight or flight” instinct. This is how the body 
induces us to take irrational (or pre-rational) actions to minimize risk.55 It is 
within the actions that the body enacts, prompted by the instinct to fight or flee, 
that we find the emotion itself. So first there is a fundamental instinct, then an 
action of the body, and then finally, the emotion of fear rises to the point where it 
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takes over as the driving factor of thought and behavior.56 Acts of embodiment 
must be engaged in order for us to feel the full force of emotions. 
Merleau-Ponty writes about emotions from a more generalized 
perspective—the balance of relationships of the self to objects, to others, or even 
to oneself. This sets a relational stage of perception to things, and retains an 
ongoing embodied relevance to cognitive science. In this way, the body is not 
dissimilar to any object in this larger field of consciousness. The body is a self-
organizing filter for the whirling potential of everything it is exposed to. And so 
every part of humanness is also part of everything that the body processes, 
because without that processing, our need to be active within the world would not 
exist. Embodiment is an opening up of possibilities rather than a grouping of 
teleological distinctions. At every site where material is exchanged between cells, 
or where one lobe of the brain shares functionality with another, an endless array 
of negotiations is constantly under way. And these negotiations are nourished by 
the search of each participating element beyond its own formalities of structure 
and function. Only within that extension, by each element beyond its own form, 
can we find meaning in the world. From this idea, it is fairly easy to surmise that 
reducing any part of embodiment to its material connectors only—while 
overlooking its possibilities for invention—is a mistake. The human body’s effect 
on its own functionality is far more than the sum of the individual functioning of 
its parts; not accounting for intra-element creative exchanges is an ongoing error 
that science has too often made in the quest for absolute truth.  
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The artist has a critical part to play in unifying Merleau-Ponty’s field of 
possibilities. Making art exposes the evidence of intention in ways that shift 
perception away from everyday observations toward critical reflections brought 
on by aesthetics. Art is also a perception that spreads artistic intention through 
action that provides an entry into the process of the artist. It is with the invention 
of Modernism that the artist becomes aware of this potential for personalizing 
experience. The modernist claims self-importance in the rendering of a story that 
exposes a personalized process of invention. This is a critical shift from art as an 
object of appreciation, to a process.  
The experience of art as rendered through the body’s senses has become 
more than an exercise in imagined narration. It also provides us with a guide to 
how the biological functionality of consciousness cannot be seated solely with the 
artwork. It takes the viewer’s own perspective to formulate a compete union 
between the artist, the object and their own perception. This can be traced back to 
Roger Fry's promotion of Post-Impressionism as a breaking free from the 
naturalism of Impressionism in the late 1880s: in Post-Impressionism there is an 
independence of artistic styles for expressing emotions rather than simply optical 
impressions in art. The individual point of artist view also requires the viewer to 
participate in a new way. 
It may be Paul Cézanne who first shifts the perceiver's epistemological 
habits of authorship from the canvas to the viewer. His work lays the foundations 
of the transition from the nineteenth-century conception of artistic endeavor to a 
new and radically different world of art in the twentieth century. His desire to 
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unite observation of nature with the permanence of classical composition exposes 
the juncture between static form and process. His expressive brushwork breaks 
down the distinction of individual objects or entities and works to create a world 
of artist's imagination where a grouping of strokes reconcile themselves within 
this setting. In particular, Cézanne's intense study of his subjects through the 
intentionality of a searching gaze exposes the viewer to the struggle and 
complexity of human visual perception.  
 
 
 
Paul Cézanne, Dish of Apples, ca. 1875–77. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. 
Oil on canvas. 
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Cézanne ignores the traditional laws of perspective, allowing each object 
to be independent within the space of a picture while its relationship to other 
objects takes precedence over its “correct” individual placement according to 
traditional perspective—and therefore to some extent over the individual identity 
of each object. Cézanne thus explores the geometric simplification that removes 
rigid and singular edges of objects, a tendency that first began with the free brush 
strokes of Impressionism. 
 
 
 
Pablo Picasso, Still Life with a Bottle of Rum, 1911. The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, New York. 
Oil on canvas. 
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This exploration finds its way to fully breaking form and meaning in 
Cubism. Picasso and other Cubists dismantle altogether the illusion of wholeness 
of the subject, suggesting a loss of a singular truth within a singular and whole 
world. Time, and the artist’s process, are made visible. And once the artist has 
broken the hold of the singular illusion of form, the viewer participates—must 
participate—in the artist’s intention and process. It is here that we discover the 
other invention of Modernism—the shift of viewer from a passive state of 
observation to a participatory engagement that creates a shared dynamic of 
intersubjectivity. The viewer must now take a certain amount of intellectual 
authorship in binding together the aesthetic experience between form and content.  
The critique of intellectualism in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception is directed towards the idea derived from rationalist Cartesian 
discourse that our consciousness, as a wholly constituted being defined by the 
cogito, judges everything in the external world by rational reflection:  
Perception becomes an “interpretation” of the signs that our senses 
provide in accordance with bodily stimuli . . . but judgment also, 
brought in to explain the excesses of perception over the retinal 
impressions, instead of being the act of perception itself grasped 
from within by authentic reflection, becomes once more a mere 
“factor” of perception, responsible for providing what the body 
does not provide–--instead of being a transcendental activity, it 
becomes simply a logical activity of drawing a conclusion. 57 
 
In Merleau-Ponty’s account of visual perception, empiricism is bound 
within sensory experience. The modern artist exposes this enigmatic ontology of 
the chiasm and the flesh where the artist’s body has the capacity to be both 
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perceiving object and subject of perception with a constant oscillation. The 
modernist artist creates a kind of organization of this effect—from her own body 
to the body of the artifact and onward to meet with the body of the viewer. It is a 
meeting of bodies by proxy—mediation from the body that builds the art to a 
body that completes the cycle by observational experience. Merleau-Ponty goes 
on to consider the exploration of the body both as an exploration of  body-parts 
and as an act of invention: 
I can identify the hand touched in the same one which will in a 
moment be touching. . . . In this bundle of bones and muscles, 
which my right hand presents to my left, I can anticipate for an 
instant the incarnation of that other right hand, alive and mobile, 
which I thrust towards things in order to explore them. The body 
tries . . . to touch itself while being touched and initiates a kind of 
reversible reflection.58 
 
Merleau-Ponty refers to this phenomenon as “drift” between two flawed 
and equally unsatisfactory alternatives—what he calls “empiricism” and 
“intellectualism.” The modern artist supports this notion by creating a realm 
where empiricism and intellectualism are impossible to separate through the 
aesthetic experience of looking at a non-representational image. And with the 
shift of authorship in, for example, Cézanne or Picasso, the viewer can begin to 
enjoy the freedoms that come along with the opening of participation in art. The 
act of art appreciation partakes both of the everyday actions of the body and of an 
abstraction of thought.  
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A Post-Biological Reflection 
In biological humans, behavior is controlled primarily by the endocrine 
and the nervous systems. Hormones and neurons make up these systems of 
chemistry and these, in conjunction with their environments, create the actions 
and mannerisms of the human organisms. It is the response of these systems to 
various stimuli or inputs—whether internal or external, overt or covert, voluntary 
or involuntary—that when bundled together form a coherent sense of biological 
action in the world. Behavior can be regarded as any action of an organism that 
changes its relationship to its environment. So it is behavior that provides outputs 
from the organism to the environment. 
A behavioral cusp is any behavior change that brings an organism's 
behavior into contact with new contingencies that have larger consequences than 
the event itself.59 A behavioral cusp is a powerful type of behavioral change 
because (1) it provides the learner with opportunities to access new reinforcers, 
contingencies, environments, and related generativeness that surround it; (2) it 
competes with existing archaic or problem behaviors that it comes in contact with; 
(3) it impacts the people around the learner; and (4) these people agree to the 
behavior change and support its development after the intervention is removed. 
The implications reach far beyond the field of developmental psychology. 
Generativeness describes the ability of the receiving environment to regulate 
novel responses, functions, values or response products derived from the original 
cusp response. For a behavior, it is the ability to recombine or merge into more 
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complex units, or the ability to contact environments. The behavioral cusp of an 
interactive activity is therefore the location where change in systems can occur. 
As used in computer science, “behavior” is an anthropomorphic construct 
that assigns “life” to the activities carried out by a computer, computer 
application, or computer code in response to stimuli, such as user input. Also, “a 
behavior” is a reusable block of computer code or script applied to an object. The 
evolution of the biological toward the mechanical is a development of survival: 
the vessel of the body is extended in material form, and thus in its expectations for 
survival.   
Behavior in an art object suggests that we consider both the physiological 
and physical implications of identification. Behaviors therefore reflect both the 
intellectual attributes of the condition of being, and the post-biological situation of 
the machine. Behaviors are the conditions in which any action may be critiqued 
for the ability of an object to work within, relate to, and expand from the site in 
which it is located. 
When we attempt to consider our own bodies as the site of our identity, 
there are situations of embodiment that show us describing a site of activity is not 
a simple task. Identifying what creates a single person is not as easy as identifying 
a collection of biological parts that are human-centric. According to Dr. Lita 
Proctor, coordinator for the Human Microbiome Project at the National Human 
Genome Research Institute, the task of isolating human biology from other forms 
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of biology is impossible. He notes that within the body of a healthy adult, 
microbial cells are estimated to outnumber human cells by a factor of ten to one.60 
These internal microbial communities are more than coexisting with the 
body they inhabit: their influence upon human development, physiology, 
immunity, and nutrition—to list a few—are inexorable. So the task of identifying 
what it is to be a biological form—what can be assumed as the starting place of 
human form—is not as clear as it may have been thought. Instead of examining 
the genome of an individual bacterial strain that has been grown in a laboratory, 
the metagenomic approach allows analysis of genetic material derived from 
complete, multi-biological microbial communities harvested from a single person.  
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The Body Form 
 
 
 
Archer Matt Stutzman competes in the individual compound open bronze medal match,  
2011 Parapan American Games, Guadalajara, Mexico, 2011.  
Photo credit: Olympic Games. 
 
Documented in the above image. archer Matt Stutzman prepares to release 
his bow at the 2011 Parapan American Games. Stutzman competes while aided 
with prosthetic devices. His attention, his focus towards his goal is all that exists 
at this moment. But the back story of how everything that was put into play to 
make this moment possible reminds us that the human body is a situation—it 
exists within a complex array of biological and mechanical developments that has 
shifted our contemporary perception of body from the exclusivity of a material 
identity to its action or purpose within the world. It is a phenomenological 
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perception of embodiment with a new twist—one where organic matter no longer 
has a singular hold or claim on life. The body has spread out into the 
technological forms of invention. Matt Stutzman, his wellness and his success, 
reminds us that the biological meshing with the post-cybernetic is well underway. 
To talk of the concept of “health” is usually to talk about maintenance and 
sustainability of the body. But if the body is transforming itself, how are we to 
examine the functional and/or metabolic efficiency of the “health” of that body? 
According to the World Health Organization, the main determinants of health 
include not only the person's individual characteristics and behaviors, but also the 
surrounding physical, social, and economic environments. To sustain health is to 
keep a balance within all of these systems. Health has always been part of a 
human intervention, an evolution that included a constant re-adjusting of the 
relationship to our embodied selves, surviving within an ever-shifting world. 
In consideration are these: what constitutes health? Where is the wellbeing 
of a “whole” or “complete” person situated? For instance, Western medicine 
separates mental and physical health—in this system you can be physically fit but 
mentally maladjusted. As consumers within a health industry, we are required to 
identify ourselves as attending to either a physical or a mental issue of health. Yet 
in all its aspects, health—or the lack thereof—is a function of the body’s moving 
about in relation to the larger environment in which it is embedded. Either the 
parts are moving or they are stuck. They are arguably all mechanical parts—some 
at a very small scale, but all having the functionality to somehow connect and 
relate to each other. Even the biochemistry that moves through brain cells to 
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create cognitive functioning is movement-based, a displacement of energy from 
one neuronal ending to another. Mental health is a balanced flow of this 
biochemistry through the receptors available. The parts are always in flow—
always in migration, but not always in balance. 
 
 
 
Stelarc, The Third Hand, created and performed 1980–98.  Performance still. 
Photo credit: Stelarc. 
 
Stelarc understands the body as a flexible extension of the brain’s 
functions, and considers adding technology to our bodies as a logical next step in 
an evolutionary track. In his performance The Third Hand, his body is part of a 
control system: the motions of the work’s three arms are controlled by the 
electrical signals of his muscles—typically from the abdominal and leg muscles—
for independent movements of each hand.  
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The result is that one part of Stelarc’s body is in control of another part—
the original body is an extendable entity, which can enrich its own functionality 
through added technology. This illustration suggests that the Third Hand can 
assist in the evolution of a built-in obsolete functionality of the original body. 
Through invented forms, the augmented body moves beyond a first wave of 
original health and into a domain that the World Health Organization would 
categorize as a Health Lifestyle: the aggregation of personal decisions—decisions 
over which the individual can participate. In this way, it moves away from the 
biomedical realm where all aspects of health, physical and mental, developed 
within the human body are influenced by a genetic make-up that interacts with a 
world in which we have only secondary control. Such a singular track, Stelarc 
may very well argue, limits our creative potential. 
 
 
 
Stelarc, The Third Hand, created and performed 1980–98. Performance still.  
Photo credit: Stelarc. 
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Stelarc’s body can also be understood from a neuroaesthetic standpoint. 
The work of philosophers such as Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Alva 
Noë claims that an embodied mind denies a separation of mind and body, because 
reason, imagination, and the perception of meaning are part of embodiment to 
begin with. Reason and emotion, furthermore, are always tied to the kinetics of 
experience, binding aesthetics to science and vice versa. In other words, 
experience and cognition are bodily mediated and part of the same bundle. In the 
case of The Third Hand, it is Stelarc’s nervous system that controls both thought 
and muscle action. The flow of possibility for the body is multiplied by the 
evolutionary potential of invention and an expansion of the concept of body. 
 
Synthetic Biology 
Our understanding of biology is now merging with the principles of 
engineering to bring us synthetic biology. Re-engineered engineering, where the 
software is a genetic code made in the laboratory and becomes the software that 
builds its own hardware—has become the new cell. So rather than cut existing 
DNA out of an existing strand, the DNA is made by a machine and can be spliced 
into an existing biological form. These constructed DNA segments are called 
biobricks. Biobricks are a new unit of measure for life. 10,000 years of genetics 
has taken us from gathering seeds to genetically manipulating DNA. Both 
spreading life forms and creating new forms, the new cell provides another way to 
see the post-biological human take new form.  
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Ionat Zurr and Oron Catts, image from The Tissue Culture and Art Project, 2008.  
Photo credit: Zurr and Catts. 
  
Looking at these issues from a cellular level is another way we are re-
inventing ourselves. The Tissue Culture and Art Project by artists Ionat Zurr and 
Oron Catts, explores the use of tissue technologies as an aesthetic medium. Zurr 
and Catts say they are investigating relationships among the different gradients of 
life through the construction or growth of what they claim to be a new class of 
object-being—that of the “Semi-Living.” They write about the work: 
These evocative objects are a tangible example that brings into 
question deep rooted perceptions of life and identity, concept of 
self, and the position of the human in regard to other living beings 
and the environment.61  
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The Tissue Culture and Art Project presents a novel way of thinking about 
evolution and the building of new wet-ware territories: as a way to build a long-
term evolutionary trajectory of health.  
Another interesting situation that the biological system faces is the 
ongoing turf war between other biological systems of the body. Many infections, 
even those caused by antibiotic-sensitive bacteria, resist treatment. Continued 
misuse and overuse of antibiotics has resulted in the evolution of drug-resistant 
diseases. This paradox has vexed physicians for decades, and makes some 
infections impossible to cure. Using antibiotic treatment alone may not be the 
solution. Bacteria become starved when they exhaust nutrient supplies in the 
body. When starved cells stop growing, those targets are no longer active. This 
also produces antibiotic resistance, which reduces the effectiveness of many 
human-designed drugs. And so it is now believed that providing nutrients to the 
bacteria in conjunction with the proper dosage of an antibiotic creates enough 
movement or action within the body to trigger better overall health by keeping the 
bacteria satiated—allowing the cells to thrive enough to be effected by the 
antibiotic. So antibiotics should not been seen as an external machine, a way to 
clean house, but as an internal cooperative prompter that re-stimulates the body’s 
bacterial adversaries/tenants by joining forces with them. 
In a similar re-evaluation, we can no longer look at the mechanics of 
cybernetic development as mere extensions of, or replacement parts for, the “real 
thing.” Artificial limbs and artificial organs become functional and real in their 
application. Material transformations of bone, skin, and organs create a wider net 
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cast over ideas of gender, age, wellness, and survival. The introduction of cells 
grown in Petri dishes has become a means to heal the body by providing it with a 
new functionality.  
This meshing of different biological systems brings to light questions not 
only about what the body is, but about what constitutes life itself. Artificial 
intelligence, technically enhanced prosthetics, and the new frontier of wet-ware 
all distinguish the contemporary moment from the last century of technological 
innovation and integration. In our post-biological and post-cybernetic moment, 
many substantial distinctions between living organisms and the technology that 
they invent or consume have inevitably collapsed.  
The Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela 
endeavored to accurately define life when they first formulated a theory for 
distinctions of living systems in the early 1970s. This work was influenced by the 
“systems” approach to theoretical biology and developed out of Maturana’s study 
of the nervous systems in animals. The theory of autopoiesis is their contribution. 
Autopoiesis (a self-producing system) describes a closed system that is 
autonomous, yet interactive with and responsive to its environment. When 
stimulated by the external environment, a living system will reorganize itself 
internally, but always retains an order that makes it unique, reflexive, and self-
perpetuating. This, Maturana and Varela contend, is the only true definition of 
life, as it elucidates the manner in which life functions as a self-propagating 
system, and does not merely describe the presence of certain parts or common 
mechanisms such as arms, organs, or even a brain.  
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Ionat Zurr and Oron Catts, image from The Tissue Culture and Art Project, 2008.  
Photo credit: Zurr and Catts. 
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We can see that Zurr and Catts’s Tissue Culture and Art Project, discussed 
earlier, does just this: it functions as an autopoietic system according to Matura 
and Varela’s definition. As the work propagates cells for growing the “semi-
living,” any distinction between original cells, and cells constructed in situ by the 
work, is blurred. The voo-doo doll is developed in a glass womb. So if autopoiesis 
defines the system that creates life as something that does not need to be made of 
original carbon cells, perhaps the usefulness of separating synthetic life from 
carbon life becomes obsolete. 
Philosopher Donna Haraway foreshadowed this turn of events in her 1991 
Simians, Cyborgs and Women when she claimed her preference for the cyborg 
over the goddess. In the chapter “A Cyborg Manifesto, ” she notes that goddess 
embodiment seemed to be given, organic, necessary; and female embodiment 
seemed to mean skill in mothering and its metaphoric extensions. The Cyborg, in 
contrast, can finally free herself from this service to bear and sustain such 
otherness rather than to sustain herself.62 Haraway’s move away from the myth of 
the female body, and towards synthetic feedback mechanisms, raises many 
questions about the post-gendered body—its function and its ecology within a 
larger system of being. Is health the sustainability of a biological status quo or 
does it have transformative power—an ability to evolve in the face of say, life-
threatening adversity? 
Organic matter no longer has a singular hold or claim on life. The post-
body aesthetic provides a new philosophy for what constitutes a whole and 
healthy body. It also challenges our ideas of what functionality means in the 
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actions of subject and object. Actions are whole and complete gestures, driven 
from intentionality to activation and feedback. They are also always part of many 
other actions that come from other subjects and objects. The distinguishing of life 
actions from non-life actions no longer provides any useful insight in critiquing 
aesthetics; rather, the discussion has relocated, to the adaptive possibilities of 
technological integration and physical transformation.  
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Chapter 4: The Autopoietic Aesthetic 
 
Preamble 
Autopoiesis is a system of self-creation. While autopoiesis can refer to 
biological systems that self-reproduce, autopoiesis also applies to non-biological 
systems that possess the characteristics of self-sustaining processes, in most cases 
by the use of internal feedback controls. In biology, the autopoietic exchange is 
observed in systems from the co-evolved genomes of mitotic divisions in the 
eukaryotic cell63 to the reward-anticipation potentials of holonomic brain theory.64 
In artificial life systems such as the code for robotics65 or the ecosystems of 
virtual modeling in artificial chemistry,66 we also see the persistence of the 
autopoietic functionality.67 When autopoietic systems overlap or blend with each 
other, they create new typologies according to their behavioral characteristics. 
Both transformative and destructive, these independent systems also become 
agents to and within other apparently unrelated systems. Autopoiesis is a new way 
to conceptualize our relationship to everything we come in contact with. This 
blending also produces a larger complex second-level union of interaction that 
involves how we relate to an artwork and how we can critique those aesthetic 
experiences.  
Inherent in this structure is the re-evaluation of the idea that aesthetic 
experiences are singular events. No longer does an object stand alone in the 
world; nor does an aesthetic experience belong only to an individual human. The 
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aesthetic experience is now always autopoietic. In addition, autopoiesis exposes a 
common ancestry of all people and machines who participate in exchanging and 
merging life events. This ontology rejects both the Kantian view of aesthetics, 
according to which aesthetics is non-conceptual and incapable of giving rise to 
knowledge, and the mind/body dichotomy that underlies it. 
 
Organ Distribution 
 
 
 
Ken Rinaldo, Enteric Consciousness 2010. Installation detail. 
Dopamine dipping from a robotic tongue.  
Photo credit: Nicolas Nova. 
 
A stunning example of an autopoietic union between people and machines 
can be experienced through the installation artwork of Ken Rinaldo. In the 
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multipart installation Enteric Consciousness 2010, we see a group of large robotic 
tongues controlled by an artificial stomach that fills with the living bacteria 
Lactobacillus acidophilus.  
The enteric system is the neurogastroenterological autonomous 
functioning of the stomach. In the enteric, that is a subdivision of the autonomic 
nervous system, cells are a transient component to both the stomach lining and the 
spinal cord. In other words, the enteric permits components to be shared with 
other parts of the body. Through the function of the enteric, the brain is directly 
connected to some one hundred million neurons of the spinal cord via the 
intestinal lining of the gut—a kind of re-distribution of the brain, spinal cord and 
stomach. Rinaldo uses this understanding through an artificial stomach that 
extends the electrochemistry of the human body—from the human brain as a 
neural crest, into the neural crest of the stomach, and into the total body ecology 
of the installation. At the same time, the robotics deliver chemicals found in the 
human body to the artificial stomach, triggering performative events for the 
interactant to engage with and thus to transform the installation as a whole. 
In one section of the installation, Enteric Consciousness 2010 is host to 
large robotic tongues dipping in and out of bowls of melted dark chocolate, drip-
feeding an artificial stomach with squirts of dopamine stored in the robotic 
tongue. In the human brain, the chemical dopamine is known to create feelings of 
enjoyment and even addictive pleasure, while in the stomach it has an emetic or 
forceful expulsion effect and can cause severe constipation, literally stopping the 
flow of activity in the lower intestines. The body’s response to chocolate is 
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similar as well. So the dual use of dopamine and chocolate is an aesthetic 
reflection on the enteric system, refocusing attention from the chemical dopamine, 
the tongue, or even the stomach as singular objects to the behaviors of the entire 
system. Meaning becomes contingent on these dynamic situations, rendering 
either pleasure or discomfort through the acts of chemical distribution. 
Furthermore, there are a variety of ways in which Rinaldo’s installation can 
change meaning—the system in play refers to both pleasure and discomfort, 
implying that sometimes, these outcomes can be a shared experience.  
 
 
 
Ken Rinaldo, Enteric Consciousness 2010. Installation detail.  
Photo credit: Joana Abriel. 
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In another area of the gallery, a twist to the robotic system is introduced 
when a viewer takes the initiative to engage in the installation by sitting in the red 
chair. The viewer—now the interactant—participates to create a complex and 
dynamic feedback loop. When an interactant sits in the chair, the dopamine 
becomes a trigger to initiate the physical pleasuring of the human. The artificial 
stomach first controls and activates the robotic tongue and second, if the bacteria 
within the artificial stomach are healthy and reproducing, the robotic tongue-chair 
senses the presence of the interactant and reclines and delivers a fifteen-minute 
massage. If the bacteria is not healthy, it severs the potential for the system to 
loop and the chair does not move. When the interactant leaves the chair the robot 
tongue returns to an upright position and the installation resets and awaits another 
interactant. The aesthetic impulse of the viewer is to interact—by sitting in the 
chair— hence prompting the autopoietic system into motion. The conduct of each 
organism corresponds to a description of the behavior of its partner. The outcome 
provides the potential for a pleasurable experience to the body but does not 
always provide this outcome. 
This installation is full of experiential feedback loops. The massage helps 
reduce stress-hormone levels, which in turn can actively reduce the incidence of 
intestinal disorders in the human gut. In this way, the installation strongly implies 
a medicinal relationship of pleasure to body to the aesthetic pleasure of art. 
Another loop is the installation’s embodied self-awareness; it initiates its own 
activities through the expressed relation between perception and action. As Alva 
Noë reminds us: 
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For perceptual sensation to constitute experience—that is, for it to 
have genuine representational content—the perceiver must process 
and make use of sensormotor knowledge.68 
 
Embodied knowledge must be active, Noë argues. This involves an 
aesthetic sense in action—the pushing out from sensorial parts and the 
soaking in of contingent parts. Furthermore, Noë presents the argument that 
normal vision depends not only on the movement of the body relative to the 
environment, but also on the self-actuated movement.69 So we must do to 
know. 
Rinaldo’s installation positions the interactants to consider their own 
embodied behaviors. This self-actuated feedback loop is the one that is created 
through the extension of the body with the mechanical devices, the smell and taste 
of chocolate, and externalized dopamine triggers. As the interactant lies in the 
chair, her body expands and contracts, claiming prosthetic identity, and altering 
physiological identity.  
According to Rinaldo’s own description: 
As well as interacting with the mood-altering chemicals in food, 
the enteric nervous system also communicates with the trillions of 
bacteria that live alongside them in the gut, digesting our food and 
boosting our immune systems.70 
 
Rinaldo sees the robotic tongue and the massage chair not merely as 
mechanical trigger devices but as ways to support the enteric nervous system 
itself in an act of self-awareness. As the brain spreads down away from 
cranium through the spine and into the gut, the interactant experiences the 
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phenomenological play of ideas as body. The experience is a bringing forward 
of our chemical consciousness, an undulation rippling up and down the central 
nervous system in our own internal massage. The brain of the gut radiates back 
up the nervous system and fills our senses.  
Within each human body, the living bacteria Lactobacillus acidophilus 
outnumber human biological cells by ten to one. They are, unto their own, an 
autopoietic network: an entirely non-human and non-hereditary adaptive 
technology, seamlessly and symbiotically incorporated into our bodies to 
metabolize nutrients, regulate fat storage, and even train the developing 
immune system. When the bacteria in Rinaldo’s installation are introduced to 
the artificial stomach, we can see these bacteria also reach beyond the 
behaviors of their own workings. While sustaining the integrity of their own 
system, they couple and negotiate with both the artificial stomach and the 
massage chair. Then we feel the experience of ourselves. Just as the digestive 
state of our enteric system determines the circuitry of our own 
neurotransmitters and receptors, so the digestive state of the installation 
controls the symbiotic relationship within the autopoietic exchange. 
Varela originally proposed the following question: to what extent can 
human social phenomenology be seen as a biological phenomenology? 
Rinaldo’s work addresses this question by creating an environment where our 
organs no longer belong only to a singular functionality, and the self-
realization of an external circulatory system becomes an aesthetic pleasure. In 
this way, autopoiesis surpasses the realm of a historical biology and reveals 
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aesthetics as a process simultaneously autonomous and dependent. To 
adequately understand living organisms in this paradox, Varela and Rinaldo 
both claim that living systems are self-producing machines. This leads to the 
observation that living beings are structure-determined systems. This concept 
may be difficult to reconcile with our historical notions of artistic creativity; 
but it is essential in the critique of the post-biological aesthetic, because what 
once determined beauty in the object has transformed our relationship to our 
own selves. Consequently, the self-producing machine challenges us to rethink 
our assumptions about “creativity” and how it works. Creativity may be 
uniquely human but it depends on individual agency. So in the autopoietic 
understanding of Rinaldo’s installation, creativity cannot rise for the interactant 
without the mechanical devices that make up a large component of the 
interactive event. 
 
Vague Organ 
An autopoietic understanding of individual parts of the human body fits 
neatly into their physiological functioning. The gallbladder and the liver, for 
example, conduct a relationship: each looks to the other for its own functioning. 
But in human evolution, the role of the gall bladder as a biliary vesicle for the 
liver has become superfluous for the function of digestion. The removal of this 
organ in humans is usually easily tolerated, with the liver taking over the 
emulsification of fats. There are many organs where evisceration does not kill or 
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severely alter the overall success of the functioning body. As a profound example, 
it is not unusual for lobectomies to be executed on portions of the brain for the 
control of severe epilepsy. Reassignment of brain functioning to other parts of the 
brain after the removal is more common than previously imagined. The brain 
shifts the process to other neural pathways, or creates new ones, to accommodate 
the altered load. This is a procedure that is done on a smaller scale every day to 
accommodate a myriad of functional changes like fever, stress, or depression. The 
reassignment of functions within the organs appears to be far more fluid than once 
imagined, making organs and their functioning ambiguous and elusive. 
The interactive sculptor Simon Penny produces works that hint at the 
elusiveness of body organs. Penny and his team build structures that emulate 
human non-speech vocal sounds, developing lung-like machines, larynx-like 
devices and vocal-tract-like structures; but the structures focus on the 
functionality rather than the forms of particular organs. In his Phatus Project, 
there are assemblages of disquieting devices that laugh, cry, moan, rage, and sigh. 
The relationship between the embodied nature of affect and the structure is 
critical: emotions are, in some sense, of the body first and of language second. 
And this is an important aesthetic focus for Penny. The creation of sculptures that 
act as primitive sound machines draws us towards a reflection on paradigms of 
our own embodiment, without the abstraction of language. 
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Simon Penny, Objects (mechanico-pneumatic voice synthesis machines) from Phatus Project, 
work in progress, 2010–12.  
Photo credit: Simon Penny. 
 
Phatus Project involves prototype lung/bellows machines, and 
microcontroller-based electromechanical process control systems. Twentieth-
century research, Penny claims, has been preoccupied with communication 
through semantic means, largely ignoring aspects of human vocalization.71 Bodies 
and body parts hold multiple meanings that offer alternatives not only to language 
but also to full-body expressions, suggesting a scalable aspect to the autopoietic 
exchange, surpassing the realm of biological functionality.  
Applied to the autopoietic aesthetic, Penny’s experiments engender a 
fundamental dialectic between human bodies and mechanical systems in motion. 
The interactant in Phatus Project moves the bellows and pushes the arm-like 
extensions, enabling the sculptures to displace air and fluids. The sculptures are 
not easy to move: it takes muscle and power to squeeze and push. While 
accomplishing the task, interactants are often found grunting and wheezing 
themselves. The sculpture grunts and wheezes back, and there ensues between the 
two a relationship of pre-verbal communication.  
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The robotic artworks created by both Rinaldo and Penny have the 
intentionality of an aesthetic developed from post-biological or hybrid art. It is 
important that these artworks are not critiqued as a simulation. Penny’s sculptures 
are not models of particular organs. They are vague by design, allowing them 
their own place in the world. It is within the acts of pushing and pulling, with our 
own body forms, that meaning emerges and a fresh act of participation is created. 
Rinaldo’s installations are not meant to explain how chemicals travel through the 
enteric system. They are aesthetic objects that when engaged with an interactant, 
create essentially the only experience of their kind.  
 
Emergent Behavior 
Applied to aesthetics, autopoiesis replaces an external objective view of art 
with an internal relativistic understanding of experiencing art. To a degree, the 
observer and the art object become co-organizers in an evolutionary system of 
patterns within the interactive artwork, creating an aesthetic or heightened 
appreciation of the ever-present phenomena of emergence. Heidegger’s 
possibility of always becoming is at work in this relationship between interactant 
and artwork through the temporality of situations and historical character of a 
coming into being. Placing aesthetics within a phenomenological ontology 
challenges the established relationship between viewer and object, a relationship 
which often keeps high art in a developmental stranglehold. For Heidegger, 
beings are not originally constituted in an individual consciousness. On the 
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contrary, the starting point for every being is Dasein, an active bringing-into-
being, which includes the phenomenological locators of history and the 
embracing of temporality as Dasein experiences provided by Penny’s and 
Rinaldo’s installations. The interactant is always a participant and, as such, can 
never sustain a singular finality of form. The implications of this ontology suggest 
many pressure points between contemporary aesthetics as opportunity for social 
rupture, with autopoiesis as a system of negotiations. How we come to an event 
and what constitutes aesthetics are, in large part, the questions interactive artists 
are exploring with their interactants.  
The autopoietic aesthetic arises, then, from interaction within an art 
system. This may include multiple self-propelled entities, such as mechanically 
driven devices and other human participants, each of which is in negotiation to 
elicit aesthetic expression. Expression can occur through a variety of systems 
created by the comingling of mechanical and biological forms. The implicit order 
of an autopoietic aesthetic is the relationship between the external coherence of a 
phenomenon, and that which is imagined as external—in social terms, as the 
“other.” This relationship of negotiation creates a kind of arena in which a variety 
of systems of thought and action may potentially communicate, cooperate, and 
engage in both conflict and negotiation.  
The autopoietic aesthetic arena can be understood, therefore, as a dynamic 
multifunctional set of systems with a variety of ways to create ideas and 
experience the world. The arena is implicitly process-driven, performative, and 
highly experiential, because it is built on models of consciousness with properties 
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that focus on the entire thought process rather than on a singular outcome. This 
arena constitutes a topological domain that shifts the subject of contemporary 
aesthetics from a thing to a situation—from an object to an intentionality. Without 
the need to distinguish life from the mechanical, physical, or virtual, autopoiesis 
deploys a design and purpose found in human action that is always coupled to an 
extrinsic system. As such, the autopoietic aesthetic arena is a fundamental shift 
from the traditional notion of aesthetics, in which aesthetics functions solely as 
the object of human appreciation. It applies a new understanding of aesthetics as a 
comingling and an inherent function of systems that possess a multitude of 
purposes and outcomes. Aesthetic appreciation rises when we involve ourselves 
inside the processing of the system—a journey to immerse ourselves within the 
system, and to feel our participation in an aesthetically designed emergent 
function. 
As it becomes increasingly difficult, and perhaps less relevant, to 
distinguish between the biological and the mechanical, an autopoietic perspective 
assists in the unification of these distinctions. From an autopoietic perspective, a 
form is not evaluated only on its material properties, but also on the basis of its 
functionality. The autopoietic process involves individual entities negotiating a 
self-propelled exchange between demarcated systems, usually undertaken to 
provide each participant with some sort of self-sustaining or evolutionary 
opportunity. For instance, the interactant enjoys the play of system participation 
in Rinaldo’s installation. This creates a sustaining interest in the work and feeds 
input to the artwork, which in turn keeps processing the tasks of its design to 
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distribute dopamine. The pre-designed objective of the installation is to sustain a 
level of its own activity—that is to create potential for the massage chair. The 
interaction from the interactant affords this as a kind of probe or stimulation. The 
choices available within each autonomous system tend to be, at first evaluation, 
merely self-serving and leading to a solipsistic epistemology. Autopoietic systems 
must interact, however, in order to survive, and in doing so they must form a kind 
of negotiated space with others. This is a key element to the power of the 
autopoietic aesthetic. It is both autonomous and able to involve or even entice 
other systems to engage. 
A self-organizing mechanical system has a self-purposefulness when it is 
intentionally designed with the foresight to sustain its own functioning. In this 
way, machines and people both have properties of self-motivation and self-action. 
Built on the ethical premise that humankind cannot own living systems, 
autopoiesis always assumes an equal exchange, in which the autopoietic artwork 
secures for itself (a living system) “the crucial qualities of autonomy and 
individuality.”72 In her own argument for autopoiesis, Hayles reminds us that it 
was part of Mantura’s original use of the term that we would see all individual 
people as equals. Following this thinking, the exchange between a participant and 
an autopoietic work of art should be considered an equal relationship. Autopoietic 
artworks are therefore positioned as part of a larger system of evolutionary forms 
that struggle to coexist, not thought of in terms of a relationship where one takes 
from the other. This struggle can be observed in any interaction—with 
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imperfections of equality, but one that Mantura argues is far more equal than that 
of the Enlightenment Subject. 
In Autopoiesis and Cognition, Varela refers to both biological and 
mechanical forms as he argues for autopoiesis as a living presence: 
Autopoiesis in the physical space is necessary and sufficient to 
characterize a system as a living system . . . hence, the biological 
phenomenology is the phenomenology of autopoietic systems in 
the physical space.73 
 
The physical space that Varela describes is also found in the autopoietic 
unity of what he describes as a living machine.74 When we, as observers of art, 
interact with an autopoietic machine, we see both its functioning and an exchange 
response, which acts as a register for presence. The exchange is both an 
instrument and an outcome. Built into the outcome is a functional quest to reach 
beyond one’s own sense of autonomy in order to search for a more complete 
experience. This exchange also moves the aesthetic experience away from the 
imperializing gaze of high art towards an exchangeable negotiation between 
participants.  
In the search for authenticity in the aesthetic experience, autopoiesis 
operates as a solitary state that looks to itself as a trigger. If a system refers only to 
itself, how does it interact with anything but itself? The key to unlocking the 
meaning of autonomy, in this case, is to re-conceptualize the notion of 
“interaction.” The function of self-reproduction in a biological autopoietic system 
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necessitates interaction; in a flower, for example, structural elements of the stem 
must interact for the flower to grow tall enough to catch the sun. In order for this 
flower to sustain life, it must also grow tall enough to catch the wind and lure the 
bugs that will use their locomotive abilities to carry the pollen away. Built into 
natural autopoiesis, then, is a state of negotiated action between agents. In the 
case of the cell membrane that makes up the flower stem, it is a permeable 
structure that holds the structure together and shares in a thermodynamic 
exchange of matter and energy with both neighboring cells and the surrounding 
environment. In order to sustain its own autonomy, its permeable cell wall 
participates in an arrangement of interaction with the world while fulfilling its 
self-sustainable needs. 
An aesthetic autopoietic system, therefore, is a focus on the process rather 
than the form of the object. The aesthetic autopoietic system also positions the art 
observer as part of the evolutionary emergence of everything that is part of our 
own identity. In a similar process and in the action of experience, we are both an 
autonomous self (unique in form and character) and an interlocking self (created 
by relationships) through the effects of engaging with interactive art. Art, like life, 
can be viewed as an endless search for exchange. Acts of exchange allow 
moments of consciousness and the reflexivity of introspection. In neuroscience, 
one can detect that it is gesture that leads to a kinetic resonance in each individual 
brain cell. In the search by one brain cell seeking to make contact with other brain 
cells, we find a compulsive need to create ordered relationships. The single cell’s 
search is not unlike the ways individual people gesture within the larger human 
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social sphere. Through a physical gesture, the excitable cell resonates outward 
into the larger primordial openness of the lived world. This is what neuroscientist 
Daniel Dennett calls the qualia, and what phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty 
describes as the Lebenswelt. At the same time, each cell receives life force from 
the larger social sphere. If we can accept this phenomenological exchange of 
human experience, existence may be essentially perceived as co-existence. 
Interactivity becomes the choice and the aim of this coupling, and works as a 
trigger to awaken consciousness.  
Interactivity, therefore, is both an instrument and an outcome: it is a desire 
to reach beyond one’s own sense of autonomy in order to establish contact with 
the general condition of reality. Interactivity is also part of the mechanics of self-
sustainability. It is the aim of coupling, and works as a trigger to awaken a system 
at the levels both of individual introspection and of a whole world relationship. 
Perhaps we have come to a historic moment that rejects distinctions between the 
life of the viewer and the life of the artwork. The life of the mechanical and life of 
the biological can appear the same, but particularly when viewed from within the 
dynamics of autopoiesis. Biological and mechanical life have already transformed 
in a variety of ways. From this post-biological position, a new symbiosis of 
interactivity in art has emerged.  
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Investigation 
 
 
 
Ken Rinaldo, Autopoiesis, copyright 2000. The intra-action of robotic arms 
connecting with each other through a closed software system.  
Photo credit: Ken Rinaldo. 
 
The installation Autopoiesis, an earlier work by Rinaldo, is a collection of 
intra-active robotic arms that connect to each other through a closed software 
system. In this artwork, autopoiesis refers to a system which can be considered 
part flesh and part machine. Robotic arms built from twigs and mechanical parts 
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stay busy communicating with each other through a distributed computer 
network. When multiple robotic arms interact, they do so in ways analogous to 
higher-order, structurally based systems, such as the relationship among neurons 
structuring cognitive activities. The gesticulating arms of Rinaldo’s artwork use 
telephone tones as a “language” to “communicate” among themselves. On each 
arm, a series of light-emitting diodes signals the status of information input and 
exchange among the group. Computer-controlled feedback loops, smart sensor 
configurations, and randomization algorithms produce and control movement. As 
in the biological, neural, and growth structures found in evolution, the artwork 
creates its own internal stasis, the effect of which is a continuous exchange.  
The arms need to know where they exist in space so that they do not 
collide with a visitor in the installation space. For this reason, they track anything 
or anyone that enters the space. Their domain is defined by the spatial limitation, 
which they cannot physically extend. Their spatial domain is not unlike that of 
rooted organic systems, such as a forest of trees or a cluster of synapses 
connecting the cells of a brain. Their systematic and distributed communication 
mechanisms provide a complex comingling of resources and information. The 
individual arms can see and feel through cameras and sensors, making 
autonomous choices on where to go and how to expend energy. At the same time, 
the system as a whole is able to strategize, remaining a singular entity that is self-
contained and self-motivated. In this context, an autopoietic drive, able to 
negotiate an improvised coupling with the observer’s determinant input, becomes 
a central agent to the production of aesthetic experience. It is in the essence of its 
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own need for interactivity that the autopoietic moves beyond homeostasis into 
acts of investigation. The system works of its own accord: the internal equilibrium 
of the meta-system is full of adaptive responses that cannot be accounted for at 
any given time. While control mechanisms function to affect internal steady 
states, there is always the potential to move into the improvisational unknown of 
the interactive moment.  
All autopoietic systems must  move as living entities move through time. 
At each moment they remain in negotiation with any other systems that they come 
in contact with. When interactants come close to Rinaldo’s installation, the 
system breaks out of its own repetitive behavior of looking at itself and reacts to 
something introspectively. The robotic arms inspect the bodies of visitors using 
on-board cameras and sensors. One communicates with the next until all of them 
know that there is a foreign body among them. Each arm moves close but is 
careful not to actually touch the interactant. The robotic instinct is one of invasion 
and survival. The experience of interaction is one of care and uncertainty. The 
parts as a whole—human, machine, software, and triggering devices—comingle 
in a state of uneasiness. The machine can be described as a unique independent 
entity, as can the human observer.  
Through the interaction of the viewer/participant, the artwork, as 
evidenced through the software systems, evolves, producing unexpected, 
emergent behavior and emotive sounds. From the perspective of systems critique, 
the viewer/participant opens the closed system with her/his interactivity, thereby 
challenging the notion of an insentient machine. 
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Rinaldo’s artwork is generally placed within the movement of generative 
art, a system-oriented practice in which the common denominator is the use of 
living systems as a production method. Unlike many art movements that have 
focused on natural form, generative art relies upon the “structurally coupled 
relationship of a self-sustained internal processing and an external mechanical 
functioning of the artwork.”75 Rinaldo references aesthetics within a biological 
schema. His aesthetic systems behave in ways that alter how we physically 
interact with them. Although the closed system of Autopoiesis can be experienced 
as complete within itself, the observer/participant can also alter this system. This 
physical interaction, in turn, enfolds the observer/participant within the totality of 
a new sensory-motor system that is a hybrid of both the mechanical autopoietic 
system and the open potential of a biological system. In this way, a seemingly 
closed system can acquire permeable boundaries, opening up to the larger 
phenomenological world. When stimulated, this artificial “living” system will 
reorganize internally, making itself unique, reflexive, and self-perpetuating—all 
in response to the diverse actions of the given observer. As illustrated by 
Rinaldo’s work, an autopoietic system is a closed system with permeable 
boundaries that functions as an autonomous being. This type of system becomes 
an operationally open “life form” when coupled with its phenomenological 
environment through interactivity. As both a closed system and an open life form, 
the mechanical and structural elements of Autopoiesis mimic biological processes, 
making those processes, in turn, the subject of aesthetic reflection. 
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In describing the biology of cognition, Maturana begins his introduction to 
a description of autopoiesis by saying that: 
The space defined by an autopoietic system is self-contained and 
cannot be described by using dimensions that define another space. 
When we refer to our interactions with a concrete autopoietic 
system, however, we project this system on the space of our 
manipulations and make a description of this projection.76 
 
According to both Maturana and Varela, autopoiesis is a homeostatic 
circular system. A self-sustaining property of autopoiesis is built directly into 
Rinaldo’s installation within the physical and technological elements. Each is 
configured to allow communication with and for the other, using only rule-based 
procedures provided in software. The system of arms in Rinaldo’s installation 
functions to communicate with itself; the movements that emerge from the arms 
of the sculpture are outcomes of an action set upon an interior processing against 
the events of external negotiations.  
Farm Fountain by Amy Youngs and Ken Rinaldo is another installation 
that focuses on a homeostatic circular system. This work also highlights a 
transition from biological autopoiesis to a mechanical or hybrid system.  
 
  110 
 
 
Amy Youngs and Ken Rinaldo, Farm Fountain, copyright 2009.  Based on the technique of 
aquaponics, the plants and bacteria in the system serve to cleanse and purify the water for the 
fish. 
 
The installation is both a sculpture and a system for growing edible and 
ornamental fish and plants in a constructed, indoor ecosystem. Based on the 
technique of aquaponics, this hanging garden fountain uses a pond pump, along 
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with gravity, to flow the nutrients from fish waste through the plant roots. The 
plants and bacteria in the system serve to cleanse and purify the water for the fish. 
The hybridist forms of Youngs and Rinaldo impose another kind of challenge to 
our notion of any absolute autonomy. Although the viewers’ location is outside 
the paradigm of utilization and service, they find themselves in a relationship of 
exchange that fosters appreciation for the system’s life-producing bounty. The 
interactive elements are part of a self-enclosed environment. 
In his forthcoming book Green Light: Toward an Art of Evolution, George 
Gessert describes the "slow art" of plant breeding, and how we create new life that 
takes into account a combination of what we know about ecology, aesthetics, and 
ourselves. The eco-artist has been part of the hybridization of plants for thousands 
of years, but its results were first exhibited as fine art in 1936, when the Museum 
of Modern Art in New York showed Edward Steichen's hybrid delphiniums. 
Since then, bio art has become a genre: artists work with a variety of living things, 
including plants, animals, bacteria, slime molds, and fungi.  
Not only have our plants transformed to answer our needs; we also have 
evolved to take care of our plants. We have assisted in their transformation and 
their evolution, which binds us together with them in a most intimate negotiation. 
In a co-evolutionary bargain struck between a person and a plant, the two parties 
act on one another for their separate individual interests, but wind up trading 
favors in the process of exchange. At the most fundamental level, humans water 
plants, and plants provide food. But plants also provide a kind of companionship 
through their presence. As a sort of victory over the selfishness endemic to being 
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human, ethics may provide us a conscious guide that follows such biological 
coordination in addressing the ever-morphing shape of societal systems. As plants 
and people sustain one another, society also provides protection for the individual 
who needs identity to reap the benefits of autotelic growth. Indeed, the evolution 
of the self is neatly bound up with the security that the collective provides. 
Similarly, a complex array of chemical negotiations must be undertaken for 
systems of humans and plants to coexist. The viewer’s experience in Farm 
Fountain establishes a cooperation that extends to the physiological experience of 
the installation. Such progress goes against a simplified notion of the individual’s 
role in relation to the artwork, thereby pushing us toward an appreciation for our 
relationship to the whole system. 
In On the Origin of Species, Darwin posits artificial selection as the 
process that reflects human will. In artificial selection, Darwin argues, nature 
provides a variety of traits, as in natural selection, but it is humans who decide 
which will be the traits passed down to further generations. In the process of 
domestication, human action plays the same role blind nature does, albeit a bit 
faster. This process of choice constitutes fitness, and, over time, leads to new 
forms of human negotiation—a cultural modification of descent. It is natural to 
engage in selection and selection alters what we understand to be natural. By 
blurring the line separating natural from artificial selection, Darwin opens the 
door to blurring the distinction between nature and all human actions. As an 
example, what we may think of as the high-level functioning of our ethical mores 
can be traced back to the primal skills of human survival. 
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An autopoietic system’s only interest is to make copies of itself without 
any apparent use of natural selection. We can understand an interaction with 
Farm Fountain as part of the evolutionary process of artificial selection, with its 
foremost interest in sustaining the heath of the sculptural environment itself. The 
sculpture moves from object to subject, acting upon the viewer, getting the viewer 
to do things it could not do for itself, such as rotate the plant towards the light or 
trim the dead leaves. The aesthetic system mirrors some of nature’s greatest 
success stories in biological systems and links the interactivity of artificial 
selection to our larger understanding of evolution. 
Farm Fountain posits a model of a domesticated co-evolution. Our genes 
are the archives of our cultural and natural information, containing detailed 
instructions on experiences we enjoy. We have spent the last few thousand years 
remaking our food supply through artificial selection and transforming its 
usability for our needs. Examples include plants that grow attractive flowers so 
that we take care of those plants. Plants have been going about their business of 
remaking us as their caretakers. The beauty of a garden identifies emotions in us 
and the plants in the garden gratify all our senses. We, in turn, look after them. 
Through Darwin’s artificial selection, Farm Fountain comes to reflect human will 
and nature provides a variety of traits from which humans may decide to select.  
 The line that separates natural from artificial selection has blurred, and so 
has our relationship to other forms of life. Living systems, including human 
beings, exist in a context, and cannot be fully understood apart from that context, 
with which they interact. This is why human experience is difficult, if not 
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impossible, to duplicate. Even during well-calibrated cognitive tasks, successive 
brain responses to repeated identical stimulations are highly variable.77 Living 
systems are multiple causal circular processes that allow for complex evolutionary 
trajectories. But the function always follows the form.  
Change in all living systems functions similarly to the way a biological 
circulatory system is maintained. An individual cell would collapse if not for the 
pumping of fluids though its efficient structural wall. Rinaldo, Penny, and Youngs 
have created art that underscores the role of ambiance or a loose system of 
negotiation in the structures of sustainability. They produce circular systems that 
run their tasks with endless precision, but that eventually would cease to exist 
without participation from the outside. By definition, an autopoietic system will 
only take on external negotiation as a kind of bargaining chip, for the sole purpose 
of survival. Although an autopoietic interaction is self-serving, there are 
collective, advantaged, and generative outcomes.  
Neurons in one’s brain, for example, have one hundred trillion cellular 
“robots,” and they care nothing about you or your consciousness or your 
intentions. The more the brain processes external stimuli, the more energy is 
produced in the neuron and its surrounding material. This, in turn, creates the 
need for more neurons to handle the load. So the brain adds additional neuronal 
endings and the cognitive landscape is altered. Another example is how energy is 
created by the system of Farm Fountain. Stimulation from light introduces energy 
to grow the plants that create the food for the fish that create the fertilizer to feed 
the plants. Both the neural process in the brain and the generative process of Farm 
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Fountain use dynamic emergent systems, both arising from external stimuli. Each 
moment will be distinct from the one that has come before. The response of the 
system emerges in the variety of responses that a participant has to the art. The 
feedback loop creates a rhythmic, or synchronous, activity between the parts 
within time and space. The participant’s relationship to the art is a part of, rather 
than a replication of, the emergent systems of all life forms. This process is not 
mimetic. The emergence is thing-itself. 
A similar rhythmic pulse between brain regions has been observed during, 
or associated with, many neuro-biological functions: these include timing-
dependent plasticity of synaptic growth, and a particular chemical exchange in a 
single lobe of the brain acting as a global stimulus to all parts. According to the 
dynamical systems view, the neural processes most relevant to an understanding 
of our overall consciousness are to be found at the level of “dynamical brain 
signatures,”78 understood as large-scale patterns of activity over multiple 
frequency bands, rather than the structural level of specific circuits or classes of 
neurons. In other words, a moment of coherent consciousness is the unfolding of 
multiple synaptic firings, but, also, a dynamic remapping of the entire brain. The 
dynamical approach emphasizes that perception and cognition are intrinsically 
temporal phenomena—they happen in time, not simply over time.79 This is 
important to consider when we compare brain function to the unfolding of 
interactive art, for the location of experience is dynamic in both space and time. It 
is the reciprocal pattern between the individual parts and the mapping of the 
whole— rather than the singular comparative observation between subject and 
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object—that makes the formation of experience. 
Interactive art, such as Rinaldo’s Autopoesis, suggests that the patterns of 
interaction serving as the foundation of the phenomenological field are also found 
within structural patterns of the body. It is the “interactive gesture” of the 
interactant that relies upon the embodied patterns of action and reaction. 
Contemporary artists, such as Rinaldo, appear to intuit these internal patterns and 
develop artworks with interactive elements that complement these patterns in a 
way that elicits and engages the viewer’s patterns of cognition. This is 
substantiated by the ability of these artworks to induce sensorial experience in 
viewers. Through the autopoietic lens, the interactive aesthetic relies less on what 
an artwork looks like than on the phenomenological embodied patterns of action 
and reaction the artwork stimulates between the viewer and sculpture. By such 
means, experience becomes physically accessible for contemplation and enables 
us to perceive ourselves perceiving.  
The teamwork of Rinaldo and Youngs in Farm Fountain presents a far 
more challenging understanding of interactivity, because at first it appears that the 
“participant” in Farm Fountain is merely an observer, too passive for any 
substantial or even observable participation. The sculptural object of Farm 
Fountain may be, however, a more accurate understanding of an autopoietic 
system than previous works, because the default state of sustained life is one of 
self-sustenance. The caretaking that is required by external participation involves 
the maintenance of lighting and temperature—interactions that take on the human 
involvement of intentionality and care. The autonomy and resilience of art 
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becomes part of its aesthetic identity, while the attention to—awareness of—the 
gesture of care becomes the passageway for participation; fueled in part by a 
kinetic intelligence that can come from a relational communication with another 
living thing, interaction becomes tightly bound to the actions of free will. It is a 
kind of bounded self-awareness that Guillemette Bolens, a researcher in gesture 
studies, suggests is a type of creative knowledge bound to the kinetic memory of 
the body. She explains, “Paying more attention to the dynamic reality of cognition 
helps shape the analysis of kinesis in literary narrative and art in general.”80 So in 
this way, ideas about kinetic activity trigger sensorimotor activity in the body. 
Meaning for things that we have considered abstract, such as reading and 
appreciating art, is actually grounded in the embodied experience of active 
comprehension. In this way, the viewer is always a participant—always in motion 
and always responding to the part of the experience that is just beyond reach.  
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Control 
 
 
 
Simon Penny, Petit Mal, designed 1989, built 1993, shown 1994.  
A robotic momentary loss of consciousness.  
Photo credit: Simon Penny. 
 
Simon Penny’s Petit Mal is, in some sense, an anti-robot because it is truly 
autonomous. Most conventional robots are elaborations of John von Neumann’s 
notion of the universal machine, in which the physical machine is simply a void 
to be filled with software content. This attitude within robotics is an unfortunate 
application of the Cartesian idea of the mind-body split, where it is imagined that 
the mind thinks, and that then the body fulfills the mind’s intentions.  
Petit Mal is a very busy machine. With only two wheels and a 
counterbalance, it is in a constant state of trying to keep its own body upright. 
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This balancing is a way of existence for the machine: it constantly checks and 
adjusts just to stay upright, which uses most of its power. Petit Mal also has a 
secondary function, which is to find any physical obstacles in the room that may 
make this work of staying upright more difficult. Things that do not move, like 
walls or stationary objects, are observed with a camera and calculated as 
structures to avoid. But moving things like people are less manageable. The robot 
must spend time calculating the moving object, because coming close to—or 
perhaps touching—another object may potentially throw it off balance. This is 
processing time taken away from the functionality to stay upright. Within this 
paradox is the irony of the robot’s existence. It must search to survive but this 
very search makes it ever more difficult to sustain its own balance. This is an 
autopoietic conundrum: for existence, every system must look away from its own 
self while it must also manage its own behaviors. Petit Mal faces this duality of 
experience as it must do both. In other words, when Petit Mal is roaming about, it 
is impossible to distinguish where the interactant leaves off an action and where 
the robot picks up a response. As Penny explains: 
You could say that Petit Mal is an autonomous agent and a 
realization of an artificial life entity. Not simply in the sense that it 
manifests some behavior that is life-like, but that it has a bottom-
up logic—it doesn’t conform to a traditional artificial intelligence 
way of viewing the world, sometimes referred to as the sense-map-
plan-act paradigm. It is reactive in the way that an insect or an 
animal is reactive. It is consistent with reactive robotics, which was 
a response to the over-reasoned over-complex computational 
solutions of the previous generation of artificial intelligence.81 
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As Penny points out, the behavior of Petit Mal is built upon a reactive 
paradigm. This paradigm is not something that can be described by software or 
hardware alone. Petit Mal’s behavior arises from the dynamics of body within the 
world—a notion that introduces the phenomenological aspect as a seminal 
component of the system’s functioning. In other words, it takes a dynamic world 
of situations to make sense of action. Hardware and software work in a seamless 
continuity consistent with autopoietic systems but it is the evocation of body 
sensations and operations that fulfills the desire of action.  
A cognitive reading of Petit Mal would present the artwork as 
temporalizing involuntary participation in the world. The artwork is not projected 
from the gaze, as we see in Rinaldo’s sculpture, but rather actively disrupts the 
gaze, intentionally generating disequilibrium. The artwork’s action involves both 
the sculpture and the participant in the search for stasis. In neurological 
terminology, a petit mal seizure inhibits neural connections and creates a 
momentary loss of consciousness. It is important, for this reason, that the Petit 
Mal sculpture present itself as just a little out of control. Petit Mal’s always 
becoming is a reaction to oppressive theories of control. In fact, Penny describes 
this robot as an engineering nightmare.82 Although Petit Mal’s mechanical 
structure is inherently stable, it has a chaotic motion generator at its heart, with a 
double pendulum offsetting its center of gravity, thereby creating a range of 
unpredictable motion. By design, Penny has developed the robot to rely on its 
own movement through time and space to find balance. An artist engineering a 
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robot to sway between balance and imbalance is the aesthetic experience for  
participants with Petit Mal.  
The interactant must relate with Petit Mal in a manner different from the 
interactions solicited by other, traditionally predictable, robotic systems. In the 
case of Petit Mal, the viewer spends much of her time interacting with the space 
between her own body and the body of the robot. The viewer very soon realizes 
that her very presence makes vulnerable the survival of the robot. This in itself 
turns the viewer into the interactant, because Petit Mal now relies on the viewer’s 
motion. Too fast a motion from the viewer/interactant, and the robot may tip and 
fall down. Too much time spent by the interactant moving about the space, and 
the robot eventually will be unable to retain equilibrium and will fall down. The 
interactant must project herself into the semi-conscious state of mind of a petit 
mal seizure in order to formulate a knowable pattern against her own movements. 
She processes movement in thinking about movement.  
In current neuroscience, this process is known as mind reading, and is 
about the reading of someone else’s mental state. In his groundbreaking book 
Simulating Minds, Alvin I. Goldman suggests that “the notion of mentalizing 
anchors the fabric of social life.”83 An “anchor” is an appropriate model for Petit 
Mal because it is a system that does not provide a simple model of presence. 
Goldman would say that anchoring happens in the body of the viewer when she 
theorizes, rationalizes, or simulates the experience of other minds through the 
patterning within her own brain. Reading minds is an extended form of 
involuntary empathy. The simulation theory referenced by Goldman within the 
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cognitive experience is not to be confused with other simulation theories in the 
realms of philosophy and technology, such as Plato’s art as imitation or Antonin 
Artaud’s virtual reality—both mimetic instructions on to how to be in the world. 
In cognitive science, simulation theory entails sensory enactment or an imagined 
state of mind through physical actions in the brain. In mind theory, the important 
distinction is that a thing is never mimetic but always a thing in itself. In the case 
of embodied actions, consciousness, as a thing itself, arises from the processing of 
external events. Indeed, one’s development as a thinking being emerges from 
interaction with what one perceives in other people’s minds and then simulates in 
one’s own. In a game of peek-a-boo, the infant feels the mother’s delight in 
encountering her own body, and responds with joyful laughter to the mother’s 
pleasure; the mother’s pleasure is simulated in the infant’s own mental process. 
Simulation can be thought of in terms of the developmental strategies for one’s 
own consciousness in an autopoietic exchange with the ideas of the world. As the 
individual grows older this simulation grows into a more sophisticated act of mind 
reading where a pre-thetic state of consciousness projects outward to find 
connections, yet remains self-serving and autonomous. This entire process brings 
the immediate experience of the other into one’s own experience of wellbeing. In 
this way, Petit Mal points us to an essential core of the self, in which we are in 
constant search for equilibrium and social interaction.  
The mirror neuron is another example of the collapse of the brain/world 
split. In the case of interactivity, a mirror neuron is a neuron that fires both when 
the human interactant acts and when another system observes the same action 
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performed by another person.84 In neuroscience, this explains how involuntary 
and immediate mental interactions simulate the actions of another system. 
Goldman explains that, “as a network, it encompass(es) environmental stimuli, 
internal states, and behavior.”85 Interaction accommodates the mental functioning 
and the behavior of the person as a single event of action. Here we can see both an 
autonomous and an interpersonal functioning for the mirror neurons. The casual 
relations binding mental states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses give rise  to 
intentional stances within an ontology that does not separate thoughts and objects, 
nor afford privileges to one over the other. This is another way of saying that what 
things might be, what constitutes their singularity, is likely to be found in their 
relations and interactions rather than in themselves alone. Simulation recuperates 
the self through the other and so the singular is always in an autopoetic 
relationship. 
In the light of simulation theory, the notion of cooperation can also be 
understood as a hybrid in which egocentric bias becomes displaced, or even 
disrupted, through the inevitable entwinement with the simulated affective 
experience of others. In a mechanistic way, dual processing of one’s own altered 
mental states allows for the simultaneity of autonomous activity, with reciprocal 
hedonic benefits. Cognition, then, becomes characterized by the controlled flow 
between the perspectives of taking and receiving. Goldman terms this enactment 
imagination, in which one’s own neural structure “enacts” what it “imagines” of 
another’s mental activity. Enactment imagination provides the essential attributes 
of the other as taken into the self. Mimicry involves mechanisms beyond 
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decoding a visual surface, such as the visual read of a face. The other’s real or 
imagined action, within the perceiving mind, is a neural enactment that Goldman 
describes as grounding self-other symmetry.86  
Cooperation helps release the egocentric bias in individuals. Indeed, the 
pull of mimicry in one’s actions is such that the other’s actions seem invitations 
for the self to participate. Often applied to contemporary aesthetics, this 
participatory model allows cooperation, rather than mastery over the object, to 
become the reflexive and preferred act of aesthetic exchange. 
 
(Auto)Reaction 
Penny’s Petit Mal creates a simulation through action. Because the 
(auto)action of  Petit Mal is consistently unexpected, the viewer positions herself 
in a manner that poses the physicality as a location for aesthetics. Anne-Marie 
Duguet delineates this dynamic in the introduction to the catalog of the 2006 
Transmediale exhibition. In Duguet’s view, the action of constant adjustment to 
the viewing state brings out the humanness of the viewer, triggering emotions and 
a desire for connection. Moreover, the viewer is placed in the position of playing 
“catch-up” to the interaction and becomes subservient to the nature of the robot’s 
behavior, another unexpected reversal: 
 . . . a trace of autonomy is perceptible, all this non-resemblance 
falls into oblivion and a “human effect” is activated, inciting the 
viewer to project endlessly. Thus, the object of humor may become 
the viewer himself interpreting a slight step back as fear, and a step 
forward as curiosity. Sensitive to the environment, capable to 
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diversify and to involve its reactions, the robot tries to have a 
relationship to the human being, and this relationship is constituted 
from the beginning as a human relationship, one of domination or 
of sympathy. The robot is no longer the slave, it enslaves the other. 
This kind of reversal is a satire of human psychology and of the 
expression of the platitude of the threat that represents the 
development of such autonomous “creatures” for the human 
being.87 
 
According to Duguet, the viewer must rely on the action of Petit Mal for 
the aesthetic experience. It is the “stepback/stepforward” positioning of the 
viewer, however, which creates an uneven projection, oscillating between fear 
and curiosity. Confusion arises from this unexpected negotiation and a dance to 
find a homeostatic balance ensues. Duguet defines an interaction that is far from 
one of cooperation—she continues to use a dual system of experience by setting 
the robot up against the interactant and vice versa. She argues that the human 
psyche is not well equipped to take on the subtle attributes of robotic aesthetics. 
This is an excellent example of an autopoietic aesthetic as a valuable lens for 
critiquing contemporary art. In neuroscience, the physical action of reaching and 
pulling within one’s own body is also a brain-generated simulation, a feeding 
back of experience into the temporal regions. The temporal regions are believed 
to be the caretaker of our senses and our emotions. In these regions, what we feel 
is neurologically mapped with what we experience. Petit Mal reminds us that 
behavior evolves. Perhaps, in the play between the two sentient forms of robot 
and interactant, we realize that each is reliant upon the other for mutual evolution. 
We also come to understand that interactive art leaves the viewer to experience 
certain things that lead to reflection, which in turn leads to other experiences. 
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Through the intelligence of embodiment, such installations highlight how the 
enactment of the physical shapes the psychological, and constitutes another way 
in which we express ourselves.  
Using this neuroscientific ontology, interactive art develops through the 
systems of self-reflexive connections that exist between the forms of the 
autopoietic object and the observer. The use of an autopoietic mechanism, along 
with the observational learning that occurs with structural functions such as 
mirror neurons, provides a method for identifying material for thought and new 
knowledge. In this way, interactive aesthetics move cyclically from the outer 
manifestations of human action to inner meaning and back out again to the 
aesthetic interface, in endless circulation without loss of autonomy. It is evident 
that experience and expression cannot be neatly separated. The singularity of 
perception dissolves, as meanings emerge into the world of experience through 
bio-physical co-evolution. The many varieties of exchange describing the 
autopoietic aesthetic are entangled within this force. 
Autopoiesis offers us a kind of co-evolution in concert with interspecies 
and living/non-living systems, where art and viewer are part of the same system 
of experience. In this way, autopoiesis poses a question about the end of 
simulation, because we can understand experience as an interacting system, rather 
than one subject being a reflection of another. As hybrid systems that must 
interface with the larger environmental arena, systems of autopoiesis can no 
longer be considered simply another kind of “other.” Some aspects of their 
functioning may reference only their internal qualities, but total success relies on 
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the materiality of a larger existence, beyond insular feedback mechanisms. The 
interactions of Rinaldo’s individual robotic arms, for example, are defined within 
a set of rules for their behavior, individually and collectively, which can be 
considered their structural identity. The structural identity in this physical sense is 
what defines the structural identity of actions—or as Varela states it, “The 
structural identity in this physical sense is what defines the structural identity of 
actions.”88 This identity generates two tenets of autopoiesis. First, nothing is a 
model for anything else: everything has its own essence. Second, locomotion of 
the singular always comingles with the locomotion of the other. And seeking 
coherence, the world “comes up” to being through the sheer confusion of 
experience. Out of the clash of the internal and the external comes the sensation 
of a very stable reality. The brain looks for these points of placidity in every 
moment to create a stable arena of perception. The brain is not at all interested in 
actually arriving at placidity; rather it is drawn to the differences in situations. 
When Petit Mal seeks equilibrium it exposes the “points of placidity” the brain is 
looking for. 
According to Varela, evolution has less to do with getting better through 
adaptation than with what we choose through experience. The tempero-spatial 
mechanisms of material form, such as brain cells or kinetic sculptures, give each 
individual moment its character and behavior. As a cell grows and lives, it 
develops all of its necessary life functions and continues to do so until it dies and 
the autopoietic cycle ceases. One similarity between a living cell and a 
mechanical autopoietic system is the cell’s inability to make qualitative judgments 
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about survival without an external connection. For instance, the cell takes in 
chemicals for growth, but to the cell’s components there is no real difference 
between food and a toxin. They are both perturbations that affect the efficacy of 
self-propagation, favorably or not. In both cases, the autopoietic system must also 
be reflexive within the larger arena of interaction. Aesthetic autopoiesis is a 
contemporary observation that simultaneously presents all facets of this prismatic 
truth. The autonomy and resiliency of art as part of its own identity is also, to a 
certain degree, its own non-identity. 
Varela’s autopoietic understanding of the subject holds value for the 
critique of interactive art because it is a method by which we can decenter our 
singular attention of the art form to include the activity of the entire system in 
which it participates. Goldman’s theory of simulation provides a way in which the 
autopoetic methodology can distribute concepts between the interactants within 
such a system. For Duguet, the action of constant adjustment to the viewing state 
may be the major catalyst for aesthetics within experience. Because Duguet’s 
process relies on a gesture from the human interactant, the embodied patterns of 
action are implicit. This state of flux is where Goldman’s theory of mindreading is 
set in motion. But according to an autopoetic exchange, the object can also 
become an interactant, bringing into question the source of the aesthetic 
experience and the flow of activity. 
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Chapter 5: Interactivity 
 
Preamble on Action 
The body is so natural to us that, as long as it functions normally, we tend 
to neglect its existence. We experience the things we encounter directly, as if we 
were touching them with our very thoughts. Yet, perception happens within—not 
through—the body. The body operates on a sub-personal level, independent of 
conscious awareness, actively modulating perception to determine which 
information will be picked up, when, and how. This process has two outstanding 
features. One is that perception is formulated through intermingling with the 
larger world. The other is that the body must be an active participant in this world 
in order for perception to arise. These two features are so obvious that they are 
taken for granted as we move about every day.  
The frame of interactive art, by deploying sensorial feedback, can help us 
focus our attention towards our bodies and how they are in constant play with 
everything the world has to offer. Our senses are only part of a larger and more 
complex situation that involves time, space, action, and intent. The complexity of 
these interactive events—how they take place and what meaning they provide in 
aesthetics—becomes of particular import to interactive art because of its aesthetic 
focus on the sensorial. Interaction is also fundamental to the contemplation of the 
interiority and exteriority of the self and is how we develop expression. 
Interactive art becomes the aesthetic rendering of the time and space that the body 
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undertakes. It is experience through the act of introspection. 
 
Experience as a Flow 
Functionalists in the philosophy of mind, such as Hilary Putnam, argue 
that psychological states are multiply realizable: there can be no one-to-one 
mappings of psychological states onto neural states.89 If we agree with this 
premise, this multiplicity is also arguably true in mapping larger states of body 
action—specifically, physical gestures—to neural states. Neuroscience is unable 
to neatly use what we may know about correlate processing in the brain to 
accurately explain our actions in the world. Concurrently, our actions cannot 
supply an absolute correlate to how the body and external phenomena relate. 
What has great potential within embodied discourse, however, is the use of an 
enactive approach to cognitive science. Enactivism is a direct approach to the 
mind/body split because it depowers the centrality of the subject: the aesthetics of 
interactivity draw attention to our contingency in a world where we act. This is 
the intercorporeal self of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach to 
subjectivity. The artist’s gaze is not directed at the external world; instead, “the 
incentive to create arises from the objects themselves.”90 Consequently, the artist 
is not the sole author of his or her actions. Although these actions originate in the 
objects, meaning arises from the artist’s interaction with the form. 
As Merleau-Ponty's work suggests, a type of subjective awareness is the 
root of true primal experience. Merleau-Ponty argues that rational operations 
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grow out of embodied biological activities in local environments, and that an 
account of abstract thinking must begin with the sensory-motor system. The 
dynamic interaction between agent and environment shapes the cognitive 
processes in real time as those processes unfold. A contemporary interpretation of 
“the being/becoming distinction” is observed in the complexity-based 
understanding of the world as being in a state of constant flux. Complexity-based 
systems are diverse and adaptive: they are composed of multiple interconnected 
elements and have the capacity to change and learn from experience. In the case 
of interactive art, they bind together two worlds—the intelligible and the 
sensible—by topologically mixing individual parts in dynamic ways. In an 
interactive event, there is active pushing and pulling between the body’s 
abstraction of becoming and the body’s immediate sensibilities. The intelligible 
and the sensible remain autonomous, but create a new situation of engagement 
that produces a pluralistic approach to the binding of the two worlds in dynamic 
formation. By locating the body as always-becoming-together through the act of 
doing, we ride across the slippage of time on experience. Here, mind and body 
(inasmuch as “body” is by material properties of the skin-container visible and 
considered indivisible) can remain a multiplicity
 
of mind-matter and subject-
object relations while always working together as a singular event. 
Henri Bergson defines mind and body together as places of passages, not 
as their individual material or conceptual substrates. He expresses the body as 
always moving and “real movement (of the body) is rather the transference of a 
state than of a thing.”91 Movement is the thing itself. Bergson aptly states: 
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If our belief in a more or less homogeneous substratum of sensible 
qualities has any ground, this can only be found in an act which 
makes us seize or divine, in quality itself, something which goes 
beyond sensation, as if this sensation itself were pregnant with 
details suspected yet unperceived. Its objectivity—that is to say, 
what it contains over and above what it yields up—must then 
consist, as we have foreshadowed, precisely in the immense 
multiplicity of the movements which it executes, so to speak, 
within itself as a chrysalis. Motionless on the surface, in its very 
depth it lives and vibrates.92 
 
Bergson argues, furthermore, that such complexity of movement is a pure 
state of being, akin to consciousness itself. He states that “the fundamental law of 
physical life is the orientation of consciousness towards action.”93 What is 
fascinating about his understanding of this movement is that the state of our 
consciousness produces a reality independent of our selves. Action, Bergson 
argues, creates a situation already outside; it is within perception that we move to 
bind this consciousness back to the body. The interactive loop that is created by 
this transference is an essential state of being and a fundamental process in which 
consciousness rises. Bergson’s philosophy of the body is strictly connected to his 
ontology of images in which the body acts as a mirror. He claims that “our body 
is nothing but part of our representation which is ever being born again, the part 
always present, or rather that which, at each moment, is just past.”94 
Each action in Bergson’s ontology shows us that time delay is the 
feedback system that exposes uncertainties. These uncertainties are echoed in the 
mechanics of the body as a discontinuous and non-totalized series of processes, 
flows, corporeal substances, incorporeal events, intensities, and durations. 
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Bergson’s biological understanding of the body has it not only always in motion, 
but also always situational. The movement of the body-as-whole only ceases 
when the decay of death is so much that it cannot sustain the functioning of 
passing energy from one part to the other. The body changes through a series of 
steps, such as the onset of rigor mortis. If left alone, the body takes on many 
forms as it passes back to its most basic material components. Even in death, the 
body continues to act out many senescent transformations. As this process takes 
hold and the traditional concepts of cognitive functioning cannot be distinguished 
from the body-as-whole, the self finally reverts back to the material from which 
its form originated. Eternal oblivion is reached when the energetic form of the 
body breaks down into its material substrates, which carry on through their own 
energetic forms. Thought may also translate to another energetic form in the 
action of body death. In his essay “Is There Life After Death?” Henry James 
affirms the power of artistic consciousness to survive outside itself. He sees the 
aesthetic process as an “enormous multiplication of our possible relations . . . 
carrying the field of consciousness further and further, making it lose itself in the 
ineffable.”95 James shows us that the idea of perception is tied to yearnings—to be 
out of one’s own self, even at the last moments when we pass away from our 
body.  
This is not a transcendental death, but rather what Bergson calls “an act of 
duration that can be grasped through a simple intuition of the imagination.”96 A 
Bergsonian death can only be understood through its incomplete feedback cycle 
or what he calls duration. Duration is always part of life as well as death. Because 
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duration is ineffable, it creates freedom: we can finally exist outside of the time 
and space of the life mirror.97 Bergson explains that death of the body is the final 
inability to interact and is the final process in the series of unfinished 
entanglements. So even in the finality of death, the momentum of entanglements 
that life has created continues in the life cycle.  
Interactive art can be understood as the envelope of total life cycle—from 
the start of the interaction through the end , we can experience the sustenance and 
decay of a total life experience. And the interactant takes away an aesthetic 
experience that continues to activate through the memory of experience. 
This understanding of body as a discontinuous and non-totalized series of 
processes works directly against the central theme of the twentieth-century 
obsession with self as the nucleus of cognition. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
touches upon this by creating a kind of decentering of the self in which lived 
experience exposes the recursive nature of the larger body of lived beings. 
Merleau-Ponty writes that the lived body is “a horizon latent in all our experience 
and itself ever-present and anterior to every determining thought.”98 This 
viewpoint from the anteriority of the singular body exposes the precarious 
condition of the self. Evan Thompson understands the dynamic and even volatile 
condition of the self in this approach: 
The enactive approach does not start from the question of whether 
cognitive processes extend beyond one or another boundary, such 
as the skin, skull, or central nervous system, that is supposed to 
mark some inside/outside distinction. Rather, the enactive 
approach starts from the question of how a system must be 
organized in order to be an autonomous system—one that 
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generates and sustains its own activity and thereby enacts or brings 
forth its own cognitive domain.99  
 
In this model of enactive theory, the self is no longer the focus nor the 
center from which all thought rises. This shift alters everything about how we 
understand the relationship between art and ourselves. Walking into an art 
installation becomes not only an act of visitation but a freedom to release our 
selves into the senses of the other. 
 
Embodied Aesthetics 
The body occupies a central position in art, sometimes as an object of 
contemplation, often as a means to express something about the subject whose 
body is the focus of the work. As long as art is produced by and for human 
beings, it will deal with aspects of human life—either directly (by making human 
conditions the topic of individual works and forms of art), or indirectly (in the 
sense that any representation of the world will be filtered through and articulated 
by human cognitive faculties). Art in all its forms is vital, because it is one of the 
few methods available for interrogating and exploring human life at large. As N. 
Katherine Hayles has stated, “[w]e do not exist in order to relate; rather, we relate 
in order that we may exist as fully realized human beings.”100 
In embodied aesthetics, this interaction is always considered an active 
process—or what Thompson calls sense-making.101 Interactive art focuses our 
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attention on the importance of making choices to render our own unique qualities 
in the aesthetic experience. It focuses us, through the pleasure of introspection, 
towards the continuously changing and actively engaged transformational process 
of life. This is a critical transhistorical moment for aesthetics because it 
distinguishes between a passive aesthetic appreciation of art and our ability to 
participate in making aesthetics a dynamic form of action. Action is intertwined 
with consciousness in ways that may be impossible to separate completely. 
There are many pre-existing assumptions about how embodiment is part of 
the rise of conscious acts. Physical activities, such as walking or using tools, are 
believed to operate in the brain in radically differently ways from non-physical 
activities such as thought.102 This assumption has created two separate domains of 
research: one, the strict relationship of neural processing to abstract thought and, 
the other, the functionality of kinesthetic movements of the body and physical 
movements relationship in the world. This also has led to a somewhat de facto 
acceptance in the field of neurocognition that doing an activity leads to a more 
direct understanding of being-in-the-world than thinking about doing that activity. 
Scientists have inadvertently focused on the distinctions that exist within a body 
system rather than the qualities that unite a body system as a whole when the 
body is engaged in activity. Thought in neurocognitive language has, therefore, 
become a processing function upon which the real (being-in-the-world as the 
observed and abstracted) acts. Neuroscientists build scenarios in which thought 
leads to projections of the real; the body then follows with doing in the direct 
form (being-in-the-world as the execution of what is really going on). According 
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to this logic, as soon as any action involves the brain it immediately becomes 
abstracted and unable to retain the “true” qualities of an event. The outcome of 
this strange scenario, if followed, would be a body that could disconnect and carry 
on without the interference of thought. In order to avoid this problematic model—
in which the brain resides inside an outer shell that experiences the world—the 
distinction between thought and action must dissolve. 
Another—and perhaps more philosophically holistic—way to understand 
action is as a system of multiple entities dependent upon one another to function. 
For example, a glass of water consists of two separate elements, water and glass, 
yet together they create something new through their use: drinking, putting out a 
kitchen fire, or watering a house plant. Action can produce many meanings. 
Water in a glass can affect thirst, fire, and growth depending on deployment. 
These potential multiple effects involve many streams of activity that produce 
experience without much prejudice to thought or action. It is consciousness 
without intentionality, but it is still full of inventiveness and playfulness because 
the processes of engagement are not reduced to the functionality of a singular 
body but rather encompass the whole embodied gesture. 
Experience, or qualia, is also a vital component of consciousness. Bio-
electric pulses of thought share the same physicality as moving a limb. In the 
same way, the movement of the chemistry of consciousness is also a kinetic act 
within the body system. The distinction between the biology that forms the 
doing—thought—and the doing itself—action—is far less important than the 
actions they perform together. It is unfortunate that so many researchers continue 
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to separate the two, constructing systems of complex mimetic structures for 
thought while relying on oversimplified action/reaction relationships for the 
movement of larger body parts. This division leads to a passive model of being 
that Bernhard Hommel’s research into an ideomotor relationship of action 
bemoans: 
Indeed, almost all textbooks of cognitive psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience try to make us believe that humans are basically 
passive couch potatoes who are waiting for external events that 
make us get up and move.103  
 
As an alternative, Hommel posits that a combination of internal and 
external stimuli work together from the very start of action, carried through 
intentionality. To return to the example of the water-filled glass, events are less 
about how to fill the glass with water and how to drink it and more about the 
intention of bringing the water and the glass into an act of use. Dividing this 
process into smaller parts, as a bioengineer or cognitive scientist would be 
inclined to do, does not provide a more accurate description of the action, but 
rather fractures one event into many disconnected parts. “Action,” in this sense, 
should be understood as an immersive phenomenon rather than a sum of 
mechanical parts. The philosophy of intentionality, as defined by the Stanford 
Dictionary of Philosophy, is “the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to 
stand for, things, properties and states of affairs.”104 A full use of action would be 
to engage consciousness in as many ways as possible, providing a depth of 
experience from the whole body system. 
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In contrast to a divided system, events may be understood as a system that 
operates through the activation of mechanical frameworks. Parts of the system 
find their meaning as they are used. In interactive aesthetics, action is used for the 
raising of an aesthetic experience. What activation occurs and why it is done 
cannot be neatly separated into unique areas of study. Interactive objects activate 
in ways similar to our understanding of the functionality of our own bodies, 
because both are in states of negotiation with each other. Each object 
autopoietically must negotiate with others outside itself. The neuroplasticity of the 
brain shows us how inventive we can be when interacting beyond our singular 
consciousness. Our neural pathways are used for multiple purposes and quick 
responses, for instance the re-routing of signals and remapping of the cortex in 
response to injury.105 It is this flexibility and adaptation of consciousness that 
makes aesthetic experiences so desirable. Characteristics such as event causality 
and intentionality are part of what we look for in full experience. These kinds of 
aesthetic behaviors are designed into interactive art as part of a behavioral 
vocabulary aesthetics, providing a fresh perspective on the nature of the human 
conditions of flexibility and adaptation.  
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Disrupting/Reinventing Introspection 
 
 
 
Daniel Rozin, Wooden Mirror, 1999. 
830 square pieces of wood, 830 servomotors, control electronics, video camera, computer, 
wood frame. 80 x 67 x 10 in. 
 
Interactive artist Daniel Rozin builds mechanical mirrors that leverage 
action as a form for introspection. Any person standing in front of one of these 
sculptures is reflected onto its surface through mechanical distortion. In his work 
Wooden Mirror, the interactant becomes the content of each piece; but the 
reflection that is produced is a gross sampling of what a traditional mirrored 
surface, or a video system, might provide. Rozin embeds a video camera within 
the mirror to capture a representation of the interactant. The representation is then 
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translated into an image as chunky cubes of wood move in the framed surface of 
the object. Each piece rotates and catches the light to best translate the amount of 
light on the surface of the interactant’s face. In a world of contemporary art that is 
often reduced to spectacle, these works offer the viewer a different interactive 
task: to stand quietly with an artwork and to feel the nuanced shifts of her own 
body. This aesthetic experience offers the interactant the ability to experience 
subtle changes in light and movement—revelations that the object constantly 
provides as a series of motors control the pitch of the wood surface in relationship 
to a light source. A small shift of the interactant’s feet or a tilt of her head will 
change, ever so slightly, what the camera collects. This, in turn, is exaggerated by 
the large pixel-like pieces of wood. With a slight lag in processing, the object 
slows the gaze and provides a self-reflective focus through the distortion of 
material translation. The result is a generalization of form. In this case, the body’s 
self-awareness is actually heightened by the loss of visual data. This makes 
Rozin’s work a kind of system of simplification, slowing time and space, and thus 
evoking interplay through a dissonance between its slowed echo and the body that 
exists in its own time and space.  
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Daniel Rozin, Weave Mirror, 2007.   
768 C-shaped prints, 768 motors, video camera, control electronics. 57 x 78 x 8 in.  
 
Weave Mirror assembles 768 motorized surfaces and prints along the 
surface of a picture plane. “A seemingly organic smoky portrait comes in focus to 
the sound made by the sculpture’s moving parts. Informed by traditions of both 
textile design and new media, the Weave Mirror paints a picture of viewers using 
a gradual rotation in greyscale value on each C-ring.”106 
The experience of Rozin’s mirrors attacks any scientific claim that thought 
can be reduced and represented as a set of functions. The interplay between the 
mirror and the interactant makes for a system full of highly personalized and 
subtle changes that involves  movement as it relates to concepts of the self. It is 
the spectacle of interactive art, however, that can distract from certain 
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introspective themes. The interactant must focus on the moment at hand: the sense 
of standing, seeing, or even breathing can become elevated, labored, and 
dramatized. The swing between body system and idea system must, at some point 
in time, overlap. This overlap also occurs while reading literature, but with less 
full-body processing. When reading, the body becomes more passive, with eyes 
focused on the page and the brain directed on the text. The question becomes how 
the reader can bring a world of words to a world of emotions. How can we as 
readers, for example, follow a fictional story as both words on a page and as a 
narrative that sweeps us away into thought? We appear to be able to navigate well 
between the two, being transported between text and meaning. Norman N. 
Holland explains this as a loosing of the self and a loosing of the world.107 He 
writes that, “our brains behave oddly when we are transported by a literary 
experience. We cease being aware of our bodies and even our environment.”108 
This is why looking to literature is helpful in understanding what is at work in a 
body system. Interaction between body and environment may be more stimulus-
driven than brain-literature interaction, but also calls upon our ability to focus on 
a particular task, if but for a moment. Cognitive physiologists call this redirection 
“spotlight attention,”109 which is a useful term to describe a state of consciousness 
with temporary direction. 
When discussing the concept of interplay for the act of reading, Paul B. 
Armstrong refers to this interplay as “to-and-fro”110—a kind of conflict often 
found in aesthetic experience that is a powerful activator in all forms of art. 
Armstrong supports Wolfgang Iser’s description of reading as including both the 
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physical act and the abstraction of reading as “the act of transgression.”111 This 
transgression works due to its fictionalizing nature: it turns each (physical and 
abstract) into the other. For Iser and Armstrong, reading becomes the interplay 
between creation and interpretation and produces an overlapping space where the 
autonomy of each pushes and pulls against each other.  
These terms, Armstrong’s “to-and-fro” and Iser’s “act of transgression,” 
reflect the permissible yet continued autonomous nature of the interactant and the 
object. In the case of reading, the object is language. For Rozin and his 
mechanical mirrors, the object is the shifting shape of the object surface against 
the movement of the interactant. Language and gesture both evoke a parallel 
discord. It is also important to note that the two parts that together create a whole 
experience do not blend into an amorphous identity, but rather render their 
potential from their differences. This, Armstrong argues, is what brings the 
aesthetic experience into play: 
This conflict over whether the aesthetic experience is characterized 
by “harmony,” unity, and synthesis or “distortion,” disruption, and 
dissonance can also be found again and again in the history of 
aesthetics. It is evident most notably, perhaps, in the dispute 
between classical conceptions of art as balanced, rule-governed, 
and symmetrical versus Romantic valorizations of rule-breaking, 
original genius, and idiosyncratic particularity. This opposition 
recurs repeatedly and calls into question the notion that there is a 
uniquely aesthetic emotion that triggers a singular, identifiable 
aesthetic experience.112 
 
Armstrong exposes the myth that aesthetics can be identified as one 
particular or singular emotion or situation. As with all phenomenological activity, 
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we instead must look to aesthetics as a rush of possibilities rather than an absolute 
equation that comes to rest on a single beautiful object. Armstrong’s work with 
language and the act of reading reminds us that dissonance from interacting 
bodies is not a function of a single medium, but rather a state of activity that can 
be found in all forms of aesthetic experience.  
Aesthetics derive meaning by rendering experience through the constant 
fusion and juxtaposition of streaming events. The brain’s elasticity, along with the 
inertia of the body’s mechanics, expresses a kind of push and pull that creates 
unique experiences. Armstrong identifies the historical trend in Western aesthetics 
of using both harmony and dissonance as aesthetic techniques. If we examine 
Rozin’s mirrors through this neuroscientific lens, changes to the body are matched 
in the brain as minute differences but are registered in the artwork as enlarged and 
gross gestures within the world. This conflict, between what the brain processes 
and what the body experiences, cannot be resolved by the brain or body alone. 
The push–out towards the object—and the pull—back towards the body—is a 
constant negotiation in the aesthetic experience. It is highly questionable whether 
there is ever resolution between all the parts; more likely is a willingness to exist 
together in unresolvable points of difference. 
The principle of self-organization is evident in Armstrong’s to and fro of 
play. From an ontogenial viewpoint, the origin and the development of an 
organism involves an ongoing back and forth for the development of an active 
betweenness. It is an act of growth. This is also arguably a vital component of all 
creative acts. Armstrong explicitly borrows this negotiation in reading from Iser, 
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who in turn borrows from his teacher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, who worked at great 
length to argue that “truth” and “method” were at odds with one another. 
Gadamer intended his work, Truth and Method, to be a description of what we 
always do when we interpret things. The movement to and fro, with its inherent 
dissonance, is central to the definition of Armstrong’s play and evidenced in the 
development of many acts of attention. Armstrong states that play is “an 
instrument for staging various kinds of open-ended exploratory interactions.”113 
The focus remains, from Gadamer to Iser and Armstrong, on the action of 
attention. 
According to Rozin, his mirrors explore “the line between digital and 
physical, using a warm and natural material such as wood to portray the abstract 
notion of digital pixels.”114 In a 2008 interview with Rozin, art critic Marco 
Mancuso observes that Rozin’s mirrors not only reflect, but also immerse the 
viewer in a dimension of unstable coexistence between the real world and a 
virtual world, and believes that mirrors are uniquely able to introduce this duality 
in a gentle and gradual way.115 
The discussion of the real and virtual world is another permutation of need 
for a betweenness in interactivity. Although it is desirable to appreciate the way 
Rozin has built his complex objects, the interactant is not primarily focused on 
materialism or the mimetic structure of the digital mirror when experiencing the 
work. The experience evokes the very actions that are being deployed and returns 
them as an aesthetic intervention. The feeling is a kind of exposure of an internal 
process of one’s own gestures and, in this way, it is extremely satisfying as an 
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experience. Armstrong’s to and fro is useful here to explain the dynamics among 
all of the parts because each part—the virtual and the physical—must retain its 
own presence in order for the movement of to and fro to occur. This engagement 
brings presence to interaction, which is how we are able to distinguish among 
things. The aesthetic characteristics of Rozin’s mirrors are designed to dovetail 
with our own behaviors through a conscious act of exchange; they are not devised 
for conceptual resolution. As such, it is an understanding that the flow of 
interactions heightens the potential for variation and multiplicity. Interactive 
aesthetics frames them with concepts brought through the performative and 
action-oriented procedures as states of betweenness. This understanding, that 
ideas are never complete, brings to both aesthetics and action science the nature of 
human activity as a functionality of expression and inventiveness. 
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Daniel Rozin, Mirrors Mirror, 2008.  
768 mirror tiles, 768 motors, video camera, control electronics. 90 x 70 x 6 in. 
 
Another work by Rozin, Mirrors Mirror, creates the viewer’s image by 
directing 768 mirror tiles in a way that reflects different portions of his image. 
Brighter pixels reflect the upper body of the viewer and the wall behind him and 
dark ones are aimed lower. So the environment is important as it affects the 
reflection. Because of the shape and position of the tiles, the viewing experience 
is private to the reflected person. This piece also includes an animation feature 
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when the interactant leaves the piece. This is an aesthetic function that allows the 
past to replay upon the surface of the mirrors, folding the past onto the present.116  
The mirrored surfaces also offer a different understanding between the 
participant and the object by including the entire optical environment as part of 
the form. Distinctions between the participant and the object are further eroded by 
the folding of the external onto the surface of the mirror in both space and time. 
The splintered self is reconstructed but never made whole. The multiplicity of 
new forms manifests in a stream of parts that collide in many fleeting moments 
upon the mirrored surface. 
 
 
 
Daniel Rozin, Mirrors Mirror (detail), 2008. 
768 mirror tiles,768 motors, video camera, control electronics. 90 x 70 x 6 in.  
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Also using the mirror to critique the embodied experience is the robotic 
work of Louis-Philippe Demers. His work The Blind Robot takes on the task of 
parsing the multiple face of each physical/virtual subject as read by a set of 
robotic fingers.  
 
 
 
Louis-Philippe Demers, The Blind Robot (detail), 2011–12. 
Development commission for the Robots & Avatars project.  
Robotic hands, 3D scanners, proprietary software, participant, mirror. 
 
The Blind Robot addresses the kinds of engagements generated when a 
social robot intimately touches a person. The robot delicately explores the body—
mostly the face—of the participant. On a nearby screen or projection, the machine 
then produces a visual rendering of what its fingertips have “seen.” 
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Louis-Philippe Demers, The Blind Robot, 2011–12.  
Development commission for the Robots & Avatars project.  
Robotic hands, 3D scanners, proprietary software, participant, mirror. 
 
As subjects are touched and scanned by the robot’s fingertips, they watch 
themselves mirrored on the computer screen. A strange, disoriented feeling comes 
over the subject. The subject is surprised about how gently the robot does this 
routine. There may be a feeling of awkwardness that the robot has become so 
intimate with the skin of the subject. There is also a sense of empathy towards the 
robot as it works to make sense of the subject’s features. Finally, an introspective 
moment is gathered and offered back to the subject through the mirror. The whole 
experience can be traced from a series of visual and tactile perspectives, creating a 
completely different perspective on robots. 
“It is a psychological experiment,” writes Demers. “[J]ust by the fact that I 
state that this is a blind robot, you will accept that this machine can touch you in 
very intimate places. If there would be a robot and I wouldn’t say anything or tell 
you that this device is here to measure your heart-rate by touching you, you would 
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have a very different reaction.”117 So the robot has a vulnerability that provides a 
unique access to the subject. This in turn provides an aesthetic of trust between 
subject and robot that brings to light a codependency between the two that is 
immersed in the experience itself. The social experience is a cybernetic 
connectivity between subject and robot. 
 
Causality in Aesthetic Action 
Current action science research starts with the premise of first looking 
towards a particular goal and terminates with the achievement of that goal.118 In 
the example of Rozin’s mirror projects, we project ourselves into the difference 
between what we see and what we believe to be ourselves. This is part of the 
aesthetic of the mirror—discovering the difference between the seen and the 
believed stimulates us to find out why and how that difference takes place.  
As a point of philosophical reference, the aesthetic use of the mirror and 
the transhistorical interest in mirroring systems has long been part of the human 
condition and is found in many art contexts. Examining how the work of Jacques 
Lacan and his mirror stage of development may fit into a neuroaesthetic reading 
of Rozin’s artworks is useful here. The fragmentation of the self is a critical 
aspect of Lacan’s understanding of how the mind develops and can be a useful 
metaphor for how to negotiate self-discovery. The seeking of self-reflection and 
the mirror stage is an important component in Lacan's critical reinterpretation of 
the work of Sigmund Freud. Lacan shares Freud’s view that the development of 
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the self is never explainable as a whole—isolated—experience, but forms part of 
the permanent structure of subjectivity. In what Lacan terms “the imaginary 
order,” the viewer’s own image permanently catches and captivates the subject:  
[T]he mirror stage is a phenomenon to which I assign a twofold 
value. In the first place, it has historical value as it marks a 
decisive turning-point in the mental development of the child. In 
the second place, it typifies an essential libidinal relationship with 
the body-image.119 
 
In the mirror stage, Lacan most certainly identifies a coexistent 
relationship between the mind and the body. Deploying use of psychoanalysis to 
understand our bodies may nevertheless be problematic for an embodied reading 
of interactive art. Vittorio Gallese argues that putting psychoanalysis and 
neuroscience together, at the more general level, is immensely problematic.120 
Although both disciplines are working on the same brain problems, their methods 
are so different that there is great resistance against their integration, even within 
the emerging field of neuropsychoanalysis. Professionals who work within 
neuropsychoanalysis, Gallese notes, cherrypick items from each field to support 
their own conclusions, rather than finding ways to successfully integrate both 
approaches.  
An important point to consider is that Freud’s work set the stage for a 
different form of introspection: a process that relies exclusively on the 
observation of one’s own mental state and is in direct contrast with external 
observation. Freud’s introspection generally provides a privileged access to our 
own mental states over an embodied approach.121 Freud’s process was refined 
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from a more embodied approach to understanding cognition; but the process of 
traditional Freudian psychoanalysis—the passivity of lying down upon the couch 
and relinquishing power to the psychoanalyst for access—is a disembodied 
experience for the patient. This interpsychic dimension in psychoanalysis is even 
more important in today’s practice as, ironically, the social element of cognitive 
functioning is becoming an increasingly relevant aspect of neuroscience. Gallese 
notes that in order to observe the dynamic functioning of the brain one must 
observe the whole embodied dynamic rather than the outdated focus on mentality.  
Another issue critical to both neuroscience and psychoanalysis is memory 
retrieval. Neuroscientist Christina Alberini warns that retrieved memories become 
fragile. In the state of psychoanalysis, memories are easily changed or altered and 
cannot be relied on until enough time has elapsed to settle the event. This 
neurological process that neuroscientists call reconsolidation, occurs when the 
memory becomes more stable over a period of time. “During this time window 
when the memory becomes stronger again, new associations can form in these 
retrieved memories.”122 Although identifying memories is a key activity within a 
therapeutic setting, the fragility of a new memory is not one that should be 
manipulated. According to Alberini, the memory needs to reach a state of stability 
before it is anywhere near representational of the actual experience. Any 
manipulation during this time contributes to the creation of false memories. 
Moving memories from the unconscious to the conscious is a far more vulnerable 
process than even Freud imagined. 
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Lacan does move past this strict methodological interpretation of the 
Freudian view by suggesting a reciprocal relationship between the physical body 
and cognition. Lacan realizes that the dissonance between body and perception is 
essential to identity. He writes that “[t]he vision of the body as integrated and 
contained, in opposition to the child’s actual experience of motor incapacity and 
the sense of his or her body as fragmented, induces a movement from 
‘insufficiency to anticipation.’” 123 This inability to unify these two—how the 
mind sees the body with how the body functions—expresses well the quandary of 
the mind/body problem. This is also perhaps the major point at issue in a Freudian 
critique of interactive aesthetics: that the dissonance in perception is one that 
needs to be rectified in the first place. Freud’s original intention for 
psychoanalysis was to create a clinical method of discourse between a patient and 
a doctor designed to help settle the troubled individual through therapeutic 
efficacy; it was not to create a playful or aesthetic dialogue. This intention 
matters. The psychoanalytic use of the subconscious as a phenomenon of 
repression is an interpretation that has been severely criticized. Jean-Francois 
Lyotard’s challenge to the function of the Freudian dream reverses many 
assumptions. Lyotard writes that the “unconscious is a force whose intensity is 
manifest via disfiguration rather than condensation.124 The loss of an ontological 
remedy for the subconscious at the end of a century of the self is part of the 
collapse of the grand narrative’s hold on human purposefulness.  
The irony of human development, as Lacan understands it, is that it is 
forever broken, unable to fulfill our desire for rational order. What is formed in 
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the mirror is a fantasy, an unreal image that only seems real. In the 1981 
philosophical treatise of Jean Baudrillard, the question of authenticity of any 
representation of reality is always already ideological, always already constructed 
by simulacra.125 Simulacra are copies that depict things that either have no reality 
to begin with, or that no longer have an original. Postmodern art has also blurred 
distinctions between the authentic and the simulated, leaving the simulacrum as 
the only truth.  
The compelling concepts of Rozin’s mirrors do not lie in the disparity 
between real and virtual, but rather in the situation in which the installation 
invites a causal discourse. Causes and effects are typically related to changes or 
events and are usually focused on the subject and their situation in action. If the 
second event is understood as a consequence of the first, then the first event (in 
this case, the human participant) is understood as privileged in the causal 
relationship. Looking at a modernist painting, for instance, exposes the power of 
observation—the observer takes from the painting what is imparted by the artist 
onto the canvas and then positioned passively for the observer to glean. 
Accordingly, our understanding of Armstrong’s to and fro is always prioritized by 
a causal relationship that reflects the self-conscious aim of, as example, the 
modernist painter.  
It was Immanuel Kant who first claimed that people have innate 
assumptions about causes. To Kant, it appeared that science was evolving to 
incorporate all reality, including human behavior, into a mechanical model. This 
would suggest that all events, as part of a unified mechanism, could be explained 
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by cause and effect. This new functional understanding of events became the 
critical appraisal of the capacity of human reason and laid the foundation of 
modern sciences. Although Kant’s understanding of prior knowledge professed 
not to arise from experience, Kant believed that knowledge about causality is a 
priori, or within the faculty of rational judgment.126 The to and fro that is the play 
between the intellectual launching of an event and the embodied experience of 
that event is another lens through which to examine the subject-object problem, 
and one that has found its way into the interactive art discourse. 
In interactive art, causality and effect are aesthetic subjects that release 
previous assumptions of stilled objecthood.  
VIDEOPLACE, by artist Myron Krueger, was one of the first artworks to 
focus on causality and effect as interactive aesthetic subject matter. The 
installation uses computer projection that interacts with the viewer's physical 
shadow. The work is a useful example of the fundamentals of embodied 
interactivity, because it is a prototype for what would eventually be called Virtual 
Reality, but with a focus more on the human gesture than the computer 
simulation. 
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Myron Krueger, VIDEOPLACE, 1969. 
Computer projection, proprietary software, interactants.  
 
As a responsive environment, VIDEOPLACE reacts to the movement and 
gesture of the viewer through an elaborate system of sensing floors, graphic 
tables, and video cameras. Audience members can directly interact with the video 
projections of others through the shared graphic environment. 
Designed so that the computer controls the relationship between the 
participant’s image and the objects in the graphic scene, the responsive 
environment coordinates the movement of a graphic object with the actions of the 
participant. While gravity affects the physical body, it may not control or confine 
the image, which can float around the screen. A series of simulations can be 
programmed based on any human action that is identifiable through the 
participant’s shadow-like silhouette. For example, when a participant’s silhouette 
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pushes a graphic object, the computer can choose to move the object or the human 
silhouette. In this way, the computer becomes the conceptual space between the 
participant and the projection. 
At the heart of Krueger’s contribution to interactivity is the notion of the 
artist as a composer of intelligent, real-time, computer-mediated spaces, or 
responsive environments, as he has called them. Krueger claims that “technology 
[is] an inevitable consequence of the laws of physics and therefore as natural as 
the birds and the bees.”127 In activating the space, the computer responds to the 
gestures of the audience by interpreting and even anticipating the participants’ 
actions. VIDEOPLACE is an example of interactive art in which both the 
participant and the object can engage in causality and effect as autonomous 
agents. The friction between resolution and the impossibility of resolution creates 
a different kind of causality that involves choices and decisions from both the 
interactant and the object, each working towards a whole. In other words, the 
purpose of functionality is an aesthetic of exchange; a coming-to-being is the 
achievement of this purpose. The aesthetic move of one event towards another 
shifts the attention away from objecthood into the act of negotiating the 
sequencing in time and space. Interactive art brings this intentionality to the 
forefront of contemporary practice by claiming that aesthetic potential is full of 
the autopoietic drive. It is specifically interactive art, however, that focuses our 
attention on the importance of making choices to render our own qualities in the 
aesthetic experience. This is a critical distinction in aesthetics because it 
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distinguishes between a passive aesthetic appreciation of art and our ability to 
participate in making aesthetics a dynamic form of action.  
A neurological understanding of the brain can be applied as an aesthetic 
model for critiquing art involving bodily participation. The neurophenomenology 
of action and response, along with an examination of the material aspects of how 
neurobiology expresses itself in time and through action, provides a reasonable 
methodology for understanding causality in aesthetics. It is less straightforward, 
however, to describe the intentions, desires, or choices inherent in an action. How 
do you assess the odds and project future outcomes? Often, intending to do 
something prevents us from doing that very thing. Aristotle reminds us that trying 
to be happy is unlikely to produce happiness. It is intention that positions emotion 
as a lived experience. For Aristotle, happiness is an act; his prescription of “living 
well and doing well” is a way to push through past choices, intentions, and wants 
into doing.128 Not only does happiness involve Aristotelian reason, but it also 
needs to be activated by a living being. 
Another important aspect of Aristotle’s overall understanding of emotions 
is that they are dependent upon the emotions of others. What, of course, is meant 
by “other” is open to interpretation: how we describe the other always speaks to 
how we describe the limits of our selves. Merleau-Ponty’s argument of the 
intersubjective is a sustained argument for interactivity. In fact, a 
phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity does not merely concern concrete 
face-to-face encounters between individuals. It is also at play in simple 
perception, action, emotion, drive, and different types of self-awareness. 
  161 
It is this complex understanding of the intersubjective that William James 
argues for in his lectures entitled A Pluralistic Universe: “Livingly, things are 
their own others.”129 For James, pushing one’s intentions into actions out in the 
world with others who are doing the same thing brings out the very emotions we 
consider to be our innermost valued parts of the self. As a proponent of embodied 
philosophy, Francisco Varela would also argue that action can be found within the 
self as a natural point of intersubjectivity. In Varela’s autobiographical essay 
“Intimate Distances,” written shortly before his death, he challenges the notion of 
an interiority and exteriority to his own body. After receiving a liver transplant, he 
questions the feeling of existence as an embodied sentience with the liver organ 
that has been taken in as part of the other. His experience is a decentered alterity 
that must exist in both places: 
These parallel themes serve as the hidden scaffolding for the 
analysis here. First the lived body as focus: The intrusion, the alien 
as flesh, and the always already mobile subject of enunciation and 
hence the mobility of the lived body’s identity. Second, the 
networks of dissemination playing in unison: The social network 
of the gift, and the imaginary circles of the images that give this 
inside a metaphorical concreteness.130 
 
The transplant, with its focus on the placement of the organ, is also a 
reflection upon the interiority of the self as a mixture of intimacy and profound 
splaying of that self onto the impersonal functions of body parts within an 
impersonal hospital. The play of these two realities crystallizes the paradox of the 
organ that is functional yet impossible to reconcile. 
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Rozin’s installation works upon the assumption of aesthetic activity as a 
search for self, an action that is never resolved and always dissonant. It requires 
practice on the part of the interactant to find a way to be present within the 
dissonance. The rise of this aesthetic is best cultivated over time, over multiple 
encounters with the installation—a quality common to many interactive artworks. 
Due to the kinesthetic nature of the interactive experience, the action calls upon 
the construction of the body for participation. The installation activates its own 
agency and, in turn, creates a shared action of intentionality. This is the causal 
power of choice: it does not necessarily lead to any resolution but rather to the 
freedom to explore the world from a series of choices and a space to allow the 
aesthetic experience to rise. 
In Essays of Actions and Events, Donald Davidson argues that the freedom 
to act can be a “causal power.”131 By causal power, Davidson means a 
relationship to freedom of choice. He defines a causal power as “a property of an 
object such that a change of a certain sort in the object causes an event of another 
sort.”132 According to causality theory, willing is not an act distinct from doing 
and, therefore, cannot be a cause of the doing. Davidson clears up this confusion 
by claiming that “free action is one where a change in the agent causes something 
to happen outside him[self].”133 This is a powerful notion. The claim that the 
freedom of an individual act is in relationship to something that is not part of that 
individual’s own free self goes to the very core of the description of autonomy. A 
causal power is therefore a system that is free but still autopoietically closed: each 
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agent relies on resources from another, yet those shared resources do not become 
part of the other’s permanent operation. 
To follow the autopoietic development of intentionality, the information 
encoded in the human desire to survive requires a biological intentionality. In his 
essay on the subject, Varela builds the foundational issues of the relationship 
between autopoiesis and perception, wherein the relation between an organism 
and its medium is continuously regenerated through the intentionality of 
negotiation with others.134 Varela set this up as a paradox: 
It is ex-hypothesis evident that an autopoietic system depends on 
its physico-chemical milieu for its conservation as a separate 
entity, otherwise it would dissolve back into it. Whence the 
intriguing paradoxicality proper to an autonomous identity: the 
living system must distinguish itself from its environment, while at 
the same time maintaining its coupling; this linkage cannot be 
detached since it is against this very environment from which the 
organism arises and comes forth.135  
 
For Varela, it is autopoietic unity that creates a perspective from which the 
exterior (understood as the environment or other autopoietic entity), may be used 
by the subject to further its own sustainability. It is significant that this negotiation 
is seen from the point of view of the living system. Varela argues that “what the 
autopoietic system does—due to its very mode of identity—is to constantly 
confront the encounters (perturbations, shocks, coupling) with its environment 
and treat them from a perspective which is not intrinsic to the encounters 
themselves.”136 In other words, the intentionality of the subject to interact does 
not “dissolve” the quality of the subject, but rather works to sustain and even 
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fortify its own experience. Varela further argues that an organism’s circular 
experience is inherent in all life and is a part of its assertion of presence. 
An entity’s autopoietic link with its environment, necessary for its own 
continuity, is also essential to aesthetic expression. This “environment” includes 
space, objects, and other people. The question arises: to whom does the aesthetic 
belong in such a negotiation? This argument is easily resolved if each entity 
retains its own intentionality, because then each may build its own meaning. Each 
system creates meaning only because each entity is intentional. Inter-subjectivity 
comes from the wealth of experience that Varela refers to as a “surplus of 
significance” within the entire ecology or system of interaction.137 This surplus 
can be located and utilized in each pathway back to each agent. “The nature of the 
identity of the cognitive self . . . is, like that of the basic cellular self, one of 
emergence through a distributed process.”138 Varela stresses that autopoietic 
systems work well when an agent—an integrated whole with an individual 
purpose—does not need central supervision. Interactive systems are able to 
participate in this autopoietic interplay within an overall system of constituted 
selves. 
Biologists commonly claim that an organism’s interactions with its 
environment are fundamental to the survival of both that organism and the 
ecosystem as a whole.139 Charles Elton, one of the founders of ecology, put forth 
many ideas about our need to search for and sustain aspects of interactivity that 
have proven accurate and even remarkably prescient. His work, along with that of 
the many others who developed the structure of biology, is science’s earliest 
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attempt to find order in the diversity of life that has its basis in the critical aspect 
of interaction between species. It is from this work that interaction can be 
understood as the ontology of biology because relationships are used as a basic 
category of being.  
The implication for how we view, make, and critique art is important here 
because what we see as evidence of the artist’s process is also modeled 
simultaneously in the synapses of the brain. Scientists no longer regard the brain 
as the engine of the body, the decision maker, or even the sole source of 
consciousness. One does not trigger the other; consciousness is an emergent 
pattern that can be found at many levels of experience. When art is experienced, 
these patterns restate both the biochemical and the mechanical locomotion of 
consciousness. The pattern is reciprocal; consciousness creates the aesthetic 
moment, and the process of experiencing art becomes a reflection of our 
consciousness. Interactivity becomes an instrument for this understanding in 
action. We do, we see, we, we comprehend, and we react as part of a whole action 
of becoming conscious. Contemporary art that explicitly stretches these 
boundaries fosters an inter-subjective contribution to the transformation of the 
historical mind/body duality. Developing an interactive aesthetic is part of an 
awareness of this exchange, and manifests the literal nature of this duality by 
working beyond a singularity of the sense, towards the relational nature of a new 
corporeal understanding and aesthetic experience.  
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Mechanical Aesthetic Behavior 
 
 
 
Daniel Rozin, Weave Mirror (detail), 2007. 
768 C-shaped prints, 768 motors, video camera, control electronics. 57 x 78 x 8 in.  
 
Mechanical interactions take place in both the sculptural object and the 
body of the interactant. How do these systems function independently? Where 
there is potential for intersections, how do they provide an aesthetic space of 
interaction? Motor motions are far more precise than the movements of biological 
bodies, since biological bodies are open systems that allow for unpredictable 
change. The differences between these kinematic systems provide variations to 
the space of potential change. 
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The scientific understanding of mechanical interactions is divided into five 
specific categories that, in a variety of configurations, make up all physical 
events. Consider the following as conditions not only for mechanical motion but 
also body events. Machine actions create physical displacements by working for, 
against, and in interaction with each other: 
1. An applied or direct interaction, which occurs when two non-
elastic entities push or pull each other.  
2. A physical contact of interaction. 
3. A friction interaction, which occurs when two surfaces rub 
against one another.  
4. A drag interaction, as when one’s own body is used to pull an 
entity.  
5. An elastic interaction, which occurs when two entities push or 
pull on each other and at least one of them resists or is 
stretched. 
 
The aesthetics of motors and mechanical joints are critical factors 
contributing to the specific type of motion in kinetic objects. Rozin uses 
servomotors, which are particularly useful because they are able to keep track of 
where they began their motion. In this case, movement is not relative to the last 
place traveled but rather to a default point relative to all other locations. When 
servos are commanded to move by the circuit, they move to the prescribed 
position and hold that position. If an external force pushes against the servo while 
the servo is holding a position, the servo will resist moving out of that position as 
best as the torque will allow. This position pulse must be repeated to instruct the 
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servo to stay in position. In this way, the robotic system always knows where it is 
in space relative to a resting position. The individual evolution of a servomotor is 
possible with memory provided by attached circuits. The motor can identify itself 
through the relative positions to which it has moved prior to each reading, 
creating feedback data that provide possible future positions. The capabilities and 
limitations of the servomotor define the parameters of the aesthetics of computer-
mediated interaction; neither the work itself nor the subjective experience holds 
aesthetic value alone. Aesthetic value is additionally derived from a feedback 
relationship between the mechanics of the machine device and the mechanics of 
the human and the critical events that exist within the gap perceived between the 
two. Also, each autonomous part has its own way of pushing and pulling in and 
out of space, each with interactive properties shaped by potentials and limitations 
in the process of cause and effect. 
 
The Body in Aesthetic Feedback 
Feedback is a part of a homeostatic imbalance that is also part of a body in 
motion. Just as muscles work with memory and expectations of possible futures, 
mechano-electric feedback works in the body as a highly personalized system. 
Feedback is a key aspect of interactive aesthetics—it is how the system plays out 
through time, choice, and action. As part of a chain of cause-and-effect that forms 
a circuit or loop, the event feeds back into itself. 
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Daniel Rozin, Mirror, 2007. 
650 wood dowels, 650 motors, video camera, control electronics.  
42 x 42 x 6 in. 
 
In order to properly position the aesthetic concept of feedback, a look into 
action theory is useful in considering theories about the processes of human 
bodily movement. This area of thought has elicited strong philosophical interest 
since Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and provides a platform for the many 
theories of action discussed in neuroscience today. Aristotle’s discussion of the 
ethics of one’s actions can be used as a way to discuss the physical actions of the 
body. He posits that one kind of moral action may be transferred to a physical 
relationship to the world; or, that being virtuous is bound by the actions of the 
body. Aristotle claims that virtue and vice are voluntary actions resulting from 
decisions, deliberations, and wishes. They are actions within our own power, not 
universal attributes.140 We learn intellectual virtues by instruction and we learn 
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moral virtues by habit and constant practice. We are all born with the potential to 
be morally virtuous, but it is only by behaving in the right way that we train 
ourselves to be virtuous. In Book III of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes 
how our evaluation of a person’s actions depends on our perception of whether 
those actions are voluntary, involuntary, or non-voluntary. In all cases, it is the 
action of self-reflection that makes for good morals and it is this kind of 
deliberation that precedes choice. Temperance is the mean state with regard to 
physical pleasure. Although Aristotle tends to see physicality, such as touch, as 
the most liable source of licentiousness, he believes that the temperate person will 
feel appropriate amounts of pleasure:  
What do we mean by saying that we must become just by doing 
just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts; for if men do just 
and temperate acts, they are already just and temperate, exactly as, 
if they do what is in accordance with the laws of grammar and of 
music, they are grammarians and musicians.141 
 
Again we can see that the arts have their goodness in themselves.  
This is the genius of Aristotle’s Ethics: individual choice is controlled by 
how one formulates and acts upon a concept, not by how one follows a pre-
described ethical stance. Aristotle determines that the degree of exactness 
required and made for human actions is not universally the same, therefore not 
universally applicable. The problem of free will is much debated in modern moral 
philosophy. Presumably, we can be held morally responsible only for those 
actions that we perform of our own free will, so determining the source and scope 
of our freedom would seem a necessary prerequisite to determining the source and 
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scope of moral responsibility. Aristotle gives us a workaround, however, telling 
us that we are not responsible for actions carried out under ignorance or 
compulsion. The focus, he argues, is on our choices rather than their outcome, 
because of the noble ends at which they aim. Intention is an aim in itself and 
making choices is part of a system of self-observation or feedback. This 
underscores Aristotle’s belief in art for art sake: “products of the arts have their 
goodness in themselves.”142 
 
Embodied Intentionality 
Intentionality, also called aboutness, is considered in embodied theory to 
be a voluntary choice wherein the capacity of a rational agent can choose a course 
of action from among various alternatives. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson 
discuss this as our spatial awareness, our bodily movement, and the way we 
manipulate objects—all of which provide the pattern for how we reason about the 
world. Acts of reason are acts of cognitive effort.143 Most important is that 
intentionality is a choice that can be sourced back to a disposition in the brain of 
an emotional state or desire. As an enactive approach, however, there are two 
critical concepts that should be followed. The first is that the cognitive process is 
not an extension out from the full body, but rather a question of how the body is 
organized as an autonomous system. The second critical concept is that the body’s 
system has its own regulatory behaviors that work to sustain itself and to regulate 
its interactions with the larger world. This is what Evan Thompson refers to as 
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sense-making—the relational side of autonomy. In a less granular form (but with 
the same claims of inter-relationships), it is what Merleau-Ponty explains as each 
organism’s ability to “modif[y] its milieu according to the internal norms of its 
activity.”144  
A project that draws attention to modifications of internal norms is called, 
The Machine to Be Another: Embodiment performance to promote empathy 
among individuals, by the artist group BeAnotherLab. Using virtual reality (VR) 
technology, multiple subjects can visualize what it looks like to be the other. 
Subjects looking at their own bodies see a three-dimensional video of the other 
subject in the place of their own. When the performance is synchronized between 
two subjects, each one has the sensation of “feeling” the other’s body. 
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BeAnotherLab, The Machine to Be Another, 2013–present. 
Embodiment performance to promote empathy among individuals.  
Virtual Reality performances. 
 
The Machine to Be Another combines neuroscience protocols with art 
performances. It uses VR not to facilitate seeing oneself in the body of a VR 
subject (as in neuroscience experiments), but to put one’s image into another 
subject’s body through first-person stereo camera technologies, and to swap the 
other subject’s body with one’s own seamlessly, through carefully orchestrated 
performatic acts. An interesting aspect of this performance is that because the VR 
technology only works strapped to the subject’s head, the only audience of the 
body swap is another performer. In this way, the performance is a closed loop of 
activity only experienced between performers. The perception of body 
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modification thus becomes an act of introspection. Spatial awareness remains 
grounded by tightly scripted body gestures, while the cognitive effort of swapping 
bodies allows for a claim of inter-relationships. The mental state is therefore 
tightly locked to the physical state, even through swapped bodies, and the 
aesthetic experience becomes the feeling of the other. 
As an ontic condition of a person who is in full consciousness, this 
behavior is, with some level of transparency, one that satisfies the intender in the 
act of exchange. Franz Brentano, who brought the idea of intentionality to 
contemporary philosophy, called it mark of the mental.145 Brentano’s empirical 
perspective claims that the mental state of intentionality stands separate from the 
physical intentionality, and that making conscious choices is a judgment that is 
not even part of the physical realm.  
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within 
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In 
presentation something is presented, in judgment something is 
affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired 
and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic 
exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon 
exhibits anything like it. We could, therefore, define mental 
phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena, which 
contain an object intentionally within themselves.146 
 
From Brentano’s observation, we can surmise that mental intentionality 
decenters the status of the self through the emancipation of the idea, which is 
incorporated in the sense-making of the individual.  
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In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty shifts the locus of 
intentionality from a Husserlian consciousness to the body-subject, which disrupts 
the notion that intentionality could ever be separate from the whole of human 
experience. His later transition from “the body” to “flesh of the world” in The 
Visible and the Invisible marks a further move in this direction, reinforcing the 
idea that intentionality should be generalized to all living organisms and, 
consequently, to the whole of nature. This notion clearly resonates with Merleau-
Ponty’s description of an organism’s attunement to its environment and his 
characterization of the relationship between organism and environment as one of 
reciprocity.147 The emphasis given to the unique role of the body in Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy of perception is not to be regarded as a way of privileging the 
human subject, and thereby a commitment to a dualism of humans versus nature. 
On the contrary, le corps propre as embodied subject serves to establish a 
methodological standpoint which ultimately yields a continuity between humans 
and non-human organisms that emphasizes the similarities between humans, other 
animals, and living things, rather than the differences. 
If we reconsider the artwork of Stelarc, we are reminded of his robotic 
prosthetic control systems in which the motions of his arm are controlled by the 
electrical signals of his own muscles; these are typically automatic motions not 
controlled by intention. The result is that one part of Stelarc’s body is in control of 
another part; the original body is an extendable entity that can enrich its own 
functionality through added technology. 
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Stelarc, Ping Body, 1996. Institute of Contemporary Art. Sydney, Australia.  
 
In Ping Body, Stelarc extends and controls his body by means of special 
interfaces that are situated in three different locations: Paris, Helsinki, and 
Amsterdam. As depicted in the above photograph, Stelarc’s biological body and 
his prosthetic extension are performing in Sydney. According to Stelarc: 
The body works not only controlled by own metabolism and 
internal rhythm but also in the net of connected bodies, devices. 
This performance was not focused on highlighting the ability of 
sending complicated information but it was concentrated on the 
active exchange of physiological and physical energy.148 
 
For Stelarc, this distribution of control is a natural extension of what he 
refers to as an obsolete body and brain. Stelarc’s body always includes 
technological extensions as an evolutionary tract. This is subsequently deployed 
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or linked into a distributed system much larger than his own original biological 
form. The first layer of interaction is the relationship between his biological leg 
muscles and his prosthetic legs—each tries to control the other while walking. 
The next layer of interactions are the remote controllers from Paris, Helsinki, and 
Amsterdam—each one also working in concert to control his gait. In addition, his 
body is divided into different biological sections, each also in communication 
with a separate remote controller. Together through this distributed method, the 
controllers attempt to move Stelarc’s body. For Stelarc, body is always part of 
cognition. Here, Stelarc explains his intentions in a conversation with Paolo 
Atzori: 
We shouldn't start making distinctions between the brain and the 
body. This particular biological entity with its proprioceptive 
networks and spinal cord and muscles, it’s the total kinesthetic 
orientation in the world, it’s the body’s mobility which contributes 
towards curiosity.149  
 
Stelarc understands the brain as a central control system that is part of 
many other systems. It is the act of intellectual inquiry that sets us out beyond our 
own skin.  
Evan Thompson and Mog Stapleton discuss this distributed relationship to 
cognition as part of their examination of current mind-body theories: 
We propose the following “transparency constraint”: For anything 
external to the body’s boundary to count as a part of the cognitive 
system it must function transparently in the body’s sense-making 
interactions with the environment. We also hypothesize that tools 
and aids that conform to transparency are incorporated into the 
neurophysiological body schema.150 
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Even when authorship is put into play through the body, every act also 
includes countless actions that are already automatic. Some anti-intentionalists, 
such as Ned Block, argue that phenomenal conscious experience, or qualia, is a 
vital component of consciousness that is not intentional. When intentionality is 
applied, intentionality becomes the free will of neurophilosophy. According to 
Patrick Haggard from the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, “intentional action 
involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a 
distinctive conscious experience that ‘I’ am the author of the action.”151 This both 
affirms and questions the notion of the self; as Antonio Damasio notes, 
“consciousness is knowledge of one’s own existence and of the existence of 
surroundings. This knowledge means that we must experience and we must be 
aware that we are experiencing. With lack of consciousness, we do not know of 
our existence; and we do not know that anything else exists.”152 Damasio very 
much privileges the self in the process of consciousness and acknowledges that 
the acts of a living organism incorporate a social dimension. 
For Merleau-Ponty, meaning is also biologically based. In this way, 
Merleau-Ponty does not tie us to a world where mind or cognition can be 
separated from the whole. “Ping” is the word used to describe the sound generated 
by sonar equipment in submarines. The distance to another object is measured by 
the time it takes this sound to echo back. Stelarc explains that the ping values 
represent the distance and time on the Net and constitutes a live performance. The 
values are also converted into a graphical interface on a screen and into sound 
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depending on proximity, position and angle of arms and legs. So the performance 
that is controlled by activities on the Net, can again be seen there, live. Where 
normally people cause events on the Net, here the Net determines what happens to 
a person, becoming Stelarc’s external nervous system and turning him into a 
machine. 
 
 
 
Stelarc, Ping Body (detail), 1996. Institute of Contemporary Art. Sydney, Australia. 
 
Stelarc exposes a process of the posthuman condition. What is less 
obvious is that the work also explores activities that are already in play within our 
bodies. Examples of reciprocal actions in biological bodies include regular events 
of involuntary reaction of muscles to the strain of a flexed joint or a chemical 
reaction in the skin of a threatened individual that creates heat and sweat. As 
neural and phenomenal events relate to any action, free will is always tangled in a 
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set of circumstances in which the “I” responsible for the event is embedded in 
both intentional gestures and Aristotle’s ignorant or compulsive action. In other 
words, creating useful categories to distinguish between Aristotle’s involuntary 
action and those performed under free will may be impossible to make through an 
embodied action lens. The act of the intentional moment is an endless weave of 
bodily and environmental factors that are always at work, softening distinctions 
between individual parts and their codependent functionality within the whole. An 
action, therefore, is both an agent of free will and contingent upon numerous other 
activities of embodiment. Each bodily activity can be dissected into the many 
parts that make up the whole involvement. Each part may be distinct and 
identifiable, but they are never far from the intentions, or the lack thereof, of an 
action goal.  
Another important realization emerges from Stelarc’s Ping Body. 
Individual muscles that Stelarc has connected to the robotic system are controlled 
from different locations and none of these individual locations is aware of how 
the others are controlling Stelarc’s body. To watch this performance is to watch 
the tearing apart of his body. Stelarc uses his body to manage the commands that, 
for instance, take him forward on the left leg and backward on the right leg at the 
same time. But the ongoing distribution of actions that are set upon his body 
become, in many cases, impossible and dangerous. Ultimately, Stelarc must 
manage the incoming commands by mechanically shutting down some input 
altogether, lest he be ripped apart at the joints. He must be the ultimate taskmaster 
for the goal, and no one else can manage this for him. Ultimately, his embodied 
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actions must be his own. The viewer stands watching the dreadfulness of it, 
imagining the feelings in their own limbs, and unable to alter the outcome. The 
horror of observation becomes a horror of one’s own embodiment. With a lack of 
any authorship, the audience finds their own loathing of inaction. 
 
Intentionality 
According to Evan Thompson, the enactive approach in cognition is 
grounded in the “sense-making activity of autonomous agents—beings that 
actively generate and sustain themselves, and thereby enact or bring forth their 
own domains of meaning and value.”153 The whole notion of autonomy, however, 
is much more complicated than once thought. It is now difficult to differentiate 
between what is part of the singular agent and what is an influence upon it. 
According to the extended mind thesis, “the environment constitutes part of the 
mind when it is coupled to the brain in the right way.”154 Within this 
understanding, the brain can never be completely autonomous. The way in which 
a distinction is made between extension and incorporation of an agent, Thompson 
argues, is incorporated in these processes.155 
According to Evan Thompson and Mog Stapleton, the phenomenology of 
action requires an appropriate predictive, or link, between intentions; this link sets 
internal clocks in action.156 This understanding of action focuses on the 
mechanisms that mediate synchronization of circadian rhythms between SCN 
neurons (neurons that receive inputs from specialized photosensitive ganglion 
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cells in the retina). Understanding how these neurons communicate, Thompson 
argues, is a network of circadian oscillators.157 
Semir Zeki and Jonathan Stutters demonstrated that subjects’ preference 
for kinetic stimuli correlates not just with the activity of the orbitofrontal cortex, 
but also with activity in a specific part of the visual cortex, namely area V5. 
Taken together with Thompson and Stapleton’s work, these studies are important 
in highlighting the role of early sensory cortices in subjective preference.158 Zeki 
and Strutters argue that the dynamics of information flow in response to aesthetic 
stimuli arguably provides insights into how desirability arises. Such efforts 
significantly contribute to characterizing the feedback and feed-forward 
mechanisms involved in intentional flow. Zeki and Strutters propose that this is 
the neurological state for aesthetic judgments.159 If this is accurate, then Kant’s 
understanding of aesthetic judgment as separate from the body is problematic at 
the core. Kant believes that we have prior knowledge about causality and that we 
hold a priori knowledge not from sense experience but directly from the faculty 
of rational judgment. All analytic judgments are a priori for Kant since our 
knowledge of such matters does not require experience. Synthetic judgments are, 
for the most part, a posteriori, in that they occur after an experience of 
observation. An a posteriori judgment is a proposition for which the predicate 
concept is not contained in its subject. The separation of these judgments may no 
longer be a useful concept in a world where the causal power of embodied 
experience is not as distinct as once imagined. Interaction is best understood, not 
only by the interplay of its parts, but also as a phenomenon of change.  
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Time, space, action, and intent cannot be separated from experience. 
Kant’s system of what happens in experience expresses as a miniature internal 
model—what is happening as a separate reality outside our bodies. This is 
precisely why Kant’s system breaks down in the face of embodied theory. Rozin 
shows us the wholeness of experience while exposing differences between 
autonomous agents. Stelarc warns what can occur when experience is not 
integrated. It is a precautionary tale of how the functional parts must work 
together through feedback for humans to endure. These projects all hold the core 
concept that interactivity is not a state of aesthetic finality but rather a 
constructivist contemplation, the potential of a wholeness in a fragmented reality. 
Interactivity, therefore, in all these projects, is what Heidegger calls the flow in 
the life worlds, the situation in which we are embodied.  
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Epilogue: Performative Being 
 
All art is performative. The very act of experiencing art activates the body 
in multiple ways. Emotions, such as enjoyment or distaste, can be directly 
associated with brain patterns that are activated during an aesthetic event. These 
brain patterns—from biochemical triggers of the body to kinesthetic responses—
are an important aspect of interactive art, even though they are so nuanced they 
are difficult for us to perceive, let alone recognize as motivating our behaviors 
and affecting our aesthetic tastes. Engaging with interactive art inspires us in 
many ways, not least by engendering the relationship between our mental interest 
and our spatial inquisitiveness. Being inquisitive in turn moves us towards 
realities beyond ourselves. Damasio’s mind reading is a neuroscientific 
explanation of this human attribute: the brain seeks out the uncanny, the unusual, 
and the non-quantifiable. The brain simply does not like routine behaviors. It 
prefers the decenterings or slippages that occur in the shift from one idea to 
another, and gets particularly excited when a slippage is delivered as a kind of 
puzzle that requires high-level brain function. A neurophilosophical appreciation 
of the aesthetic experience, one that is attuned to these shifts that occur in 
experience, is essential to the contemporary moment. In both art and science, 
engaging in the world is a manifestation of our desire to explore and bind together 
the fragments that come our way.  
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Framed philosophically, this curiosity responds not to what we are, but to 
what we desire. Desire is in close proximity to absence, and maintaining a 
difference between what is perceived and what can be evoked from experience 
reaches into the heart of aesthetics. It is important to note, however, that a 
neurobiological reading of desire is very different than one that comes from the 
psychoanalytical roots of Freud. Freud disregards negation as being the work of 
denial, while the neurological view identifies negation as a dissonance between 
potential and an activation of creativity. Art should disturb, not console. The 
aesthetic object as well as the viewer should not rest but explore this unbinding 
rupture. This is a desire that is in constant motion to make sense of a world that 
will never be whole. 
Interactive art, as performance, unearths the deeper nature of 
contemporary aesthetics as well as the exploratory desires of the human subject. It 
is the subject that conceptualizes and deploys action by rendering the behaviors of 
aesthetics. The living subject is always engaged in an inquisitive search to some 
extent. Art frames this engagement with particular aesthetic behaviors that lay 
claim to one of the most fundamental of human experiences: self-awareness 
through introspection—an act rendered as a private performance to the self. The 
internalization of every interaction creates waves of interrelated activity among 
muscles and bones, cells and fluids, and neurons and chemistry, all of which 
through their actions bind together the existence of the self back to its own 
motion. And yet the body occupies an ambiguous, even paradoxical, role. Its parts 
must work together to make a singular moment, and this singular moment cannot 
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exist without engaging the world beyond the self and all things that the self is not. 
The self is never an isolated condition but always an interactive subject. That is, 
the subject cannot be whole until the body is put to work in the world. It is only in 
this moment of engagement that we find a sense of wholeness; as we move 
inwards we are simultaneously moving outwards, all as one action. As 
neuroaesthetics reduces art experiences to neural events, it also opens us to the 
life world that Heidegger argues is fundamental for all epistemological inquiries. 
Cognition is very much part of this practicality and of life events. 
Husserl originally framed the life world as a pre-epistemological 
steppingstone for the phenomenological analysis of the grand theater of world 
objects, but also as the place where the subject infuses its dynamic influence. He 
writes, “we—subjectively…[are] constantly functioning.”160 Experience, Husserl 
argues, is the phenomenological environment in which a subject may come to 
know an essence or identity. Embodied cognition, as defined by Varela, 
Maturana, Thompson and a growing number of scientists, is the content of mental 
conditions that are influenced by the states of our bodies. These states incorporate 
the phenomenological environment and include the transformation of thought into 
action. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty laid the ontological underpinnings of the 
embodied theories of consciousness and action that are now bringing a 
phenomological understanding of the world back into current discourse, with new 
scientific realizations that a brain and a body may be far more elusive than ever 
imagined. 
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Aesthetic experiences, from the embodied perspective, can be framed as 
the creation and appreciation of the inductive process of action theory. In this 
sense, the move towards the object requires both introspection and active 
involvement. This set of ideas is the phenomenological platform on which 
interactive art exposes the self to the world; it is through the act of aesthetic 
engagement that we simultaneously require both embodied experience and 
introspection. The outcome is a human transformation of feeling. Aesthetic 
behavior becomes an entanglement with the life world as an evolutionary tract. 
Aesthetics, as a way of understanding this transformative process, can change the 
world. And it is interactive art, specifically, that serves as a phenomenological 
roadmap to the enactment of perceptual presence.  
 
Embodied Being 
The phenomenological implications of embodied aesthetics and the 
inherent qualities of interactive art necessitate the development of a new 
interdisciplinary framework for understanding them in relation to the 
transformation of embodied selves. Embodied philosophy recognizes that the 
human form largely determines the phenomenon of human consciousness. 
Cybernetics holds that the nature of the body is in the process of the posthuman 
condition. The subject in cybernetics is the cyborg. Neuroscience identifies the 
functionality of biology, which is constructive as humans begin to offload that 
functionality from carbon-based life forms to a variety of other systems based on 
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code and silicon. The convergence of these multiple perspectives on the body has 
provided a better understanding of the augmented and transitional human. This 
transitional position wreaks havoc on the ontological stand that being is an 
absolute situation and, by default, owned exclusively by the carbon-based subject. 
The relationship between the structure of the form and the functional outcomes of 
human action are in play, and the shifts that are underway expose fundamental 
questions about how the subject organizes itself as a living/extended-living form 
within a dynamic environmental system. Phenomenology is an organizational 
approach and the scientific study of the mind tends to look towards structure to 
understand cause and effect. Although there are ontological disagreements within 
the disciplines of phenomenology and philosophy of mind, it is clear that their 
overlap provides a new critical discourse for critiquing the life-based activity of 
interactive art. 
Maturana and Varela attempt to define the difference between 
organization and structure. They argue that the organization of a system consists 
of the necessary relations that define the system. The structure of a system 
consists in the actual relations among its components, which serve to integrate the 
system. Individual structures in the organization can vary provided they satisfy 
the organizational constraints of the system.161 This is an interesting model to use 
when thinking about a living/extended-living form because it suggests that there 
is an organizational system—and a variety of relations—that can differ from the 
object in which the form exists. In Maturana and Varela’s prime example, the 
autopoietic system allows for both autonomy and interrelationships between 
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objects. This makes even more sense when we apply it to the activity of subject-
artwork interaction, because it is the autonomous subject who sustains an essential 
quality of self as she engages with the other. Again, it is interaction that is part of 
the singular body’s ability to rise to a new experience while maintaining a sense 
of self. The phenomenological self exists in the immediate given within a 
dynamic structure. It is a self that provides the agency of reflexive perception, 
while it is experience that binds the self to the world. This understanding needs 
both the phenomenological and neuroscientific approaches to allow subjects to 
grow in their understanding of experience as both a personal and a shared 
phenomenon. 
 
Some Problems of Being 
The ontological problem of being remains unresolved. Philosophers who 
divide thought and action continue to propagate the cogito myth, locating the 
human essence of being within a platonic paradigm of pure thought while 
assigning the body to the oversimplified acts of processing sensations. Art history 
is also riddled with notions of the beautiful that stem from a modest 
understanding of the sensorial. Intellectual concepts are often viewed as 
disconnected from the sensory world. In this ontological misstep, the embodied 
form is impure and adulterates thought, while thought tends towards the rational, 
goal-oriented, and privileged. In contrast and according to embodied philosophy 
the human essence of thought should be part of the entire human condition and 
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the body should be part of the container. The act of thought is no longer 
considered an abstraction or underlying configuration to human activity but, 
rather, part of awareness.  
Another problem with the concept of being is that the totality of the 
human condition is imperfect. In embodied theory, existence changes with every 
action. So in a world of constant activity, nothing remains the same. This may 
appear to be self-evident, but we rarely accept this phenomenon in our everyday 
lives, and forget to make use of it in aesthetic critique. In the aesthetics of action, 
change is built into the art experience and reminds us of the temporality of all 
things. The aesthetics of action also includes the realization that all things involve 
a multiplicity of potential outcomes; the awareness of one’s own actions can 
never render a single ontological standpoint. To further complicate the situation, 
the state of being has a remarkable fluidity that takes on many forms and 
outcomes in the aesthetic experience. Subjective temporal structures guide aspects 
of behavior and cognition, distinguishing memory, perception, and anticipation, 
which are all embedded in concepts of time. The contemporary object interlocks 
with the subject in a closely knit kinship making it difficult to claim a strict 
autonomy for either. It is easy, by contrast, to see the object blending with the 
subject, both locked together in an autopoietic state of flux. It appears that the 
more we work on the problem of being—being in pursuit of a state of singular 
human existence, being as a uniquely human quality—the more nebulous our 
notion of being becomes.  
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This inability to pinpoint a precise state of humanness is important in the 
context of neuroaesthetics, because it is impossible to accurately align being with 
the reductionist system that neuroaesthetics currently deploys. As long as we are 
unable to reduce being to a single state, art as a dynamic act of being cannot be 
accurately described by neuroaesthetics alone. This argues that neuroaesthetics 
must mature, from its current ideological construction of reductionist 
methodologies, to including the situational conditions of the subject as a social 
being. The subject must be seen as part of events, just as mirror neurons are part 
of empathetic behavior (but are not its cause or raison d’être). There are many 
factors that bring a human to action and not all of them are part of a neatly 
interlocking system of human intentionality. Some are choices made by chance or 
impulse—gestures of unwitting whim. Some move towards the subject from the 
surrounding world. Some are even mistakes that turn out to change destiny. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the contemporary moment is that being can 
be flawed, or missing ontological markers altogether, and still manage to render a 
sense of reality. Interactive art capitalizes on this because it is less about realizing 
an aesthetic form than about the unusual situations that emerge from process.  
Process therefore becomes the critiqueable subject that does not stand still. 
An open system of this nature may never be accurately understood through a 
reductionist analysis, because nothing critical comes of distilling the essential 
elements of a material form, especially one that brings attention to its own 
emergent properties. Rather, it is the accumulation of events that brings all of the 
parts together in an additive and functionally negotiated process. This is why the 
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kismet that controls what happens in the future cannot be accurately predicted. 
Actions are therefore the consequences of the potential of possibilities; and the 
language of interactive art helps place us as participating beings in the world.  
Being as a question of grounding the self in the world has long been an 
issue of philosophy. This question goes to the heart of Heidegger’s existential 
analysis of a phenomenological description of Dasein. From this ontological 
position, what do we make of the transitional posthuman being? Heidegger 
perceives cybernetics as an end, and whatever comes after is a new subject of 
philosophical inquiry. Heidegger further argues that cybernetics replaces 
philosophy—that there are no ethical questions left when cybernetics becomes 
integrated with being.162 If the ethics evaporate through cybernetics, Heidegger 
argues, we are left only with a technical rendering of the world. Heidegger 
anticipated a tremendous change to humanity with the advent of modern science. 
In his 1969 essay “The End of Philosophy,” he writes that, “No prophecy is 
necessary to recognize that the sciences now establishing themselves will soon be 
determined and steered by the new fundamental science which is called 
cybernetics.”163 Heidegger agrees that technology and humanness can come 
together. It is the outcome that he concerns himself with. He continues by 
claiming that “in the Cybernetically represented world, the difference between 
automatic machines and living things disappears. . . . [T]he cybernetic world 
project, the victory of method over science, makes possible a completely uniform 
and in this sense universal calculability, in other words the controllability of the 
lifeless and the living world. In this uniformity of the cybernetic world, man too 
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gets installed.”164, 165 In his view, technology stalls the ability for the human to 
move freely in the world with the same force of will. Although Heidegger’s 
critique of cybernetics produces a termination, it is also clear that some kind of 
being prevails. It is at this juncture where human and posthuman collide—an 
ending that terminates and a beginning that opens new possibilities. In this way 
cybernetics, and the fundamental challenges it brings into being, start the world 
anew. The question then becomes, can the new being who rises from this 
termination ever find a new method to create a new poetry? 
Heidegger describes the state of being grounded as presencing—a blend of 
the words “presence” and “sensing.” Heidegger’s presencing is never in a stable 
state, but rather always in a transformative state. This is important, because 
Heidegger sees technology as a unique (perhaps historically intermediary) un-
grounding of the human. This is a very different kind of state than presencing: 
Heidegger goes so far as to suggest that technoscience retools philosophy into 
superficial theory as it attempts to work in a technological world. Bret Davis 
argues that the problem of will has long been central to Heidegger’s later thought, 
and that in the context of will, cybernetics is an imitation of being.166 Heidegger 
does not see presencing in technology—presence and sensing are attributes of his 
historical understanding of humanness. Cybernetic function is thus denied any 
ontological meaning.  
With what Heidegger claims to be a loss of self-reflection, the Cybernetic 
represents the loss of the modern epoch, or what he calls the “will to will.” 
Heidegger argues that due to technology, the will to will requires that human and 
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non-human nature be reduced to the function of “standing-reserve,” or a taking 
from humanness. “The enhancement of power,” he further explains, “is at the 
same time in itself the preservation of power.”167 Using his fundamental treatise 
on being and his deep concerns about technology, Heidegger suggests that 
Cybernetics becomes more powerful than the human can sustain. For Heidegger’s 
biological subject, a special kind of rupture between human and technology 
remains in reserve, making it unavailable to human access. 
Heidegger may be correct about technology’s interaction with the human 
subject, but only to a degree. Technology is an extension of the human ideal and, 
therefore, too easily disconnected from the unconditional uniformity of biological 
humankind. Another way to consider the human cyborg, however, is to proceed 
with the understanding that there is no axiological value to any human-made 
form, without the intervention of the human. Power, as deployed by Heidegger, is 
the struggle to retain rather than negotiate.  
Heidegger could not have imagined a situation in which the technological 
form extended the human condition in the way a contemporary cyborg does, a 
form so distant from our carbon-based being. But the Heideggerian “history of 
being” is a history of being’s oblivion as the subject’s state of unknowing. This is 
precisely what our investigation into technology deploys. Heidegger’s end 
therefore can be re-interpreted as an inability to move humankind forward. 
McLuhan would argue that as media, human-made forms are extensions of our 
selves. And, in the case of the cyborg, the subject reclaims presencing of being 
through robotic extensions. In this way, the human remains in all technology 
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because technology would have no meaning without it. No matter how complex 
the technological system, the human subject delivers back to itself in the act of 
introspection for the subject. Working with technology is not a move away from, 
but rather an oscillating return to, humanness. This return is also within the work 
of interactive art: it is the ability of the subject to identify with the object. The 
delivering back of these aesthetic qualities to the subject is essentially what we 
look for in our aesthetic experiences. The offloading of the historical being to the 
cyborg is, therefore, not the end of philosophy but a provisional reinvestment in 
the human. A fresh understanding of embodied aesthetics, therefore, is valuable in 
binding the posthuman to all of the life activities associated with the historical 
human.  
According to Heidegger, the experience of what is present signifies the 
true, unmediated experience of “the things themselves.” If there is a single truth 
presented at the moment of the presence, however, it cannot last. In Heidegger’s 
view, we can see truth for a moment and then it slips away. So the things 
themselves must also always be changing. Heidegger’s approach towards ideals 
of human perfection creates an ontological stalemate because truth does not 
transform at the same pace that beings move in time. The reminder that 
experience is both temporal and full of slippages is another important feature of 
interactive art. The subject interacts with the object in embodied time but the 
object always stands separate in some way. The possibilities of a new critique lie 
in the to-and-fro of the autopoietic exchange between the two. This also signifies 
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a move from modernism to a new form of aesthetics that provides room for the 
collision of new methodologies of inquiry regarding the subject.  
As an alternative to Heidegger, Haraway’s cyborg is almost always 
ungrounded, not of this world or tethered to human history. Yet her cyborg speaks 
of the human condition. Haraway uses the transformation of the carbon-based life 
form as a kind of freedom from the patriarchal hold on the subject.  
Each of these cyborgs extends the humanist project by providing the new 
subject a body that becomes more than the biological subject. So decentering is 
not a loss of subject, but rather a repositioning of the center that creates an 
oscillating relationship between things. For the neuroscientist, decentering may be 
the mechanisms by which the brain maintains its internal balance—processes that 
control whether a neuron relays information to other neurons or suppresses the 
transmission of information. For the interactive artist, the oscillation between 
participant and object goes to the heart of the aesthetic experience. In interactive 
art, it is this negotiation with technology, in which each looks to the other, that 
always returns us to ourselves. This dance between an organic subject and 
technology plays a fundamental role in how introspection works for the aesthetic 
subject, because it is contingent upon the subject’s relationship to the interactive 
experience. 
Being must transform as humanity evolves. What is being if being is 
disconnected from its own evolutionary and transmutable course? Here 
Heidegger’s argument has become stuck; it works from an ontological form that 
frames a singular fundamental nature of reality. Heidegger’s modernity sits 
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squarely on the ancient shoulders of Plato, who saw the world built upon a system 
of truths and untruths—art being part of the latter. And, because Plato’s world of 
appearances stems from sensory falsehoods, the subject remains oddly out of step 
with the rest of the world. In this model, art is perceived as a travesty of 
falsehood. It is time for this misunderstanding of the subject and the experience of 
art to be re-evaluated. Experience is the subject’s motivator and cannot be 
separated from the involvement of being. The world embraces the subject because 
the subject is the world. Being involves the emergent possibilities of subjects 
working together and is not a singular condition of a single entity. If presencing is 
an act of imperfection that forms the human condition, we certainly should 
embrace it as a critiqueable act of aesthetics. 
Another critical problem that constrains being stems from the cogito. 
Western metaphysics continues to privilege the thinking part of cognition over the 
physical attributes of the subject. In most metaphysical thinking, cognition 
remains an act of thought rather than an act of embodiment. But acts of being 
involve both. And the embodied being, as an active agent of change, is an 
essential attribute of contemporary aesthetics. Contemporary art is no longer 
interested in the modernity of the single subject’s experience. The century of self 
has been replaced by a situation that continually unfolds to embrace many 
subjects with divergent experiences. Furthermore, the subject is not passive. As an 
active participant, the subject uses her agency to elevate the aesthetic nature of the 
object. Aesthetics is created through seamless, endless moments of interaction. 
Aesthetic beings exist in a co-negotiated, ontological space. In addition, being is 
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always changing and emerging. There are both distinguishable choices and subtle 
or even untraceable attributes in play, so being as a participant in the aesthetic 
process must remain fluid and open to both accident and the unknowns of 
evolutionary surprise. Interactive art can describe an aesthetic domain around 
these accidents wherein participants can free themselves from the predictability 
and dread of Heidegger’s technological mastery. Active presencing as the face of 
cybernetic introspection has become the new critique. 
 
Naturalizing Aesthetic Beings 
According to philosopher Alfonsina Scarinzi, “the project of naturalizing 
human consciousness/experience has made great technical strides, but has been 
hampered in many cases by its uncritical reliance on a dualistic ‘Cartesian’ 
paradigm.”168 Her assessment is accurate if we continue to look only to the 
reductionist methodologies of most neuroscience. As an alternative to this 
historical approach, a growing group of theorists such as Scarinzi are looking to 
the new domain of embodied aesthetics. This domain draws from a rich history of 
American pragmatists such as Dewey, James, and Peirce, and encompasses the 
work of philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty, Valera, Johnson and to some extent 
Damasio. Embodied aesthetics also pulls from enactive cognitive sciences, 
motion theory, literary studies, and art history and theory to produce a fresh look 
at aesthetics.169  Embodied aesthetics is interdisciplinary at its root, not unlike the 
collision of cybernetics and art that occurred mid-century.  
  199 
It is generally accepted that aesthetic experience requires work from the 
faculty of imagination. By naturalizing aesthetics and looking at the parts of the 
brain that are activated through acts of imagination, it is possible to excavate a 
single aspect of the experience. The totality of experience, however, is not a 
question of how perception might activate imagination, but rather of how 
aesthetics and imagination may be seen as essential functions of the total 
embodied experience. Cognitive scientist Ruth M. J. Byrne has proposed that 
“everyday imaginative thoughts about counterfactual alternatives to reality may 
be based on the same cognitive processes that rational thoughts are based on.”170 
So rather than allocating imagination a position away from perception and the 
shared world, naturalizing the experience suggests that imagination is indeed part 
of the world. Following the line of Byrne’s observation, it is very possible that 
science will find that the distinctions between the facts of science and the 
fantasies of imagination may not be as contradictory as once argued. Imagination 
and rational thought have both been identified as showing activity in the occipital, 
frontoparietal, posterior parietal, medial parietal (precuneus), and dorsolateral 
prefrontal regions of the brain171—two very different outcomes sharing the same 
brain space. Imagination and rational thinking are two outcomes that we may now 
begin to realize have overlapping potential. But perhaps more importantly, when 
we consider how experiences arise, we must also always consider the issues of 
context both in the body and in the world. Bringing imagination and rational 
thought closer together is another way in which the end of simulation takes hold, 
replacing the cogito.  
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Another characteristic of naturalizing aesthetics is the consideration of the 
social subject. The social subject calibrates an object from both an internal view 
and an external environmental experience. Interactive artworks offer participants 
these kinds of internal/external projections and signals within the context of the 
artist’s frame, the process of embodied meaning-making. The artwork first, and 
perhaps foremost, helps identify the bodily physical structure as part of the 
aesthetic experience and appreciation. The subject is also essential to the work’s 
expression of meaning. The aesthetic gesture is the coalescence of an experience 
rather than the mimetic potential of the object.  
Aesthetic objects with which the subject interacts are considered, in 
Western aesthetics, to be mimetic. But the subject’s experiences are not. If 
physical and mental activity are necessarily bundled together to process 
experience, then the subject’s experience is the thing-in-itself. Because of the 
fundamentally active nature of experience, the subject undertakes experience in 
the here and now. Action and introspection work together to produce experience 
as quickly as the physical limitations of the body can process it. This is important 
to understanding aesthetics: if experience is not mimetic, then neither are the 
experiential components of aesthetics.  
 
The Materiality of Perception 
The relationship of cybernetics to systems theory and simulation models 
suggests that development of the field is heavily weighted towards mimetic and 
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symbolic structures. In 1948, however, Norbert Wiener defined cybernetics as 
“the scientific study of control and communication in the animal and the 
machine.”172 His original examination of human-machine interaction was 
grounded in the physical attributes of the tasks. Wiener was interested in the 
interactive aspects of the interrelationships of learning tasks, using pointers such 
as stimuli, oscillation, and feedback between living and mechanical systems. The 
organizational properties of both biological and mechanical systems are 
physically tethered to their material properties—this is an often-overlooked aspect 
of contemporary cybernetics. A seminal point that has emerged from Wiener’s 
work on cybernetics—and has been picked up by embodied theory—is the 
understanding that cognitive functioning must shift from predominantly 
disembodied and computational views of the subject to more embodied and 
situated views. Specifically, Wiener’s mathematical postulates have led to the 
realization that mental functions cannot be fully understood without reference to 
the physical body and the environment. Wiener would agree that while mentality 
can be abstracted, it is also a system made up of physical materials. This is the 
purposefulness in interactive art: aesthetics are inextricably tied to the embodied 
self in a way that other contemporary technological practices, such as virtual 
reality, are not. 
Behavioral aesthetics exposes the materiality of ideas and helps describe 
what might arise in the exchange of the physical processes of the body. It is 
important to note that interactive art includes both biological materialism and 
posthuman developments as part of an evolutionary trend in aesthetics. As 
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cybernetic art began to take on the physical traits of human action, the need to 
describe the particular situations for aesthetics became apparent. The more recent 
post-biological claim that organic matter no longer has a singular hold on life is a 
profound moment for aesthetics, because the aesthetic object has claimed its own 
autonomy. Sight, touch vision, smell, and taste are all sensations afforded to the 
cyborg. Baumgarten highlighted the importance of our senses in experience and 
Kant realized that the intellect must play a role in aesthetic judgment. Although 
neuroaesthetics is the neural basis for the contemplation and creation of a work of 
art, we can look back to Merleau-Ponty’s ontological body-subject, where there is 
a mutual engagement in the ever-present world frame. It is the perception, 
identification, and interpretation of sensory information that enables an 
understanding of the environment. Without perception, action would be unguided. 
Without action, perception would serve no purpose.  
The constructivist understanding, that matter and action work together, 
constitutes a conditionally open position for the subject. If all goes well in 
experience, perception and enaction combine to provide a rich environment where 
consciousness emerges and activity is the agent for invention. It is important, 
therefore, to move past the idea that the brain passively transmits impressions. We 
live in our environment—not only as observers, but also in how we act and use 
our understanding to create our world and our place in it.  
Interactive art offers responsive environments that react to many things—
most importantly to the subject. Autopoietic environments act unto themselves 
and represent a new kind of cybernetic subject. The object can also be the subject 
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and participate with its own sensory experiences. In Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
visual perception, empiricism is bound within sensory experience. When 
autopoietic systems overlap or blend with one another, they create new typologies 
according to their behavioral characteristics. The idea of the subject, therefore, 
becomes far more ambiguous than in the past. The activity of aesthetic 
experiences becomes a discovery of how we lose ourselves and then find 
ourselves again. 
 
Disruptive and Decentered Beings 
Being is anything but a passive process. A sounding of Heidegger’s 
cybernetic alarm is perhaps a pointer to a watershed in contemporary 
philosophical development—the un-grounding of the subject from all 
metaphysical underpinnings. The decentering of the subject is an outcome of this 
technological experiment, and interactive art performs an essential role for future 
agencies. 
The next era of human evolution with cyborgs does not imply the end of 
humanity. Not only will biological, unmodified humans exist in the far future, 
they will always reserve the right to stay that way. Transhumans and posthumans 
are likely to exist (whether they are genetically modified, cybernetic, or digital) as 
part of a new diversity of subject. Through prosthetics, cyborgs are functioning 
and capable of substituting motor, sensory, or cognitive modalities. Near-future 
functional applications include neural enhancements, advanced cognitive features, 
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and extended physiological senses. The next-generation brain-to-computer 
interfaces will be used for assisting, augmenting, or repairing human cognitive or 
sensory-motor functions and will communicate thoughts and intentions to a 
cyborg for augmented functionality. Brain-to-brain interfaces that translate 
thoughts, sensations, or impulses into digital signals already exist in experimental 
states.  
Alongside the work of the scientist and the researcher, the artist works to 
critique the human experience by constantly re-evaluating her position relative to 
herself and to others. The interactive artist challenges historical ideas of the 
body’s particular regions and discrete boundaries, exposing these as far more 
malleable than previously thought. Interactive art can help express the complexity 
of the body through the performative, introspective, and energetic qualities of 
being with, and being of, the art. 
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